[21.] The Institutional Foundations of the Power to Persuade, with Ian Turner
Forthcoming, American Journal of Political Science

[20.] Bending the Iron Law, with Giovanna Invernizzi
Forthcoming, American Journal of Political Science

[19.] Theories of Democratic Backsliding, with Edoardo Grillo, Zhaotian Luo, and Monika Nalepa
Annual Review of Political Science, 2024, 27: 381-400

[18.] The Effect of Sustained Transparency on Electoral Accountability, with Guy Grossman and Kristin Michelitch
American Journal of Political Science, 2024, 68(3): 1022-1040
Pre-Analysis PlanSupplemental AppendixPolicy Brief

[17.] Reference Points and Democratic Backsliding, with Edoardo Grillo
American Journal of Political Science, 2023, 67(1): 71-88
Winner of the 2024 “Best Article Award,” APSA Formal Theory Section

[16.] Wisdom of the Crowd? Information Aggregation in Representative Democracy, with Stephane Wolton
Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, 135: 86-95
Supplemental Appendix

[15.] Party Nomination Strategies in List Proportional Representation Systems, with Peter Buisseret, Olle Folke, and Johanna Rickne
American Journal of Political Science, 2022, 66(3): 714-729
An earlier version won the “CQ Press Award” for best paper on legislative studies at APSA 2018

[14.] Competing Principals? Legislative Representation in List PR Systems, with Peter Buisseret
American Journal of Political Science, 2022, 66(1): 156-170

[13.] After Citizens United: How Outside Spending Shapes American Democracy, with Nour Abdul-Razzak and Stephane Wolton
Electoral Studies, 2020, 67: 102-190
Monkey cage post

[12.] Voting Behavior under Proportional Representation, with Peter Buisseret
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2020, 32(1): 96-111

[11.] Self-Enforcing Partisan Procedures, with Daniel Diermeier and Razvan Vlaicu
Journal of Politics, 2020, 82(3): 937-954

[10.] Campaign Cost and Electoral Accountability, with Stephane Wolton
Political Science Research and Methods, 2019, 7(1): 1-21
Appendix – Blog post – Replication: Do, Dta (Stata 13) – Data construction: Do (Publicly available data sets: 1, 2, 3)

[9.] Rational Ignorance, Populism, and Reform, with Stephane Wolton
European Journal of Political Economy, 2018, 55: 119-135
Supplemental AppendixBlog post

[8.] Electoral Imbalances and their Consequences, with Stephane Wolton
Journal of Politics, 2018, 80(4): 1168-1182
Supplemental Appendix

[7.] Electoral Competition and Policy Feedback Effects
Journal of Politics, 2018, 80(1): 195-210

[6.] Citizens United: A Theoretical Evaluation, with Stephane Wolton
Political Science Research and Methods, 2017, 5(3): 567-574

[5.] The Hidden Cost of Direct Democracy, with Bruno Strulovici
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2017, 29(3): 440-466

[4.] A Bargaining Model of Endogenous Procedures, with Daniel Diermeier and Razvan Vlaicu
Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, 47(4): 985–1012

[3.] The Voters’ Curses: Why we Need Goldilocks Voters, with Stephane Wolton
American Journal of Political Science, 2016, 60(3): 726-737
Supplemental AppendixAdditional Proofs – Extensions

[2.] Electoral Control and the Human Capital of Politicians, with Peter Buisseret
Games and Economic Behavior, 2016 98: 34-55
Blog post

[1.] Procedural Choice in Majoritarian Organizations, with Daniel Diermeier and Razvan Vlaicu
American Journal of Political Science, 2015, 54(4): 866-879
Supplemental Appendix

CURRENT RESEARCH

An Overview of Ranked Choice Voting

TEACHING

POLS GR8211 Political Economy of Institutions [PhD-level Formal Theory III] (syllabus)

POLS W4732 Research Topics in Game Theory [PhD-level Formal Theory II] (syllabus)

ECPS4921 Seminar in Political Economy [Senior Seminar] (syllabus)