Edmund Burke, an Anglo-Irish statesman and a member of the Whigs political party in Parliament, is known for his striking criticism and opposition to the French Revolution in his famous letter, Reflections on the Revolution in France. In this exquisite piece, Burke particularly emphasizes the notions of inheritance such as that of property, status, and liberties, along with upholding traditions and prejudices as wisdoms to attain the greatest values of liberty in government. However, in the latter half of the letter, Burke directly contradicts himself when he rejects the concept of inheriting ancestral crimes in his defense of the clergy and church. The purpose of this paper is to explore this apparent contradiction by providing a thorough analysis on Burke’s ideas on prejudice, human nature, and history, and how these all play into his idea of inheritance and its importance in government and society, and show how the contradiction actually serves to enhances Burke’s argument and critics of the French Revolution.

To understand the contradiction, we begin by understanding Burke’s philosophies on inheritance. According to Burke, the notion of inheritance is significant in laying the foundations of government and  society. He references the Magna Carta and the Declaration of Right in his argument, claiming that these documents “assert our liberties, as an entailed inheritance derived to us from our forefathers” (Burke, 33). Burke believes that it is only through inheritance, that we receive our “sacred rights and franchise” along with our “freedom” which serve as “hereditary rights” (32, 24). Burke believed that all property, rights, privileges, and status were all inherited from our ancestors, as he lists that “we have an inheritable crown; an inheritable peerage; and an house of commons and a people inherit privileges, franchises, and liberties, from a long line of ancestors” (33). Burke points out that the “course of succession is the healthy habit of the British constitution” which shows that inheritance is an important aspect to government which has allowed society to function properly and maintain order (25).

Now that we have established Burke’s inheritance, we move on to understand how he seemingly contradicts the concepts surrounding his ideas of inheritance. This inconsistency occurs when Burke defends the clergy and condemns the atheists libellers for scrutinizing “into the histories of former ages for every instance of oppression and persecution” the clergy has committed and creating “a sort of pedigree of crimes” on the basis of genealogies and family distinctions when there is no vice to be found in the present existing clergy (140). Burke argues that it is unjust to punish men “for the offences of their natural ancestors” who he states have no relation to the guilty acts (140). In this theory, Burke suggests that the crimes and vices of ancestors are not inherited. This idea comes off as quite contradictory to his earlier statements on inheritance. Under Burke’s logic, if our liberties, privileges, and franchises were all inherited, why wouldn’t our ancestral crimes also be inherited? It is contradictory that our “pedigree of liberties” and “pedigree of properties” are inherited from ancetrals, but not our “pedigree of crimes” (31, 224, 140). This begs the question–why are some things inherited and others aren’t? Is it simply a convenience for Burke to state that we only inherit what is good, and abandon the vice and crimes of our ancetrals? If we can lavish in the privileges of inherited wealth or social class, shouldn’t we also face the burdens and punishments of our ancestral crimes? What purpose does Burke’s contradiction on inheritance serve in his general analysis and attitude towards the French Revolution?

To understand the context of this contradiction and attempt to answer these questions, we now delve deeper into an analysis on Burke’s inheritance–in particular, the inheritance of prejudice, and how it plays a role in maintaining the eternal social contract. According to Burke, inheriting all the aforementioned privileges, liberties, status, etc; is a result of the “happy effect of following nature” which he describes as a form of profound “wisdom without reflection” (33). It appears that this profound “wisdom without reflection,” namely, when one follows a certain idea or moral habit because it is passed down and inherited without questioning why, serves as an introduction to his philosophies on inherited prejudice and its importance in society (33). Burke begins by stating that human beings are not entirely rational beings, but rather emotional beings with “untaught feelings” and sentiments that cannot be controlled by reason (87). Burke argues that prejudice actually serves in a way to unite people; instead of allowing each man his own “private stock of reason” because each man’s reason is “small” in comparison to the whole of society, and it is better to rely on the conclusion derived from the whole than to rely on one’s own reason which is prejudice (87). Burke also maintains that a man’s duty becomes a part of his nature “through just prejudice” (87). Burke describes the church as one of the “first prejudices” and that it involves “profound reason” which allows for the “uniformly continued sense of mankind” (92). Burke believes that inheriting prejudice and upholding traditional values and customs are crucial in maintaining order in society and also allows one to derive the greatest value from society in which they “have high and worthy notions of their function and destination” in order to reach a “solid, permanent existence” (96). We need prejudice to maintain the state so that it does not fall to the “evils of inconstancy and versatility” which may cause a child to “hack that aged parent in pieces” which he uses as a metaphor to describe the French Revolution (96). In maintaining the order in society, we are preserving the societal “contract” of those who are “living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born” (96). Those who do not look back towards their ancestors will ” not look forward to their posterity”, so therefore the inheritance of prejudice and upholding traditions and customs is necessary for the eternal contract in maintaining society (33).

After establishing the importance of Burke’s inheritance and prejudice in maintaining the social contract of society, we now delve into Burke’s philosophy on the complications of human nature and necessity in order to justify his contradiction regarding inheritance. To explore this, we will bring it into the political context of Burke’s argument against the French Revolution. One of the innate faults of the French Revolution that Burke highlights is its intoxication with the abstract concept of natural rights and ideals of a completely just government à priori. Yet, they do not realize that such a perfect government can never be reached after understanding true human nature (60). Burke explains that the due distribution of powers that makes the constitution of a state requires “a deep knowledge of human nature and human necessities” (60). Burke elaborates that the science of government intended for practical purposes is a matter that “requires experience, and even more experience than any person can gain in his whole life” due to how complicated human nature is (61). It is not sufficient to simply rely on abstract rational principles and ideals to form a government because humans are not entirely rational beings, but also act upon “untaught feelings” and impulses of their sentiment (87). Humans cannot be purely rationalized–accepting things based on rationality is a violence on reality. We now apply this concept in light of the contradiction we highlighted earlier regarding Burke’s contradiction on inheritance. Just as humans cannot be rationalized–the idea of inheritance, which relates heavily to that of humans, whether it be from ancentrals to the living or to the posterity–cannot be rationalized in the same manner. Just as human nature and impulses may be contradictory which is why Burke argues for the need of prejudice to regulate these feelings and impulses, we cannot delineate inheritance in a rational sense. It is rational to say that a grandson inherits everything of his grandfather’s–including wealth, property, privileges, and all his grandfather’s crimes. The injustice of this inheritance is obvious–should one get punished for something he didn’t do? However, if one was to rationalize this, then one would also ask–should someone receive the accomplishments, wealth, and awards of something he didn’t do? In a rational standpoint, we could argue that the point of these questions are the same–one’s birth and hereditary allows them to receive things they did not work for or deserve. If we continue rationalizing this, there would be an unending circle and net positive in which both criterias are just or unjust. However, what Burke is saying is to completely disregard all such rationalization. Just as humans cannot be solely rationalized, and how an abstract government of “pretend rights” on only rational principles will inevitably fail, it is likewise incorrect to rationalize inheritance. Instead, it is only through great experience of government and knowledge of the non-rationalizable parts of human nature and necessities, such as feelings and impulses, is it possible to flourish and have order in society (61). The same experience and inheritance of prejudice and traditional moral values is what has brought about the contradiction that is incapable of being rationalized. It is due to large amounts of practical experiences that the division of inheritance of liberties and property versus crimes can be drawn and in this way the state “recruits to its strength, and remedies its distempers” (61). In this sense, we have shown that the apparent contradiction of inheritance is not truly a contradiction, but another ligament in support of Burke’s overarching theme of the un-rationalizable aspects of human nature, the need for prejudice and tradition to regulate this, and the overall impracticality and lack of experience of those leading the Revolution who parade their ideal government formed from rationalized principles and beliefs.

We have shown that the contradiction of inheritance in Burke’s arguments are an extension of his initial claims on the Revolution leaders’ lack of understanding of human nature and necessities in his criticism of the French Revolution. We now enhance this justification through a brief analysis of Burke’s defense against the inheritance of crimes through an exploration of his ideas on history and pretexts. He begins by  stating that governments or corporate bodies are “immortal for the good for their members, but not for their punishment” meaning governments are meant to promote the good of members, not to enact punishment (141). However, this does not mean punishment would not be distributed at all–punishment is distributed if it promotes overall good for the state. An example would be a punishment for stealing or injuring others in order to deter others from doing so. Therefore, it does not make sense to continue the punishment of one’s ancestrals if it does not create a net positive in society or benefit the majority. In addition, throughout history, we have seen that there are miseries brought onto the world by “pride, ambition, avarice, revenge, list, sedition, hypocrisy, ungerne zeal…” (141). These causes of miseries are inherent in the world as the world is a corrupt place. However, the man who regards the pretexts of these vices as that originating from “kings, priests, magistrates…” is “wise historically” but a “fool in practice” (142). This idea fits similarly to our previous assertion that one cannot rationalize a state of affairs regarding humans without also having great experience in understanding human nature. Burke states that even if you kill the organ that runs the vice, such as the current king or ruling class, the vice will appear back in a different form (142). These vices cannot be just so rationally construed to one person as they exist innately in the world. In understanding this particular aspect of our human world full of our own vices, we can now understand why there should not be an inheritance of crimes and vices, and the original contradiction in inheritance  is justified in this sense.

To conclude, inheritance cannot be so easily rationalized just as humans and government cannot be construed solely on rationalized principles and ideas. Instead, the line drawn between the acceptable inheritance of liberties and property versus the non-acceptable inheritance of crime can only be reached with wisdom of government in forms of prejudice, traditions and customs, and moral values. After analyzing Burke’s arguments regarding prejudice, social contract, human nature, and history, we are able to show how his contradiction in inheritance actually plays into his larger criticism against the Revolution and their ideal government being built solely on rational principles and beliefs.

Citations

Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France. Oxford, Oxford World Classics, 1993