Incommensurability and “No Kill Zones”: Settling Arguments and Producing Knowledge in a Divided Discipline
Monday, September 24th, 2012
Ever self-conscious about its purpose and method, the discipline of International Relations (IR) has long debated questions about its most basic relevance, such as what to study and for what purpose. This has led to several complaints about incommensurability between different approaches to the subject, and therefore a lack of progress and knowledge production. Recently, several scholars have advocated a more inclusive debate between different theories and philosophies in IR. This article attempts to evaluate the extent to which scholars, using different theoretical perspectives, can produce meaningful knowledge in IR. It will focus on the two most prominent theoretical approaches to IR; realism and liberalism, which have more in common than the more divided philosophies of science, that make up the field. Drawing on the recent debate about ”No Kill Zones” in Syria, proposed by Anne-Marie Slaughter, and criticized by Stephen Walt, the article will illustrate the limits and possibility of producing knowledge about international relations through debates between theories, which rely on incommensurable foundations. To evaluate this, it will draw on three prominent philosophers of science: Karl Popper, Max Weber, and Thomas Kuhn. This will lead to the argument that there is no possible resolution for inter-theoretical debates, like the one between Slaughter and Walt, from the application of scientific method or set guidelines, and that incommensurability remains a feature of IR. We should therefore seek to engage in inter-theoretical debates, where possible, instead of trying to settle these theoretical debates themselves. To do so, this article suggests that the traditional “bottom-up” approach to evaluating incommensurability should be replaced with a “top-down” approach, which enables such limited inter-theoretical debate, through an open conversation beginning with conclusions rather than foundations. Firstly, however, it will discuss theoretical divisions in IR, and incommensurability in general.
Ever self-conscious about its purpose and method, the discipline of International Relations (IR) has long debated questions about its most basic relevance, such as what to study and for what purpose.[i]
This has led to several complaints about incommensurability between different approaches to the subject, and therefore a lack of progress and knowledge production.[ii]
Recently, several scholars have advocated a more inclusive debate between different theories and philosophies in IR.[iii]
This article attempts to evaluate the extent to which scholars, using different theoretical perspectives, can produce meaningful knowledge in IR. It will focus on the two most prominent theoretical approaches to IR; realism and liberalism, which have more in common than the more divided philosophies of science, that make up the field. Drawing on the recent debate about ”No Kill Zones” in Syria, proposed by Anne-Marie Slaughter
, and criticized by Stephen Walt, the article will illustrate the limits and possibility of producing knowledge about international relations through debates between theories, which rely on incommensurable foundations. To evaluate this, it will draw on three prominent philosophers of science: Karl Popper, Max Weber, and Thomas Kuhn. This will lead to the argument that there is no possible resolution for inter-theoretical debates, like the one between Slaughter and Walt, from the application of scientific method or set guidelines, and that incommensurability remains a feature of IR. We should therefore seek to engage in inter-theoretical debates, where possible, instead of trying to settle these theoretical debates themselves. To do so, this article suggests that the traditional “bottom-up” approach to evaluating incommensurability should be replaced with a “top-down” approach, which enables such limited inter-theoretical debate, through an open conversation beginning with conclusions rather than foundations. Firstly, however, it will discuss theoretical divisions in IR, and incommensurability in general.
A Divided Discipline
The recent calls for a more inclusive debate in IR are nothing new, but they are still relevant, as key moments in most narratives about IR give the impression of a highly divided discipline. A famous example is when Robert Keohane dug trenches between good scientific hypothesis-testing positivism and reflectivism with no “research programs.”[iv]
Similarly, attempts to bridge philosophical divides often reveal more fragmentation than cooperation. Sterling-Folker and Shinko’s attempt to “traverse the realist-postmodern divide” of conceptions of power is a striking case of incommensurability, where very little substantial agreement was reached, despite the best efforts.[v]
Finally, calls for theoretical pluralism often reveal a lack of understanding of other theories. Lake, for instance, adds to the vast body of literature which un-ironically complains that IR spends too much time talking about itself, and encourages it to focus on “explaining real world patterns,” and to use theory “to reveal causes” instead.[vi]
This assumes a degree of neopositivism concerned with extracting knowledge from the world, and depoliticizes the question of how to identify problems. Disputes about which problems to frame research around are themselves major points of contention in IR, and many post positivists would not agree to his alternative agenda. Despite these points, the discipline may not be as fractured as it is often portrayed in textbooks and lectures, with many scholars taking an eclectic approach and only loosely identifying themselves with one particular theory. Nevertheless, incommensurability between different theories remains a feature of IR but does not make inter-theoretical debate and knowledge production impossible.
It is important to distinguish between two kinds of incommensurability[vii]
: firstly, there is incommensurability in terms of diverging aims of analysis. This is an often-misunderstood sense of incommensurability, which is not actually problematic for the discipline. It arises when two theories try to do different things, despite talking about the same phenomenon. A classic example of this in IR is the amount of criticism of Waltz’s neorealism. Waltz’s theory is criticized for not explaining phenomena the theory never claimed to be able to explain.[viii]
In these cases, the theories are incommensurable, but it is not a problem, because they do not clash. Secondly, there is incommensurability, whereby two approaches have no foundation on which to engage in debate or comparison about conflicting analyses of the same object. The use of the word “foundation” is deliberate. This understanding of incommensurability means that two theories explain the same thing from different epistemological, ontological, methodological, and normative foundations, which cannot be evaluated or falsified by any comparative analysis, measurement, or standard. An example of this is the debate between Slaughter and Walt—who both attempt to describe the same aspect of the same phenomenon, but from different foundations, which themselves remain irresolvable. Having explained incommensurability, this article will now introduce this debate.
The “No Kill Zone” Debate
As the tanks of Bashar al-Assad’s regime closed in on rebel territories, and mass killings were reported by the international media, strong disagreement about what to do about Syria struck the international community. Then on 23 February 2012, New York Times
featured an article by the prominent liberal IR Scholar, Anne-Marie Slaughter. She argued that a proxy- or civil war could strengthen Al-Qaeda, and would therefore threaten US national interest. Hence, she suggested the international community establish “No Kill Zones,” where it would arm opposition soldiers to protect civilians from aggression from the Syrian Army. These zones should then be expanded allowing the opposition to gain foothold and “to negotiate directly with army officers on truces within each zone, which could then expand into a regional, and ultimately national, truce.” This would require the international community to either enable the opposition to attack Syrian air defenses or do so itself. Whether or not the international community would act from inside or outside Syria, the key to the plan was that the Zones remain defensive, and that international assistance be stopped if the opposition took the offensive. She asserted that any revenge attacks by rebels should not be tolerated, and that international intervention could be stopped, if such attacks took place.[ix]
Four days later, the prominent defensive realist, Stephen M. Walt, replied
to Slaughter’s proposal on his blog for Foreign Policy
. He voiced concerns that these zones could not remain defensive in any meaningful sense for two reasons: firstly, he asked, “once we commit ourselves to arming and protecting them [the opposition], how are we going to stop them from doing whatever they can to bring him [Assad] down?.” Secondly, because Slaughter considered it necessary to attack Syrian air defense to protect the zones, he argued that the distinction between defensive and offensive action would break down. Drawing on the recently concluded NATO mission in Libya, he worried that Syria would turn into a similar offensive against the regime. The basic problem with her proposal, he concluded, was that “once we commit ourselves to creating safe havens [‘No Kill Zones’], we will be obliged to defend them for as long as there is any possibility that Assad’s forces might attack.”[x]
In a second piece
, published a month and a half later, Walt evaluated realist responses to the crisis in Syria. He distinguished between “crude realism,” which he associated with Paul Collier, and “sophisticated realism,” which he identified with himself. Drawing on Collier, he said that a crude realist analysis would argue that:
“Toppling Assad would eliminate a key Iranian ally and deal a crippling blow to Hezbollah, thereby advancing broader U.S. interests in the region. In this optimistic scenario, grateful Syrians would seek friendly relations with their Western benefactors, including Washington.”[xi]
He contrasted this with “sophisticated realism,” which would consider unintended consequences, and argue that Assad’s regime would have no choice but to fight until the end, leading to prolonged conflict. Moreover, a sophisticated analysis would be wary of supporting a fractured opposition, as a new government might not be friendly to US interests.[xii]
To make this point, he mentioned Iraq and Libya as recent cases, which demonstrate how intervention does not necessarily translate into swift changes in government policy. While this may be a valid comparison, it neglects the importance of context, as we shall see shortly.
Before drawing on this debate to analyze the scope for debate between different perspectives in IR, two caveats are worth setting out: firstly, the two pieces are chosen because they represent IR in practice. They are therefore not academic arguments but short analyses produced for a wider audience. It would therefore be meaningless to evaluate them by academic standards. Secondly, this article does not engage with the debate to resolve it—only to evaluate if that would be possible. Having outlined the debate between Slaughter and Walt, this article will now use it to evaluate the possibility of inter-theoretical debate and knowledge production in IR—by drawing on three philosophers of science.
Karl Popper and his idea of falsificationist science inspire the first approach. One could simply take both cases into account and then see whichever one turns out to be right. There are, however, several problems with this approach. Firstly, many disputes in IR cannot be falsified or verified, simply because the idea is not carried out. In this case, “No Kill Zones” have not yet been created.[xiii]
Moreover, even if the zones were created, they are so vaguely defined that their premises could be changed later. Should they be enforced by the international community and fail, Slaughter could add qualifications such as: their employment coming too late, not having the international backing she presupposed, or other technicalities. Very few arguments in IR are genuinely falsifiable, because it requires a degree of specification that is almost never done in the social sciences. The problem is that the object of study, international relations, is best conceived of as an open system very different from a controlled laboratory environment.[xiv]
Secondly, the concept of falsification itself relies on non-falsifiable assumptions. Falsification necessitates “mind-world dualism.”[xv]
Ontologically, this assumes that the researcher is detached, at least to a significant degree, from what it is he or she is studying. Epistemologically, this leads to the assumption that knowledge production is about closing the gap between mind and world by studying it. Popper acknowledges this fundamental paradox of science, “Scientific discovery is impossible without faith in ideas which are of a purely speculative kind…a faith which is completely unwarranted from a scientific point of view.”[xvi]
This is not necessarily a problem for falsification, but it would seem unreasonable to attempt to resolve a debate about incommensurability by testing it against incommensurable standards.
Thirdly, if one seeks to produce knowledge, general lessons must be learned. Insofar as this is possible at all, a final problem with hypothesis testing remains: neglecting context when drawing on history. Slaughter and Walt would rightly find it difficult to learn from the experience of “No Kill Zones,” even if they were created, because such a “lesson learnt” takes something out of context, while the context of an action remains highly relevant to its outcome. This is sometimes called “history as scripture,” when people identify lessons and construct narratives from history that they apply to other cases with little regard for the original context.[xvii]
Walt does exactly this in his reply to Slaughter, when he argues: “
As in Libya, what sounds at first like a noble effort to protect civilians would quickly turn into offensive action against a despised regime.”[xviii]
To make this kind of historical inference, Walt equates the context of Syria with that of Libya, and assumes that events would unfold in a similar manner, without any further justification. As it happens, Slaughter’s idea that the zones would be defensive, despite arguing that they must expand, and pre-emptively attack Syrian air defenses, makes it very likely that the mission would indeed escalate. Nonetheless, it would not be for the same reason as in Libya, and without appreciating the social, economic, geographical, and discursive contextual differences, the “history as scripture” tendency remains. Popper himself warned against the problems of learning from history through identifying patterns and “learning lessons” based on narrow historicism.[xix]
For this reason, testing the zones and evaluating Slaughter and Walt’s claims by the outcome would not provide a definitive “lesson” about “No Kill Zones,” as future cases would take place in different contexts. For these reasons, a Popperian test of the hypotheses of Slaughter and Walt does not provide to means to settle theoretical differences or overcome incommensurability.
Weber’s Pluralist Science
Max Weber suggested a second method for inter-theoretical debate. He defined science not by its method, but by its goal—knowledge production.[xx]
Like Popper, he recognized that science has different starting points with no terms with which to compare them. He therefore suggested a pluralist science, where research was valid if its internal methodological logic was sound. That is, its conclusion followed from its premises.[xxi]
By testing the validity of claims by their own internal coherence, we can engage in limited dialogue. Post-structuralist deconstruction has been working under such conditions for years, making no claim of objectivity or truth, but merely opening up discourses and theories alternative to interpretations.[xxii]
In the case of Slaughter and Walt, it is important to note that Walt’s initial reply relied on very few realist assumptions. In fact, it highly resembled a Weberian critique, which pointed out that the foundation of Slaughter’s argument, being a clear division between “defensive” and “offensive” behavior, did not follow from her premise that “No-Killing Zones” should be expanded and pre-emptively attack outside their territory. While this Weberian approach does not provide the means for a debate about theoretical differences, it opens up space for understanding, as it is necessary to understand another theory, in order to critique it. This exposure may force the scholars to challenge their own foundations, without falsifying them in any scientific way. Much of the IR establishment has supported this view of science.[xxiii]
However, by evaluating theories by their internal consistency, we do not have an inter-theoretical dialogue, because Weber requires us to put our own assumptions to the side and “play the other person’s language game,” as Wittgenstein might have put it. Weber shows that incommensurability does not equal a lack of productive conversation between theories but produces no foundation on which to debate these theoretical differences.
This leads us to the final philosopher, Thomas Kuhn, who regularly appears in IR debates, despite denying that his work could be applied to the social sciences.[xxiv]
As Kuhn explained, the reality of scientific enquiry is not that people start with a proposition and then attempt to falsify it. Rather, scientific knowledge production takes place in the context of a paradigm. A paradigm follows from a “concrete scientific achievement,” which resolves debate over foundations and methods in a scientific field.[xxv]
This then frames “normal science” until a new paradigm shift takes place. Working within a paradigm makes people ignore, or even react with hostility to work, which falls outside the paradigm, as it is not seen as progress in that community. Applying this to IR faced people with problems, similar to the “history as scripture” phenomenon, leaving some people to treat paradigms as different theories[xxvi]
, and others to see them more widely as philosophies of science.[xxvii]
These difficulties are only exacerbated by Kuhn’s own inconsistent use of the term.[xxviii]
If one takes Wight’s view of paradigms as theories, Slaughter would be working within a liberal paradigm, whereas Walt would be within a realist one. A solution inspired by Kuhn would in this case be to let the different paradigms work with their own agenda. While Kuhn is often used to criticize divisions in the discipline, it is rarely noted that he defended “normal science” within paradigms on the grounds that it is “the most efficient way to ensure an accumulation of knowledge,” even if it is conservative, uncritical, and narrow.[xxix]
This would mean that discussions between Slaughter and Walt would be restricted to a situation where, “though each may hope to convert the other to his way of seeing his science and its problems, neither may hope to prove his case.”[xxx]
In other words, Slaughter and Walt should not produce knowledge together but prioritize productivity instead.
We should take seriously Kuhn’s warnings against applying paradigms to IR, but his conclusion need not follow. IR is a different discipline than the natural sciences, but many of the traits of paradigm mentalities remain: professionalization, mainstream theories dominating, and social norms, which guide the behavior and study performed by its professionals.[xxxi]
While avoiding the “history as scripture”-like fallacy of directly applying Kuhn to IR, we can still draw on his work to understand the incommensurability of Slaughter and Walt’s foundations. Firstly, like Kuhn’s scientists, there is a clear danger that different approaches fail to engage in debate, with incommensurability itself used as an excuse. Secondly, Kuhn’s idea about professionalization as a reason for shunning alternative views applies to IR as well. Personal beliefs, dignity, reputation, and income is on the line for scholars who have spent years in libraries and in front of laptops working on their theories. The historian, Paul Schroeder, for instance, applied Waltz’s neo-realist theory to 300 years of history in an extensive study with the conclusion that it was ”unhistorical, unstable, and wrong.”[xxxii]
In response, Waltz hostilely rejected the data and its conclusions.[xxxiii]
Meanwhile, others attempted to change the premises of neo-realism to make it fit the historical study.[xxxiv]
A “Top-Down” Alternative
As we have seen, Popper, Weber, and Kuhn have all given us insights about the possibilities and constraints to inter-theoretical debate and knowledge production in IR. Neither philosopher, however, could produce a method for debating incommensurable foundational assumptions, or shed light on how the Slaughter/Walt debate might be resolved, except for a limited engagement proposed by Weber. This shows that debates in IR about incommensurability should be framed differently. If we accept that we cannot resolve foundations in any scientific manner, however defined, it does not have to follow that IR needs to stay divided along Kuhnian lines. In fact, Kuhn insisted that it is possible to debate across paradigms.[xxxv]
So far, the evaluation of the possibility of debate between incommensurable foundations has taken a traditional “bottom up” approach, by assuming that no fruitful debate can flourish from different foundations. Alternatively, one can take a “top-down” approach, whereby one starts with similarities and works downwards. This article will now attempt to demonstrate how a “top-down” approach makes limited inter-theoretical debate possible, in spite of incommensurable foundations.
Insofar as Kuhn’s paradigms are transferable to IR, it should be along the lines of Jackson’s divisions of philosophies of science.[xxxvi]
Slaughter and Walt therefore share a paradigm of neo-positivism. More importantly, however, they are both working within a “paradigm of paradigm incommensurability.”[xxxvii]
Because the discipline of IR is a social phenomenon, studied by communities, it may be that the significance attached to incommensurability between theories is, in part, a social norm that people work with, sustained by representations such as two-by-two matrixes and textbooks.[xxxviii]
Wight makes this point, whilst noting that Kuhnian rigid paradigms are dissimilar to theories of IR, which are more open to change. This view of the social practice of IR and its norms might as well be presented from a post-structuralist perspective as the discourse of IR, which privileges mainstream theories and polices the discipline against more dissident views.[xxxix]
Critical Theorists could explain the same phenomenon in terms of hierarchy—and the promotion of mainstream IR theory—associated with Slaughter and Walt, which reproduces the status quo.[xl]
These similarities between different theories—relying on different philosophies of science—serve as a very important example of a possible “top-down” approach. From different foundations, scholars can reach similar conclusions. When talking about the discipline of IR itself, these different scholars can debate and share knowledge, by starting from their conclusions rather than their foundations.[xli]
This does not overcome incommensurable foundations, but proposes another form of debates, which is more productive than using incommensurability itself as an excuse not to engage in inter-theoretical debate and knowledge production.
Incommensurability, as understood in this article, remains a feature of IR. This means that Slaughter and Walt have no objective means by which to settle their theoretical differences. As demonstrated by the discussion of Popper’s philosophy, testing their hypotheses—whether in reality or in theory—will not settle the matter. Premises can be tweaked by the authors, as their theoretical claims are only vaguely defined. Moreover, learning lessons on which to base future opinion is difficult to do without ignoring the context, and this can be used to excuse any failed prediction. As the discussion of Weber demonstrated, however, it is possible to engage in limited discussion, as demonstrated by Walt’s first reply to Slaughter. However, while Weberian critique enables people to engage with other theories, it does not enable inter-theoretical dialogue, because it requires us to evaluate other theories only by their own coherence. Nonetheless, it requires us to appreciate and understand other theories, which enables us to challenge our own foundations. Finally, as the discussion of Kuhn demonstrated, IR scholars are social beings set in a context of social pressure and norms. They are therefore not likely to sacrifice prestige, salary, or work by abandoning their previous beliefs. Moreover, as Wight suggests, it may be possible to talk of a “paradigm of paradigm mentalities,” which is partly an assumption and partly an excuse to avoid inter-theoretical engagement and knowledge production because of incommensurable foundations.
However, the fact that we lack the means to test our theoretical foundations does not force us to dwell in the relativism of coin tosses.[xlii] As the critical realist Bashkar emphasizes, we produce knowledge using knowledge.[xliii] Logically, we have to make assumptions in order to produce IR scholarship. This is not a problem for the natural sciences, as Popper and Weber explain, and it should not be for IR either. By being explicit about our assumptions, we open them up to debate.[xliv] This article suggests one possibility for such inter-theoretical debate. By taking a “top-down” approach, we can seek common ground from our conclusions rather than stopping at our incommensurable foundations. There is plenty of agreement between Slaughter and Walt, who both frame their analyses on a shared concern with human rights abroad and interests at home. The crucial point about a “top-down” approach is that such debate must be held from scratch, without scientific method or guidelines of inquiry. Neither Popper, Kuhn, nor Weber came up with a method for discussing foundations. No theory can adequately explain why people pick different starting assumptions, or how they change them. We can engage in inter-theoretical debate on these terms. The key is to recognize that there is no objective, final, or decisive means available for this debate. Perhaps by turning it on its head, we can find new ways of engaging, rather than seeking to resolve what still seems irresolvable.
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Nikolaj Werk is a postgraduate student in International Relations Theory at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is an editorial board member of ‘Millennium: Journal of International Studies’, and holds a BA in Politics and International Relations from the University of Manchester. He is currently based in London.
This article will distinguish between “International Relations (IR)” (the discipline) and “international relations” (the subject matter).
Milja Kurki, "Causes of a divided discipline: rethinking the concept of cause in International Relations theory," Millennium – Journal of International Studies
32 (2006): 291; Colin Wight, "Incommensurability and Cross-Paradigm Communication in International Relations Theory: ‘What’s the Frequency Kenneth?’." Millennium – Journal of International Studies
25, no. 2 (1996): 291.
David A. Lake, "Why "isms" are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress." International Studies Quarterly
55 (2011): 465-480; Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Theoretical Pluralism in IR: Possibilities and Limits." In Sage Handbook of International Relations
, by W Carlsnaes, T Risse and B Simmons. London: Sage Publications (Forthcoming), 2012; Patrick T. Jackson, The conduct of inquiry in international relations: philosophy of science and its implications for the study of world politics.
New York: Taylor & Francis, 2010.
Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches." International Studies Quarterly
32, no. 4 (1988): 379-396.
Jennifer Sterling-Folker, and Rosemary E. Shinko. "Discourses of Power: Traversing the Realist-Postmodern Divide." Millennium – Journal of International Studies
33, no. 3 (2005): 637-664.
Chris Brown suggested this distinction.
Ole Wæver, "Waltz’s Theory of Theory." International Relations
23, no. 2 (2009): 201-222.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, "How to Halt the Butchery in Syria." New York Times
, February 24, 2012: A27.
Slaughter did not reply to these claims.
[xiii] For an interesting way around this, see the case for the use of counterfactuals in IR (Lebow 2010).
Gabriela Kütting, Environment, Society, and International Relations: Towards More Effective International Environmental Agreements.
London: Routledge, 2000.
Patrick T. Jackson, The conduct of inquiry in international relations,
Karl R. Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
2nd. London: Routledge, 2002: 16.
George Lawson, "The eternal divide? History and International Relations." European Journal of International Relations
, 2010: 16 (Published online before print).
Walt, Bait-and-switch in Syria?.
Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism.
2nd. London: Routledge, 2002.
Jackson, The conduct of inquiry in international relations,
Richard Ashley, “Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique.” Millennium – Journal of International Studies
17, no. 2 (1988), 227-262; Véronique Pin-Fat, Universality, Ethics and International Relations: A Grammatical Reading.
Oxford: Taylor & Francis, 2009.
Thomas C. Walker, "The Perils of Paradigm Mentalities: Revisiting Kuhn, Lakatos, and Popper." Perspectives on Politics
8, no. 2 (2010), 433-448.
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
2nd. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, 11.
"The Nature of a Paradigm." In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge
, by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974, identifies no less than 21 different ways he used the term.
For a poignant illustration of this, see Der Derian (2009: xx-xxii).
Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vc. Neo-realist Theory." International Security
19, no. 1 (1994): 129.
See Colin Elman, and Miriam F. Elman. "History vs. Neo-realism: A Second Look." International Security
20, no. 1 (1995), 183. This attempt to accommodate the theory is more akin to Lakatos’ idea about “grafting processes,” whereby one can achieve “growth on inconsistent foundations.” As he argued, instead of ignoring data falling outside the paradigm, it could be allowed to grow on the foundations of the paradigm in a parasitic manner, to either change it or break out and form a new one. Whether we take Lakatos’ or Kuhn’s approach, the behavior that paradigm mentality encourages, does much to sustain incommensurability and prevent inter-theoretical knowledge production in IR. On Lakatos, see
John David Kadvany, Imre Lakatos and the Guises of Reason.
Durham: Duke University Press, 2001.
Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold.
2nd. London: Routledge, 1998, 119-20.
David Campbell, Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity.
2nd Revised Edition. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998, 207-228.
Ken Booth and Peter Vale, "Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity: The Case of Southern Africa." In Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases
, by Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams. London: UCL Press, 1997, 337.
[xli] Campbell, 222-5, does this, for instance, by drawing on constructivism, when explaining the policing of IR itself.
Mervyn Hartwig, Roy Bhaskar.
London: Taylor & Francis, 2011, 51.