November 18, 2016
“Two Enduring Confusions in Embodied Cognition”
November 18, 2016
11am – 1pm
Fayerweather room 513
For our November meeting, we have invited Prof. Kenneth Aizawa (Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University). This meeting is meant to address some philosophical problems with embodied cognition arguments. The goal is to clarify our understanding of the claims of embodied cognition theories through this discussion. Three respondents from various fields will respond, showing how these concerns intersect with their own respective work.
Prof. Aizawa will speak for 30 minutes on “Two Enduring Confusions in Embodied Cognition,” followed by a 10-minute response from three respondents: Prof. Kevin Ochsner (Columbia University, Director of the SCAN lab), Prof. Mariusz Kozak (Columbia University, Music Department), and Prof. Stephen Flusberg (SUNY, Director of the Everyday Cognition Lab). We will then have a 60-minute general discussion including everyone in attendance.
Please see the reading list below. Our respondents may suggest additional readings, and we will send an update closer to the time of the meeting to finalize the reading list. Please make sure to do the reading in order to make sure our discussion is informed, and so that we have common material to discuss.
Abstract
Two Enduring Confusions in Embodied Cognition
Prof. Kenneth Aizawa
For almost fifteen years now, the two foundational issues regarding extended cognition were the distinction between causation and constitution and what cognition is. These issues continue to be central to debates over embodied cognition. To take an example, Susan Goldin-Meadow shows that participants perform better on a task when they are free to use their hands to gesture. On the cognitivist interpretation of what is going on in these cases, gestures are among the causal influences on the cognitive processes in the brain and they enable better performance. On the usual embodied cognition interpretation, however, the gesturing is (part of) the cognitive process. Gesturing constitutes a part of the cognitive process in the way that “carrying a 1” sometimes constitutes a part of the cognitive process of addition. The most common argument for the embodied conclusion begins with the observation that gesture causally influences thinking, then somehow reaches the conclusion that gesture constitutes thinking. Yet, in its simplest form, this type of argument commits the infamous “causation-constitution fallacy.” One strategy for dealing with this problem has been to suppose that cognition is, in fact, behavior, that cognition is performance. So, the reason that gesture constitutes cognition is because gesture constitutes performance, and cognition is performance. Notice, however, that this is to offer an account or theory or definition or conceptual analysis of what cognition is. It is to provide a “mark of the cognitive.” But, the question then becomes why we should think that cognition is performance or behavior. This account flies in the face of some of the basic assumptions regarding cognition and behavior, namely, that cognition and behavior are different and that cognition is among the endogenous causes of behavior.
Reading:
Additional (optional) reading: