Archive for European Union

Why the EU Should Reconsider Renegotiating the 2016 EU-Turkey Migration Deal

Guest Contributor Ali Cain is an M.A. Candidate in the European History, Politics and Society Program at Columbia University. She is additionally the Program Coordinator for the Cardozo Law Institute in Holocaust and Human Rights (CLIHHR). Her research interests include populism, refugee rights and transatlantic relations.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has used over 4 million refugees in Turkey as political blackmail against the European Union (EU). Leveraging the 2016 EU-Turkey Migration Deal, Erdogan has consistently threatened to “open the floodgates” and allow refugees to cross into neighboring Greece whenever his demands are not  met. Previous demands have included quicker EU accession talks, European support for a refugee safe zone in northern Syria, and more funding to support refugees.

 In late February 2020, Russian and Syrian government forces attacked the Syrian province of Idlib, forcing thousands to flee into northwest Turkey. In response, Erdogan finally fulfilled his threats and allowed thousands of refugees to leave, even providing buses for transportation to the Greek border. Upon arrival, refugees were greeted with tear gas, barricades and shouts to go back home. Videos later surfaced of the Greek Coast Guard circling refugee boats in what looked like an effort to both deter them from landing but also capsize them. The New York Times further reported that the Greek Coast Guard beat migrants with sticks and shot at them, resulting in the death of a Syrian refugee. Worryingly, the EU’s willpower and ability to address this crisis and reinvigorate the discussion over modifications to Europe’s Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is substantially reduced as it now faces the surmounting challenge of tackling COVID-19. 

In discussing this new migration crisis, the EU has taken a defensive position in calling for the protection of Europe’s borders. Instead of using this opportunity to reinitiate a conversation on a “fresh start” for Europe’s asylum system as she advocated for during her consideration for EU Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen instead commended Greece for being Europe’s shield and offered its government €700 million ($769,968,000) of aid, €350 million ($384,984,000) of which would go to strengthening Greece’s border control. While offering support to Greece, Ms. von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel also visited Turkey to discuss renegotiating the 2016 EU-Turkey Migration Deal. At the height of the 2015 refugee crisis, the EU and Turkey agreed that each individual who arrived at the Greek border by boat and/or without official permission would be returned to Turkey, as it is considered a safe country for “irregular” migrants. In exchange for every individual sent to Turkey, a Syrian would be accepted into an EU member state. The EU initially agreed to provide €3 billion ($3,299,860,000) of assistance to the Turkish government to fund on-the-ground projects for refugees. 

Since the agreement was finalized, Erdogan has demanded more funding and the EU has obliged, increasing its contributions to €6 billion ($6,599,720,000) and extending its support of projects until 2025. Other parts of the deal have faltered; the EU agreed to visa liberalization for Turkish citizens and a reinvigoration of accession discussions regarding Turkey joining the EU. However, there has been little movement on both of these commitments due to Erdogan’s growing usurpation of power which has led to an increased crackdown on opposition, heightened violence towards the Kurdish community, and greater involvement in the Syrian conflict. The EU has additionally failed to accept its agreed exchange of Syrian refugees. Only 27,000 have been resettled since 2016. 

Many European governments would see the original agreement as a logistical success given that its goal was to deter refugees from coming to Europe. Yet, although migration from Turkey has fallen by 97%, a crisis still remains. Turkey is growing increasingly unsafe for refugees. The renegotiation of this deal would allow Erdogan to continue fostering an unsafe environment, pressure Europe into more funding, infringe on refugee’s human rights and further challenge Europe’s human rights commitments. 

First and foremost, Turkey does not meet and will not meet the EU’s standards for accession. Since a 2016 coup attempt, Erdogan has made Turkey, which was once applauded as a successful Muslim democracy, into an increasingly authoritarian state. Following the coup, he fired thousands of government workers, educators, and military members and arrested many of them for “anti-state” crimes. He then issued a referendum in 2017, allowing him to consolidate executive power by controlling elections, intervening in the judiciary, and appointing ministers directly. This power grab led to international outcry, including from the EU who referred to the constitutional changes as a “big setback for democracy.”  

Turkey’s increasingly authoritarian state is best exemplified in its status as the biggest jailer of journalists by the Committee to Protect Journalists and its ranking as “not free” by Freedom House. Erdogan’s actions clearly violate Europe’s commitment to human rights and its principles for the accession process; any previous reforms that satisfied the EU’s conditions for membership should now be considered completely null and void. Therefore, a renegotiation of this deal that commits to reassessing Turkish accession is not only woefully misguided but jeopardizes the human rights standards and legal commitments the EU is obligated to uphold. 

Second, refugees in Turkey are facing increasingly hostile conditions due to rising unemployment and growing xenophobia that conflict with Turkey’s status as a safe country. There are over 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. 64% of those living in Turkish cities are living at or below the poverty line because it is extremely challenging for refugees to obtain working permits. Unemployment in Turkey is now at 13%. 

This had contributed to an increase in xenophobic sentiment among Turkish society. It has been reported that 60-80% of Turks  want Syrian refugees out. Violence has begun to occur, with Syrian owned stores being attacked in July 2019 after a false rumor about a Syrian sexually assaulting a minor was circulated. The hashtag #ÜlkemdeSuriyeliIstemiyorum (I don’t want Syrians in my country) has become prominent throughout Turkish social media. 

This public pressure, as well as the clear strain on Turkey’s social services, has led to increased deportations. There is a lack of accountability in ensuring asylum procedures are lawfully carried out. Turkey is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and is therefore required to not only protect refugees but also uphold the international legal principle of non-refoulment which mandates that refugees cannot be sent back to countries where they will face human rights violations.  A 2019 investigation by Refugees International found that Turkish authorities were increasingly stopping Syrian refugees to check their identification papers and accelerating deportations to Syria, many of which were forced returns. Furthermore, Erdogan has sought to resettle Syrian refugees in a “safe zone” controlled by American backed Kurdish forces. Many have criticized this plan, including the Europeans. A resettlement in northern Syria, where violence continues, not only threatens refugees but also enflames Turkey’s tensions with the Kurds. Although this plan is at a stand-still, Erdogan continues to seek out and demand support, using his release of refugees into Europe as political bait.  

Finally, the 2016 deal has allowed for conditions to also worsen for refugees in Greece. Those who arrived in Greece following the agreement were prohibited from crossing into mainland Europe, resulting in refugees having to seek asylum in Greece or face immediate deportation to Turkey. Because the deal mandates that all of those who fail to qualify for asylum be deported, Greek authorities must detain everyone who is considered to have entered Greece irregularly, which has led to overcrowding in detention centers. An estimated 40,000 people live in facilities built for 6,000. Conditions in these camps are dire; Amnesty International reported those detained on the Greek islands of Lesbos and Chios had “no access to legal aid, limited access to services and support, and hardly any information about their status or possible fate.” The Greek islands have thus become a prison of both limbo and inhumane living conditions for asylum seekers. According to the New York Times, Greece has detained migrants at secret detention centers and is sending them to Turkey without any due process on their asylum claims. Although Greece does have the right to detain those who enter its borders, it is nevertheless obliged by international law to give each asylum applicant a fair and timely consideration. 

Additionally, the European Commission announced it would offer €2,000 ($2,199) to those living in Greek detention camps who voluntarily agreed to return home. Although the Commission stated that the intended recipients of this funding are economic migrants and not refugees, poor camp conditions and severely delayed asylum decisions could put pressure on refugees to return to their home countries. It is also questionable how many economic migrants are in Greece, considering that most individuals are from war-torn Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead of trying to buy out migrants in returning home to potentially unstable states, the Commission could instead use its funding to better improve the living conditions in detention facilities and support Greece’s government in processing its asylum applications more efficiently. 

Turkey’s concerns about the refugee crisis  are not totally unfounded as it is the largest host country in the world. Considerable strain has been placed on its social services and its population. Hosting four million refugees in a country that is struggling economically is not an easy task. However, growing anti-refugee sentiment and the subsequent harms to the refugee population in the country is one of many clear signals that the EU should not renegotiate its 2016 deal with Turkey. Rather, steps ought to be taken to address the structural causes of such a high number of refugees forced to leave their homes. The EU should not allow itself to continue to be in Erdogan’s chokehold; by continuing its “payer not player” status in using funds as a conflict resolution mechanism instead of diplomacy and mediation, the EU is helping to prolong violence in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Although the world is currently occupied with COVID-19, and rightfully so, the EU will have to return to its discussion on migration reform eventually.  When it does, it has moral and legal obligations to protect refugees and to figure out a solution that is dependent on European states and international law, not Erdogan’s will. 

A Fresh Start in EU Migration Policy: Re-examining the Dublin Regulation

Guest Contributor Ali Cain is an M.A. Candidate in the European History, Politics and Society Program at Columbia University. She is additionally the Program Coordinator for the Cardozo Law Institute in Holocaust and Human Rights (CLIHHR). Her research interests include populism, refugee rights and transatlantic relations.

During her 2019 candidacy for European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen proposed a New Pact on Migration and Asylum to “relaunch the Dublin reform of asylum rules.” Ms. von der Leyen is correct: Europe’s asylum system needs a fresh start. The Dublin Regulation III mandates that asylum seekers register upon arrival in the first European Union (EU) member state he or she enters. At the refugee crisis’ peak in 2015, 1.3 million asylum seekers and migrants arrived in Europe. Many traveled through the Mediterranean Sea, designating Italy and Greece as first ports of entry and, therefore, responsible for processing asylum claims. The influx of asylum seekers has led to immense strains on local governments, inciting animosity against refugees and creating a significant backlog of asylum decisions. 

According to Politico, there is a backlog of 90,000 asylum cases in Greece alone. The Greek government recently released a plan to create a “floating wall” to block migration routes on the Aegean Sea and will soon begin construction of closed detention centers that will limit the movement of asylum seekers. At a press conference on February 27, the Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis explicitly told those who do not qualify for international protection to “not come to Greece”, and warned that they will remain stuck on the islands until they are returned home. Although Greece’s treatment of refugees is appalling, their actions and rhetoric towards refugees demonstrates the depths of desperation which border states are being driven to due to EU inaction. To complicate issues further, the EU received its highest numbers of asylum applications since 2015; the European Asylum Support Office reported that 714,2000 applications were received in 2019. Future migration crises are inevitable, especially given climate change as an increasingly central driver of forced displacement. Commission President von der Leyen must prioritize the reform of the Dublin Regulation to create a cohesive asylum process in Europe. 

The Dublin Convention was created in 1997 in response to the Schengen Zone’s development. Under the Convention and its succeeding regulations, geographic arrival points determine state responsibility for refugees. The number of refugees already present in a state are not taken into consideration when determining relocation destinations or places of stay during the processing of asylum applications. Although the Dublin Framework includes rights for refugees that are already solidified under international law, including family unification and speedy asylum decisions, those rights are not enforced equally among EU member states. Following the 2015 refugee crisis, the EU began to discuss reforming the Dublin system to include burden-sharing measures and increased human rights protections. The European Commission proposed a reallocation quota determined by each country’s population and gross domestic product (GDP). The European Parliament suggested amendments to the Commission’s proposal also to include family reunification and prior residence/study in relocation decisions. The European Council must decide whether to implement burden-sharing provisions, but has been divided on the best way to actually relocate refugees since December 2018. The Visegrád countries – Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia – have refused to accept refugees or abide by quotas.

As a result of Council gridlock, member states have relied heavily on third-party agreements to curb migration. These agreements have been successful in achieving the EU’s overall goal of curbing migration but pose threats to human rights and are not sustainable in the long-term. Although the EU’s 2016 deal with Turkey led to a 97% decrease in migration from Turkey to Greece, 3RP reported that over 64% of the 3.6 million refugees living in Turkey are living in poverty. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced plans for the “voluntary” resettlement of refugees in a “peace zone” in Northern Syria. Pushing refugees to return to Syria would violate non-refoulement standards under international law, which mandates that a host country cannot return asylum seekers to a country where they would be in danger or would be persecuted. Furthermore, President Erdogan announced on February 27, 2020 that Turkish authorities will not prohibit Syrian refugees from leaving Turkey to go to Europe, as Turkey is facing an influx of Syrian refugees from Idlib due to recent attacks by the Assad government and Russia. This recent announcement demonstrates the precise issue with third-party agreements: they provide short term reprive for host countries but kick the can of dealing with refugees down the road at refugees’ expense.  

The EU-Turkey deal also has implications for those already in Europe. For example, thousands of refugees are stranded on the Greek island of Lesbos as the EU-Turkey agreement prohibits their arrival on mainland Greece. Most recently, protests against inhumane living conditions broke out at the Moria refugee camp, where 20,000 refugees are cramped into facilities built to house 3,000 individuals. These conditions, which are common in many refugee camps throughout Europe, infringe on basic human rights secured under international conventions, including the 1951 Refugee Convention.  The EU’s 2015 Emergency Trust Fund for Africa has decreased economic factors that encourage migration from Africa by providing over 50,000 jobs and improving living standards. However, as explained in a recent Oxfam report, European investment in specific countries and regions is tied to migration levels stemming from each origin country. Addressing underlying societal issues like poverty and inequality, and political issues like corruption is not tied to aid. The EU also increasingly has depended upon the Libyan Coast Guard for search and rescue (SAR) missions, which intercept boats and return passengers to Libya. Those sent back to Libya face torture and trafficking in detention centers run by both the government and militias. Forced returns to Libya also violates the principle of non-refoulement.

A report released by the European Council on Foreign Relations argues that member states may now be more open to asylum relocations and burden sharing. In July 2019, fourteen states signed a solidarity mechanism, pledging to relocate migrants across the EU. In September 2019, Italy’s staunchly anti-migrant interior minister Matteo Salvini was recently replaced by migration specialist Luciana Lamorgese in September 2019. Italy’s migration policies have already begun to change as private charity’s boats can now dock at Italian ports. Additionally, a recent European Council on Foreign Relations survey found that a majority of EU citizens no longer see migration as the most pressing issue of concern. Instead, survey respondents reported “health, housing unemployment, and living costs as standout issues.” Although it is easy to get caught up in the pessimism of current EU affairs, all European countries can agree that the current system under the Dublin Regulation is not working. A November 2019 EU Council Presidency report acknowledges the importance of the EU speaking in one voice about migration and concludes that “the more members states have the perception that EU legislation is meeting their concrete needs and taking into account their administrative realities, the more likely it is that the implementation will be successful.” The new Commission’s expressed interest in reforming the CEAS and the designation of €949 million ($1,039,120,000) to the EU’s Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund presents an opportunity for reform. The EU has also pledged 30.8 billion ($41,608,700,000) for immigration and border control issues in the 2021-2027 budget.  Furthermore, the conclusion of Brexit provides a pivotal moment for the remaining 27 member states to reestablish the EU’s joint efforts and cohesiveness.

Migration is one of the most complicated and emotionally-driven issues to nation-states, as it heightens various concerns regarding economic and cultural security. The EU’s current approach in relying on third-party agreements, increasing general border control, and remaining gridlocked over how to better distribute refugees throughout Europe is a significant problem. Border states, especially Greece, and larger financially stable states like Germany, cannot be solely responsible for asylum seekers. The European Commission must push states to reopen discussions and negotiations on reforming the Dublin Regulation.

Will Brexit Setback Human Rights Protections in the United Kingdom?

Brian Dan is a guest contributor from the University of Strathclyde and a L.L.M. candidate in human rights law

Is Brexit just a snag in European Union integration without accompanying regression in human rights legislation? Of course not. Brexit signals a backsliding in human rights protections and imperils the closest thing to a constitutional framework for human rights in the United Kingdom.

The U.K. has over 40 years of EU law transposed into its own laws. Together, the EU laws, which are supreme to the domestic laws of the EU states; the Common Law system of England and Wales, which is law created by judges in courts; and the legislative directives of the Council of Europe, an international organization comprised of 47 European states, constitute an overarching, legally-binding system for the promotion, respect and protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

The human rights protections provided to British citizens by the U.K.’s membership in the EU and Council of Europe are distinct but also complementary. The EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights, which established the European Court of Human Rights as the apex interpretative body of EU law, all contribute to the human rights framework that protects citizens in the U.K. However, it is not the U.K. government’s intention to retain all EU law following Brexit. Instead, it has introduced what is now published as the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, which will end the supremacy of EU law in the U.K. legal system when passed.  

For any U.K. electorate, the decision not to transpose the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights— one of the main instruments governing human rights protection in the EU— into domestic law via the withdrawal bill should cause concern. It means British citizens will be stripped of some of the legal protections guaranteed by the Charter if no equivalent legislative interventions are put in place.

This could mean a reduction in human rights and procedural remedies in areas within the scope of EU law. These areas include privacy, data protection and the right to a fair hearing, to name a few. The General Data Protection Regulation of the EU, passed in 2018, hinged on the Charter, for instance. It is currently directly applicable in the U.K. and affords  British citizens an elevated degree of personal data privacy and protection that expands on the protections offered by the UK Data Protection Act of 1998. The introduction of the right to be forgotten, for example, provides an obligation to erase any personal data held by an organization upon request by the right holder, the obligation to ensure that personal data is collected only after explicit consent, and the right to access personal data upon request in a readable and portable format, rights which are some of the data security protections accorded to all EU citizens. There are currently no immediate equivalent protections in U.K. domestic law.

Pro-EU protests in the aftermath of the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, 2016. // ilovetheeu// Creative Commons

It would also mean the loss of a backstop of protection against regression to the national laws in areas such as anti-discrimination, environmental protections, workers’ rights, access to social security, and health care and consumer rights.

Furthermore, an EU exit represents the loss of the oversight role by the European Court of Justice over the U.K. in observance of its human rights obligations under EU laws. The Court of Justice has long protected fundamental rights by interpreting them as general principles of EU law for the last three decades.

It is clear that the elimination of European oversight over the many social gains exposes these guarantees to governmental attack and other mechanisms for dilution post-Brexit. As the situation stands, removal of legal protections may not even involve substantive parliamentary oversight. Historically, the U.K. government has strongly opposed much of Europe’s social rights agenda. So, only time will tell if Brexit will mean the end of many social rights protection in the U.K. The collective right of EU citizens were established at different times and in different ways, and the Charter was designed to summarize all the personal, civic, political, economic and social rights into one binding instrument.

At the moment, the U.K. has several layers of human rights protection frameworks that directly and indirectly impact its legal mechanisms in place to uphold fundamental individual rights. Where common law falls short, the U.K. courts rely on the jurisprudence of its affiliated regional and judicial institutions: The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights. This means the U.K. courts are obligated to consider the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and act within the case law jurisprudence developed by it, not to regress from it and therefore undermine the level of protection afforded to UK citizens. Equally, the U.K. parliament and the executive are bound by its decisions as a State obligation under international law.

Of importance to note is that while the Charter’s direct applicability in the U.K. ends on “exit day,” the protection derived from the European Convention on Human Rights and the subsidiarity role of the European Court of Human Rights will remain unaffected. The U.K. still remains a member to the Council of Europe whose membership is hinged on ratification of its convention. In fact, the Council’s mandate revolves around the objectives of the Convention, and all 47 members states must be contracting signatories to the law.  

The Debate: Fundamental Rights Protections Post-Brexit

Much of the discussion at this stage is necessarily speculative as “exit day” has yet to arrive; even the provisions of the European Withdrawal Bill, with the amendments from the House of Commons set to be returned to the House of Lords, may not reach the statute book in their final form. The whole decoupling process is a beehive of uncertainties, at least for now. No final negotiation terms have yet been reached, and the stalemate seems not only to be in Brussels, the decoupling negotiation seat, but also at number 10 Downing Street.

At the moment, while the government remains adamant in its response to parliament that there will be no rights regression, the Joint Committee on Human Rights,  a select committee of both the House of Commons and House of Lords, remains unsatisfied with these answers. Some believe the disapplication of the Charter will not only result in a regression in rights protection but also create legal uncertainties. As general principles of EU law, the Charter rights form the anchorage upon which most legislation is established.

Human rights activists are calling for a reevaluation of Brexit, and a recent advisory case by anti-Brexiters in Edinburgh has expressed that the U.K. could still stay in the European Union if, for example, the current withdrawal stalemate continues and the resultant negotiation terms in the European Union Withdrawal Bill are rejected by Parliament. However, at the moment, there are no immediate indications as to when the court of sessions in Edinburgh will set down the case for a full hearing. While the opinion may take a long time to come, it remains worthy for consideration before “exit day” arrives.


Brian Dan is a human rights LLM candidate at the University of Strathclyde in the United Kingdom focusing on the United Nations human rights law system. His research interests lie in economic, social and cultural rights, and international law in general. He is currently a researcher at the Centre for the Study of Human Rights Law at the University of Strathclyde.

Viktor Orbán’s Hungary: A Nationalist Government Within the European Union

By Bárbara Matias, an M.A. student in human rights

In late May, thousands of Hungarians marched against Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s educational reform laws subduing foreign universities and non-governmental organizations. The educational reforms were the latest in a series of clashes between the right-wing Hungarian government and the European Union (EU); the protests yet another manifestation of civil society’s mobilization against Orbán’s opposition to EU frameworks. On May 1, the 13th anniversary of Hungary’s accession to the EU, for example, thousands took to the streets in a pro-EU rally, suitably called “We Belong to Europe.’’

This past April, Prime Minister Orbán and Hungary’s parliament passed an amendment to Hungary’s national law on higher education, tightening regulations on independent and foreign-funded universities. Specifically, the law targets the Central European University (CEU), a Budapest-based university founded by Hungarian-born American financier George Soros and accredited in the United States and Hungary since 1993. The current government under Orbán sought legal means to shut the university down, viewing it as a foreign NGO whose liberal and internationalist teachings undermine the power of the elected government.

Hungarians marched against Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in April 2017 // jennifer.ang // Fickr

The act defines new requirements such as opening a campus in the country of accreditation and tightening bilateral agreements between Hungary and the university’s country of origin, in this case, the United States. It pushes back against globalization and liberalism, and further threatens to slide the country into an authoritarian state. As academics worldwide and international organizations condemned the passage of this law, Lydia Gall, Balkans and Eastern Europe researcher at Human Rights Watch, stated, “The Hungarian government’s contempt for critical voices in society and academic freedom is unworthy of an EU member state.”

Hungary has been under the current administration of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s national conservative rule since 2010. Openly skeptical of EU integration, Orbán said in May 2014 during the European Union elections that Hungary “must tell Brussels loudly and resolutely: respect the Hungarians!” He quickly opposed the EU Commission’s mandatory quotas for relocating migrants, calling a national referendum to vote on the EU plan, which prompted EU representatives to question how such a referendum “would fit into the decision-making process which was agreed to by all member states, including Hungary, under EU treaties.”

Viktor Orbán // Creative Commons

The referendum sought to legitimize the government’s conservative, anti-European and anti-immigration stance through a popular domestic vote – in fact, Orbán spent 10 bn Hungarian forints (around €30m) campaigning for the ‘No’ vote and feeding the concerns of the electorate.

Prime Minister Orbán also notably sparked outrage in 2013, by amending the country’s constitution to boost his executive powers. At the time, German media outlet Der Spiegel noted, “In other words, a country at the center of the European Union is moving away from the principles of freedom, democracy and the rule of law.’’

In 2014, the Hungarian Prime Minister incensed EU counterparts once more by claiming that the EU does not deter Hungary from “building an illiberal new state based on economic hardship.” In 2015, Orbán similarly faced European outcry by stating that he believes the death penalty should be put back on the government’s agenda – even as a total ban of capital punishment is enshrined in both the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (Article 2 reads that “no one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed’’) and the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 1 of the 13th Protocol establishes that “the death penalty shall be abolished’’).

Protest in April 2017 against Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in solidarity with CEU // jennifer.ang // Fickr

Most recently, with the amended education law, the Hungarian government has once more challenged core values of the union it belongs to. Article 13 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU states that “the arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint” and “academic freedom shall be respected,’’ much like Article 14 safeguards the right to education. EU officials finally launched an infringement procedure against Hungary in late April, demanding that is either justify or amend its breaches to EU human rights and open-market standards, at the risk of a referral to the European Court of Justice and possible fines.

Clearly, there is an evident downward spiral of human rights and rule-of-law in Hungary as Prime Minister Orbán insists on continuing to defy EU standards of academic freedom and democratic governance. As EU citizens and rights-holders, Hungarian’s freedoms remain at risk under Orbán’s repressive crackdowns and government of supranationalism.

Bárbara Matias is an M.A. candidate at the Institute for the Study of Human Rights at Columbia University. Her research interests include refugee rights, forced displacement, and human rights affairs in the context of the European Union.