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X-WR-CALNAME:The Center for Science & Society at Columbia University
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://blogs.cuit.columbia.edu/scisoc
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for The Center for Science & Society at Columbia University
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DTSTART:20160313T060000
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Halifax:20160324T140000
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DTSTAMP:20260607T061800
CREATED:20160324T142642Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20161222T215546Z
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SUMMARY:Giorgio Coricelli - Strategizing and Attention in Games
DESCRIPTION:Speaker: Giorgio Coricelli\, Associate Professor of Economics and Psychology\, University of Southern California \nI will present the results of two related experimental studies (work in collaboration with Luca Polonio) in which we used eye-tracking to measure the dynamic patterns of visual information acquisition in games. In a first study\, participants played one-shot two-player normal-form games in which either\, neither\, or only one of the players had a dominant strategy. Our method allowed us to predict whether the decision process would lead to equilibrium choices or not\, and to attribute out-of-equilibrium responses to limited cognitive capacities or social motives. Our results suggest the existence of individually heterogeneous-but-stable patterns of visual information acquisition based on subjective levels of strategic sophistication and social preferences. In a second study we used eye-tracking technique to test whether players’ actions are consistent with their expectations of their opponent’s behavior. Participants played a series of two-player 3 by 3 one shot games and stated their beliefs about which actions they expect their counterpart to play (first-order beliefs) or about which actions their counterparts expect them to play (second-order beliefs). Using eye-tracking study we could identify a larger consistency between actions and stated beliefs compared with previous studies\, and we could characterize the behavioral rules associated with choice-beliefs inconsistency. Implications for the theories of bounded rationality will be discussed. \nFree and open to the public\, registration required.  Please register on the Center for Decision Sciences website. \nThis event is part of the Cognition and Decision Seminar Series\, sponsored by the Program for Economic Research and the Center for Decision Sciences at Columbia Business School.
URL:https://blogs.cuit.columbia.edu/scisoc/cssevent/giorgio-coricelli-strategizing-and-attention-in-games/
LOCATION:Uris Hall Room #326\, Columbia University\, 3022 Broadway\, New York\, NY\, 10027\, United States
CATEGORIES:Columbia University Events
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