Spring 2018
Jan 22 Yougwoo Koh
Jan 31 Weijie Zhong
Feb 7 Rumen Kostadinov (NYU)
Feb 21 Zhihan Cui (SIPA)
Feb 28 Nikhil Vellodi (NYU)
Mar 7 Evan Friedman
Mar 21 Teresa Esteban-Casanelles
Mar 28 Guy Aridor
Apr 4 Khanh Ngoc Han Huynh
Apr 11 RC Lim
Apr 18 Jeremy Ward
Apr 25 Sara Shahanaghi
May 2 Duarte Gonçalves/ Dilip Ravindran
Fall 2017
Sep. 11 Yu Fu Wong: “Spatial Experimentation”
Sep. 18 Weijie Zhong: “Lemonade from Lemons: Information Design and Adverse Selection”
Sep. 25 Bikramaditya Datta: “Delegation and Learning”
Oct. 2 Xingye Wu: “Large Matching Markets with Peer Preference: a Scarf’s Lemma Approach”
Oct. 9 Nate Neligh: “Vying for Dominance in Dynamic Network Formation: Theory and Experiment”
Oct. 16 Evan Friedman: “Noisy Beliefs Equilibrium”
Oct. 23 Dilip Ravindran
Oct. 30 Andrew Kosenko
Nov. 13 Han Huynh
Nov. 20 Jeremy Ward
Nov. 27 RC Lim
Dec. 4 Daniel Rappoport
Dec. 11 Duarte Gonçalves & Teresa Castanelles
Dec. 18 Zhihan Cui & Manuel Puente
Spring 2017
Jan 23 – Ludmila Matyskova
Jan 30 – Weijie Zhong
Feb 6 – (RC) Xi Zhi Lim
Feb 13 – Evan Friedman
Feb 20 – Khanh Huynh
Feb 27 – Xingye Wu
Mar 6 – Chris Gibson
Mar 20 – Andrew Kosenko
Mar 27 – Daniel Rappoport
Apr 3 – Jeremy Ward
Apr 10 – Nate Neligh
Apr 17 – Manuel Puente
Apr 25 – Dilip Ravindran/Shuo Liu
May 1- Teresa Castanelles/Valentin Somma
Fall 2016
Sep 12 – Teck Yong Tan: “Managing Training and Production Activities in Organizations”
Sep 19 – Weijie Zhong: “Optimal Dynamic Information Acquisition”
Sep 26 – Daniel Rappoport: “A General Approach to Disclosure Games”
Oct 3 – Ambuj Dewan: “Estimating Cost Functions in Perceptual and Cognitive Processes” (with Nathaniel Neligh)
Oct 10 – Enrico Zanardo: “How to Measure Disagreement”
Oct 17 – Shuo Liu
Oct. 31 – Nate Neligh and Evan Friedman
Nov 7 – Xi Zhi Lim
Nov 14 – Andrew Kosenko
Nov 21 – Valentin Somma
Nov 28 – Khanh Hyunh and Lan Nguyen
Dec 5 – Jeremy Ward and Manuel Puente
Spring 2016
Jan 25 – Teck Yong Tan – “Firm Culture and Innovation: The Extrinsic Motivation of Freedom at Work”
Feb 1 – Weijie Zhong – “Selling Information”
Feb 8 – Chris Gibson – “The demand for an asset in the presence of more informed
investors”
Feb 15 – Charles Maurin – “Optimal transcript structure”
Feb 22 – Ambuj Dewan – “Promises and Pronouncements” (with Charles Maurin)
Feb 29 – Xingye Wu – “Nonempty Core in Large Markets with Contracts”
Mar 7 – Enrico Zanardo – “An Axiomatic Definition of Disagreement”
Mar 14 – Spring Recess
Mar 21 – Han Huynh – “The Swing Voter’s Curse in the Laboratory”
Mar 28 – Evan Friedman: “Quantal Response Equilibria with Rational Inattention”
(RC) Xi Zhi Lim: “Exaggerated (Bernoulli) Feeling for Less Likely Events”
Apr 4 – Valentin Somma – “Correlation of Information”
Apr 11 – Nate Neligh – “Refinements of Backwards Induction in a Network Formation Game”
Apr 18 – Manuel Puente (Navin out of town) – “Strategic Ability and Beliefs”
Apr 25 – Daniel Rappoport – “Dynamic Disclosure: Saving the Best for Last”
May 2 – Andrew Kosenko (Navin out of town) – “Private Bayesian Persuasion and Preference Heterogeneity”
Fall 2015
Sep 14 – Teck Yong Tan, “The Extrinsic Motivation of Freedom at Work”
Sep 21 – Sergey Kolbin (Navin out of town) – “Precision of Communication in Coordination Games of Regime Change”
Sep 28 – Evan Friedman – “Expected Trials to Confidence and the Costs of Information Acquisition”
Oct 5 – Valentin Somma – “Thinking enough or hedging”
Oct 12 – Nathaniel Neligh – “Backwards Induction Network Formation: A Model of Technological Compatibility”
Oct 19 – Andrew Kosenko – “Bayesian Persuasion with Private Information”
Oct 26 – Daniel Rappoport – “Matching with Cheap Talk”
Nov 2 – Xingye Wu – “‘Incentive Smoothing’ in Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem”
Nov 9 – Ambuj Dewan – “Promises and Pronouncements” (with Charles Maurin)
Nov 16 – Xi Zhi Lim (Navin possibly out of town)
Nov 23 – Enrico Zanardo – “How to Measure Disagreement”
Nov 30 – Charles Maurin – “Designing Evaluations: Screening and Motivation” (with E. Zanardo)
Dec 07 – Chris Gibson – “Asymmetric Information and Market Failure”
Dec 14 – Julien Combe – “Teachers Assignment: Large Markets and Open Issues”
Spring 2015
Feb 2 – Teck Yong Tan, “Feedback and Belief Manipulation via Discretionary Rewards”
Feb 9 – Andrew Kosenko, “Why do innocent people plead guilty?”
Feb 23 – Enrico Zanardo, “The Value of Information in Voting Games”
Mar 2 – Nate Neligh, “Specialization and firm structure”
Mar 9 – Ambuj Dewan, “Learning, Language, and Coordination”
Mar 16 – Spring Recess
Mar 23 – Charles Maurin, “Competing on Information Structures” (with Enrico Zanardo)
Mar 30 – Xingye Wu,”Coalition Formation in Large Markets”
Apr 6 – Chris Gibson, “Social learning behavior with costly information acquisition”
Apr 13 – Daniel Rappoport, “Humility in experts”
Apr 20 – Valentin Somma, “Moral Hazard in Information Acquisition” (with Daniel Rappoport)
Apr 27 – Wiejie Zhong
May 4 – Anton Kolotilin (Visitor from UNSW), “Timing Information Flows” (joint with Gabriele Gratton and Richard Holden)
Fall 2014
Sep 15 – Sergey Kolbin – “State dependent communication clarity in global games”
Sep 22 – Nate Neligh – “Eliciting Preferential Attachment”
Sep 29 – Keeyoung Rhee (Navin out of town) – “Learning, Dynamic Moral Hazard, and Bailouts in Financial Crises”
Oct 06 – Teck Yong Tan – “Belief Manipulation Via Discretionary Bonus Payment”
Oct 13 – Wing Suen (University of Hong Kong) – “Aspiring for Change: a theory of middle class activism” (with Heng Chen)
Oct 20 – Enrico Zanardo – “When does information reduce disagreement?”
Oct 27 – Daniel Rappoport- ” Yes, No, Maybe so: Reputation Concerns in the Revelation of Uncertainty”
Nov 03 – Vojta Bartos – “Attention Discrimination: Theory and Field Experiment with Monitoring Information Acquisition”
Nov 10 – Charles Maurin – “Promise and Pronouncement: Guilt or Responsability”
Nov 17 – Chris Gibson (Navin possibly out of town) – “Attention please: Paying to reduce information acquisition costs for rationally inattentive consumers”
Nov 24 – Xingye Wu – “A Fixed-Point Characterization of Stable Matchings with Multilateral Contracts”
Dec 01 – Ambuj Dewan – “Models of Persuasion with Costly Information Acquisition”