Harriman Core Project, 2014-15
David Stark, Director
Elena Krumova, Postdoctoral Fellow
In late 1989 and early 1990, the dominant idea among policymakers was that the countries of Eastern Europe would be learning from the West. The term transition offered an image in which East Europeans were on a road to catching up with Western institutions which had earlier arrived at the right answers for the proper models of the relationship between markets and democracies. Twenty five years later, we are organizing a project at the Harriman Institute in which our goal is to consolidate existing research – less about “1989” itself than about the past 25 years of experience with political and economic transformations. To do so, we will focus on how different actors are learning from each other. Who is paying attention to whom? And what new combinations are being cobbled together in this process?
In hindsight, the fall of the Berlin Wall marked not only the end of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe but also the end of the Cold War consensus that market and democratic institutions work in unison and with little friction. Among ordinary people in the Eastern bloc, “the West” stood for rich consumer societies with seemingly unrestricted freedom of personal expression. The communist regimes had failed to deliver on their promises for either prosperity or workers’ democracy. One of the political party posters in the first elections in Hungary in 1990 captured this sentiment well with the image of a broken fork used to scribble May 1st for the celebration of Labor Day. The symbolism was obvious – this broken tool was good neither for writing, nor for eating. The regime had to change and the model was clear – it was Western liberal democracy. Market and political institutions had to be split into two independent spheres of life. These two separate spheres, however, shared the same simple logic – the logic of competition. Lack of competition among political parties and firms during communism caused the downfall of the regime. The prescription was straightforward and simple.
This Cold War consensus has slowly unraveled in the last twenty five years and especially after the financial crisis of 2008. Today the alliance between market and democratic institutions does not seem as unproblematic as it did in 1990. The logic of competition is not enough to guarantee political voice and shared prosperity. Competition for economic resources among political rivals in the former communist countries, counter-intuitively, create interdependency among firms and parties. At least in the case of Hungary, one of the most globalized countries in Eastern Europe, this inter-dependency has only increased over time to produce a politicized economy. Moreover, discontent about globalization, the European Union, and multiculturalism has grown across Eastern Europe. As political parties on both sides have revived rhetoric from before World War II, are they also looking for ways to experiment with new models?
For example, in an important speech in July 2014, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban commended the idea of “illiberal democracy” and pointed to China and Russia as exemplars from which his country had much to learn. In this speech, Orban explicitly problematized the relationship between markets and democracy and challenged the policy-making consensus of the last quarter century. In no place is this challenge more clearly visible than in China. If June 4, 1989 was the day of Solidarity’s electoral triumph against the communist party in Poland, it was also the very same day in which the Chinese leadership crushed the Tienanmen Square protesters. How has China subsequently paid attention to developments in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union? Evidence suggests that China took the fall of the Berlin Wall, the rise of dissident groups, and internal divisions within the communist parties of the region as a negative model for its own future. While Eastern Europe was importing institutions wholesale, China has invented a hybrid model that we can refer to as “Market Leninism.” This model combines market reforms with one-party control over the army, economic appointments, and ideological doctrine.
If we broaden our vision, we can see other instances of non-violent attempts to overthrow authoritarian regimes via popular uprisings in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine,Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Tunisia. From the so-called Colored Revolutions of Eurasia, to the Jasmine Revolutions of North Africa, to the Umbrella Revolution in contemporary Hong Kong, what models of democratic and economic institutions are they paying attention to? In contrast to the Eastern Europeans, people in these regions do not necessarily look to Western liberal democracy as the logical path to be taken. Protestors are inventing new repertoires of resistance, demonstrations, and political tactics. And what lessons have authoritarian governments learned and what adaptations have they made? Our goal is to investigate these evolving processes by observing who is paying attention to whom.
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For Contact:
Elena Krumova
[email protected]