Archive for EU

A Fresh Start in EU Migration Policy: Re-examining the Dublin Regulation

Guest Contributor Ali Cain is an M.A. Candidate in the European History, Politics and Society Program at Columbia University. She is additionally the Program Coordinator for the Cardozo Law Institute in Holocaust and Human Rights (CLIHHR). Her research interests include populism, refugee rights and transatlantic relations.

During her 2019 candidacy for European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen proposed a New Pact on Migration and Asylum to “relaunch the Dublin reform of asylum rules.” Ms. von der Leyen is correct: Europe’s asylum system needs a fresh start. The Dublin Regulation III mandates that asylum seekers register upon arrival in the first European Union (EU) member state he or she enters. At the refugee crisis’ peak in 2015, 1.3 million asylum seekers and migrants arrived in Europe. Many traveled through the Mediterranean Sea, designating Italy and Greece as first ports of entry and, therefore, responsible for processing asylum claims. The influx of asylum seekers has led to immense strains on local governments, inciting animosity against refugees and creating a significant backlog of asylum decisions. 

According to Politico, there is a backlog of 90,000 asylum cases in Greece alone. The Greek government recently released a plan to create a “floating wall” to block migration routes on the Aegean Sea and will soon begin construction of closed detention centers that will limit the movement of asylum seekers. At a press conference on February 27, the Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis explicitly told those who do not qualify for international protection to “not come to Greece”, and warned that they will remain stuck on the islands until they are returned home. Although Greece’s treatment of refugees is appalling, their actions and rhetoric towards refugees demonstrates the depths of desperation which border states are being driven to due to EU inaction. To complicate issues further, the EU received its highest numbers of asylum applications since 2015; the European Asylum Support Office reported that 714,2000 applications were received in 2019. Future migration crises are inevitable, especially given climate change as an increasingly central driver of forced displacement. Commission President von der Leyen must prioritize the reform of the Dublin Regulation to create a cohesive asylum process in Europe. 

The Dublin Convention was created in 1997 in response to the Schengen Zone’s development. Under the Convention and its succeeding regulations, geographic arrival points determine state responsibility for refugees. The number of refugees already present in a state are not taken into consideration when determining relocation destinations or places of stay during the processing of asylum applications. Although the Dublin Framework includes rights for refugees that are already solidified under international law, including family unification and speedy asylum decisions, those rights are not enforced equally among EU member states. Following the 2015 refugee crisis, the EU began to discuss reforming the Dublin system to include burden-sharing measures and increased human rights protections. The European Commission proposed a reallocation quota determined by each country’s population and gross domestic product (GDP). The European Parliament suggested amendments to the Commission’s proposal also to include family reunification and prior residence/study in relocation decisions. The European Council must decide whether to implement burden-sharing provisions, but has been divided on the best way to actually relocate refugees since December 2018. The Visegrád countries – Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia – have refused to accept refugees or abide by quotas.

As a result of Council gridlock, member states have relied heavily on third-party agreements to curb migration. These agreements have been successful in achieving the EU’s overall goal of curbing migration but pose threats to human rights and are not sustainable in the long-term. Although the EU’s 2016 deal with Turkey led to a 97% decrease in migration from Turkey to Greece, 3RP reported that over 64% of the 3.6 million refugees living in Turkey are living in poverty. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced plans for the “voluntary” resettlement of refugees in a “peace zone” in Northern Syria. Pushing refugees to return to Syria would violate non-refoulement standards under international law, which mandates that a host country cannot return asylum seekers to a country where they would be in danger or would be persecuted. Furthermore, President Erdogan announced on February 27, 2020 that Turkish authorities will not prohibit Syrian refugees from leaving Turkey to go to Europe, as Turkey is facing an influx of Syrian refugees from Idlib due to recent attacks by the Assad government and Russia. This recent announcement demonstrates the precise issue with third-party agreements: they provide short term reprive for host countries but kick the can of dealing with refugees down the road at refugees’ expense.  

The EU-Turkey deal also has implications for those already in Europe. For example, thousands of refugees are stranded on the Greek island of Lesbos as the EU-Turkey agreement prohibits their arrival on mainland Greece. Most recently, protests against inhumane living conditions broke out at the Moria refugee camp, where 20,000 refugees are cramped into facilities built to house 3,000 individuals. These conditions, which are common in many refugee camps throughout Europe, infringe on basic human rights secured under international conventions, including the 1951 Refugee Convention.  The EU’s 2015 Emergency Trust Fund for Africa has decreased economic factors that encourage migration from Africa by providing over 50,000 jobs and improving living standards. However, as explained in a recent Oxfam report, European investment in specific countries and regions is tied to migration levels stemming from each origin country. Addressing underlying societal issues like poverty and inequality, and political issues like corruption is not tied to aid. The EU also increasingly has depended upon the Libyan Coast Guard for search and rescue (SAR) missions, which intercept boats and return passengers to Libya. Those sent back to Libya face torture and trafficking in detention centers run by both the government and militias. Forced returns to Libya also violates the principle of non-refoulement.

A report released by the European Council on Foreign Relations argues that member states may now be more open to asylum relocations and burden sharing. In July 2019, fourteen states signed a solidarity mechanism, pledging to relocate migrants across the EU. In September 2019, Italy’s staunchly anti-migrant interior minister Matteo Salvini was recently replaced by migration specialist Luciana Lamorgese in September 2019. Italy’s migration policies have already begun to change as private charity’s boats can now dock at Italian ports. Additionally, a recent European Council on Foreign Relations survey found that a majority of EU citizens no longer see migration as the most pressing issue of concern. Instead, survey respondents reported “health, housing unemployment, and living costs as standout issues.” Although it is easy to get caught up in the pessimism of current EU affairs, all European countries can agree that the current system under the Dublin Regulation is not working. A November 2019 EU Council Presidency report acknowledges the importance of the EU speaking in one voice about migration and concludes that “the more members states have the perception that EU legislation is meeting their concrete needs and taking into account their administrative realities, the more likely it is that the implementation will be successful.” The new Commission’s expressed interest in reforming the CEAS and the designation of €949 million ($1,039,120,000) to the EU’s Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund presents an opportunity for reform. The EU has also pledged 30.8 billion ($41,608,700,000) for immigration and border control issues in the 2021-2027 budget.  Furthermore, the conclusion of Brexit provides a pivotal moment for the remaining 27 member states to reestablish the EU’s joint efforts and cohesiveness.

Migration is one of the most complicated and emotionally-driven issues to nation-states, as it heightens various concerns regarding economic and cultural security. The EU’s current approach in relying on third-party agreements, increasing general border control, and remaining gridlocked over how to better distribute refugees throughout Europe is a significant problem. Border states, especially Greece, and larger financially stable states like Germany, cannot be solely responsible for asylum seekers. The European Commission must push states to reopen discussions and negotiations on reforming the Dublin Regulation.

Viktor Orbán’s Hungary: A Nationalist Government Within the European Union

By Bárbara Matias, an M.A. student in human rights

In late May, thousands of Hungarians marched against Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s educational reform laws subduing foreign universities and non-governmental organizations. The educational reforms were the latest in a series of clashes between the right-wing Hungarian government and the European Union (EU); the protests yet another manifestation of civil society’s mobilization against Orbán’s opposition to EU frameworks. On May 1, the 13th anniversary of Hungary’s accession to the EU, for example, thousands took to the streets in a pro-EU rally, suitably called “We Belong to Europe.’’

This past April, Prime Minister Orbán and Hungary’s parliament passed an amendment to Hungary’s national law on higher education, tightening regulations on independent and foreign-funded universities. Specifically, the law targets the Central European University (CEU), a Budapest-based university founded by Hungarian-born American financier George Soros and accredited in the United States and Hungary since 1993. The current government under Orbán sought legal means to shut the university down, viewing it as a foreign NGO whose liberal and internationalist teachings undermine the power of the elected government.

Hungarians marched against Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in April 2017 // jennifer.ang // Fickr

The act defines new requirements such as opening a campus in the country of accreditation and tightening bilateral agreements between Hungary and the university’s country of origin, in this case, the United States. It pushes back against globalization and liberalism, and further threatens to slide the country into an authoritarian state. As academics worldwide and international organizations condemned the passage of this law, Lydia Gall, Balkans and Eastern Europe researcher at Human Rights Watch, stated, “The Hungarian government’s contempt for critical voices in society and academic freedom is unworthy of an EU member state.”

Hungary has been under the current administration of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s national conservative rule since 2010. Openly skeptical of EU integration, Orbán said in May 2014 during the European Union elections that Hungary “must tell Brussels loudly and resolutely: respect the Hungarians!” He quickly opposed the EU Commission’s mandatory quotas for relocating migrants, calling a national referendum to vote on the EU plan, which prompted EU representatives to question how such a referendum “would fit into the decision-making process which was agreed to by all member states, including Hungary, under EU treaties.”

Viktor Orbán // Creative Commons

The referendum sought to legitimize the government’s conservative, anti-European and anti-immigration stance through a popular domestic vote – in fact, Orbán spent 10 bn Hungarian forints (around €30m) campaigning for the ‘No’ vote and feeding the concerns of the electorate.

Prime Minister Orbán also notably sparked outrage in 2013, by amending the country’s constitution to boost his executive powers. At the time, German media outlet Der Spiegel noted, “In other words, a country at the center of the European Union is moving away from the principles of freedom, democracy and the rule of law.’’

In 2014, the Hungarian Prime Minister incensed EU counterparts once more by claiming that the EU does not deter Hungary from “building an illiberal new state based on economic hardship.” In 2015, Orbán similarly faced European outcry by stating that he believes the death penalty should be put back on the government’s agenda – even as a total ban of capital punishment is enshrined in both the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (Article 2 reads that “no one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed’’) and the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 1 of the 13th Protocol establishes that “the death penalty shall be abolished’’).

Protest in April 2017 against Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in solidarity with CEU // jennifer.ang // Fickr

Most recently, with the amended education law, the Hungarian government has once more challenged core values of the union it belongs to. Article 13 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU states that “the arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint” and “academic freedom shall be respected,’’ much like Article 14 safeguards the right to education. EU officials finally launched an infringement procedure against Hungary in late April, demanding that is either justify or amend its breaches to EU human rights and open-market standards, at the risk of a referral to the European Court of Justice and possible fines.

Clearly, there is an evident downward spiral of human rights and rule-of-law in Hungary as Prime Minister Orbán insists on continuing to defy EU standards of academic freedom and democratic governance. As EU citizens and rights-holders, Hungarian’s freedoms remain at risk under Orbán’s repressive crackdowns and government of supranationalism.

Bárbara Matias is an M.A. candidate at the Institute for the Study of Human Rights at Columbia University. Her research interests include refugee rights, forced displacement, and human rights affairs in the context of the European Union.

 

EU Special Representative for Human Rights, Stavros Lambrinidis, visits Columbia University

 

EU SR Lambrinidis and Yasmine

By Jillian Carson, Program Coordinator, ISHR

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On Thursday October 3rd, the Institute for the Study of Human Rights (ISHR), the Blinken European Institute and the Harriman Institute hosted Stavros Lambrinidis, the European Union’s first appointed Special Representative for Human Rights at Columbia University.

Mr. Lambrinidis is an attorney who served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece. He also previously held the post of Vice-President of the European Parliament, and from 2004 to 2009, served as Vice-President of the Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee. Mr. Lambrinidis graduated from Yale Law School and, early in his career, served as Chairman of the Committee for Human Rights in the Bar Association of Washington, D.C.. Mr. Lambrinidis took office on September 1, 2012 and his mandate will run until June 2014.  He and the EU delegation to the United Nations visited New York for the opening of the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly.

Challenges in Human Rights and Foreign Policy

Mr. Lambrinidis spoke candidly about some challenges his office and human rights policy face in today’s global community. Part of the challenge the European Union (EU) will face, he noted, will be to find a balance and consistency in human rights policy for the EU and for each member state. These consistencies include, for example, how internal policy is presented externally.  Each state must recognize their own internal challenges in this regard. No state perfectly protects and promotes rights, a false sense of exceptionalism, often promulgated by Western countries, actually works to undermine their credibility in the international arena. Another concern relates to the complexities in ensuring consistency in the reactions to other states’ violations of rights; are the reactions to external human rights violations consistent and, more importantly, proportional? A state’s favoritism or criticism towards certain states may be seen as based on economic considerations, weakening the ability of that state to speak authoritatively about protections and promotion of human rights abroad. Regarding proportional responses, Mr. Lambrinidis also noted that, when possible, it is best to “win” a country’s respect for human rights and human rights practices, rather than resort to the use of force. Lastly, Mr. Lambrinidis is concerned with ensuring that there is consistency in EU policies on community, regional and domestic levels throughout the EU member states.

Mr. Lambrinidis also spoke of his concern over the “false dilemma” of arguments that attack the universality of human rights and place human rights at odds with culture, religion or ethnicity. He urges that states must formulate a better argument to truly defend the universality of human rights in theory and, more importantly, in their practice and proliferation. He asserts that it is often repressive, nationalistic regimes pronouncing that human rights are a “Western construct.” By conceding to these narratives or failing to offer robust counter-arguments, we undermine those advocates within these societies fighting for their rights.

An important part of the Special Representative’s mandate will be to renew the EU’s commitment to a genuine partnership with civil society. Mr. Lambrinidis expressed concern about the “shrinking space” of civil society in domestic and foreign policy. The failures of human rights advocacy often result from a lack of collective and pervasive action. By engaging EU governments and civil society actors at local, regional, and international levels, Mr. Lambrinidis hopes to empower these groups to take ownership of human rights at home, protect them from hostilities, and defend their value domestically and internationally.

Finally, Mr. Lambrinidis stressed the importance of promoting economic and social rights alongside civil and political rights. In many countries, the lack of basic human rights, such as the right to food or health care, radically hinder the populations’ ability to fight for their civil and political rights. He urged that recognition of these challenges; meaningful partnerships; and cooperative strategies between the EU, the US, and other international human rights defenders will help address a broader range of human rights issues and improve the effectiveness of human rights rhetoric and practice worldwide.

Successfully Promoting and Protecting Human Rights

Since taking office, Mr. Lambrinidis and his delegation have demonstrated their commitment to the integration of human rights into EU policy and have achieved a number of successes. He shared a few of these accomplishments. Guidelines and instructions have been created for all EU delegations for protecting and promoting LGBT rights, as well as the promotion and protection of freedom of religion. After past failures, the EU, as part of the Commission on the Status of Women, adopted conclusions on the elimination and prevention of all forms of violence against women and girls in March of this year. Guidelines have been published in response to these conclusions. The EU Special Representative will continue to focus on the intersection of business and human rights, drawing from guiding notes published with a focus on the oil, gas, and other extractive industries, as well as information technology and temporary employment services business sectors in the EU.

The EU has established the office and position of the Special Representative for Human Rights to ensure that human rights will play a central role in in EU foreign policy. Mr. Lambrinidis explained that the importance of this integrated approach draws from the reality that human rights violations lie at the root of most conflicts and thus, viable solutions must involve their promotion and protection. The Special Representative will be tasked with monitoring and expressing the coherence and practice of EU human rights policies, a daunting task considering the 28 member states and the countless religious, ethnic and cultural identities that comprise the EU. However, Mr. Lambrinidis stressed his optimism in the strength and capability of human rights-focused foreign policy in Europe and globally.

For a full audio recording of the EU Special Representative’s talk at Columbia, click here.

Jillian works at the Institute for the Study of Human Rights as a Program Coordinator for the Alliance for Historical Dialogue and Accountability and the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Program. She is an alumni of the Human Rights Studies Master’s Program, with a concentration in Indigenous rights. Her thesis and subsequent research focuses on the right to education for First Nations in Canada and the function of transitional justice mechanism in Canadian reconciliation processes.