Cognitive Imprecision and Small-Stakes Risk Aversion*

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Abstract

Observed choices between risky lotteries are difficult to reconcile with expected utility maximization, both because subjects appear to be too risk averse with regard to small gambles for this to be explained by diminishing marginal utility of wealth, as stressed by Rabin (2000), and because subjects’ responses involve a random element. We propose a unified explanation for both anomalies, similar to the explanation given for related phenomena in the case of perceptual judgments: they result from judgments based on imprecise (and noisy) mental representations of the decision situation. In this model, risk aversion results from a sort of perceptual bias — but one that represents an optimal decision rule, given the limitations of the mental representation of the situation. We propose a quantitative model of the noisy mental representation of simple lotteries, based on other evidence regarding numerical cognition, and test its ability to explain the choice frequencies that we observe in a laboratory experiment.

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Risk-averse choices are conventionally explained as reflecting expected utility maximization (EUM) on the part of decision makers for whom the marginal utility of additional wealth decreases with increases in their wealth. Experimentally observed choices under risk are difficult to reconcile with this theory, however, for several reasons.\(^1\) One is the observation that people often decline even very small bets that offer somewhat better than fair odds. In the case of any smooth utility-of-wealth function, choices ought to become nearly risk-neutral in the case of small enough stakes (Arrow, 1971). And while it is always possible to explain rejection of any given bet by assuming sufficient rapidly diminishing marginal utility of wealth, the degree of curvature of the utility function that is required will then imply that the same person should reject even extremely favorable bets when potential losses are moderately large (though in no way catastrophic), as explained by Rabin (2000); this too seems plainly counter-factual.\(^2\)

A well-known response to this difficulty (Rabin and Thaler, 2001) is to propose that people maximize the expected value of a nonlinear utility function, but that this function is reference-dependent: it is not a context-invariant function of wealth, but instead depends on how the wealth that may be obtained in different possible states compares to some reference level of wealth.\(^3\) But this proposed solution raises a further question: why the human mind should exhibit such reference-dependence, if it leads to behavior that would seem not to be in the decision maker's interest.\(^4\) Simply stating that this appears to be what many people prefer — as if they perfectly understand what they are getting from their choices and nonetheless persistently choose that way — is not entirely convincing. We propose instead an alternative interpretation, under which decision makers often fail to accurately choose the option that would best serve their true objectives, because their decision is based not on the exact characteristics of the available options, but rather on an imprecise mental representation of them.

Our alternative explanation has the advantage that it can simultaneously explain another well-established feature of choice behavior in experimental settings: that choices appear to be random, in the sense that the same subject will not always make the same choice when offered the same set of simple gambles on different occasions (Hey and Orme, 1994; Hey, 1995, 2001). We propose that this should be understood as reflecting imprecision in the cognitive processes involved in making a choice, in the same way as random trial-to-trial variation in perceptual judgments (say, about the relative magnitude of two sensory stimuli) is understood.\(^5\)

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\(^1\)For a broader review, see Friedman \textit{et al.} (2014).

\(^2\)Rabin’s argument appeals to introspection. But see Cox \textit{et al.} (2013) for examples of experiments in which subjects make choices with respect to both small and large bets that are inconsistent with EUM under any possible concave utility function.

\(^3\)Fudenberg and Levine (2006, 2011) offer a different potential explanation. But as with the hypothesis of reference-dependent preferences, their explanation for small-stakes risk aversion provides no explanation for other phenomena that we address in this paper, such as the observation of risk-seeking with respect to small losses along with risk-aversion with respect to small gains.

\(^4\)As Rabin and Thaler (2001) point out, “myopic loss-aversers ... make decisions that mean that others can take money from them with very high probability and very low risk.” They also note that such exploitation seems all too commonplace. Our point is not to assert that the predictions of such a model must be wrong, but rather to urge that persistent behavior of this kind calls for an explanation.

\(^5\)For additional types of evidence also suggesting that the valuations that can be accessed when making
As reviewed in Woodford (2019), the standard approach to modeling imprecision of this kind in perceptual judgments, since the work of Fechner (1860) and Thurstone (1927), attributes the randomness in perceptual judgments to randomness in internal representations of the stimulus features in the brain of the observing subject, and not necessarily to any sub-optimality of the judgments that are produced on the basis of that imperfect representation of the world. Such an approach has the advantage of allowing for random variation in the responses that are given on individual occasions, while nonetheless retaining a fairly constrained specification of the nature of the randomness. The “decoding” of the information contained in the noisy internal representation can be assumed to be optimal, leading to a precise specification of this part of the model on normative grounds; the nature of the noise in the “encoding” process is specified more flexibly, but this can be a subject of empirical study (for example, using neurophysiological measurements), and can also be experimentally manipulated (by changing conditions in ways that should predictably increase or decrease encoding noise), as we discuss further below.

In essence, we propose that small-stakes risk aversion can be explained in the same way as perceptual biases that result from noise in internal representations. According to our theory, intuitive estimates of the value of risky prospects (not ones resulting from explicit symbolic calculations) are based on mental representations of the magnitudes of the available monetary payoffs that are imprecise in roughly the same way that the representations of sensory magnitudes are imprecise, and in particular are similarly random, conditioning on the true payoffs. Intuitive valuations must be some function of these random mental representations. We explore the hypothesis that they are produced by a decision rule that is optimal, in the sense of maximizing the (objective) expected value of the decision maker’s expected wealth, subject to the constraint that the decision must be based on the random mental representation of the situation.

Under a particular model of the noisy coding of monetary payoffs, we show that this hypothesis will imply apparently risk-averse choices: the expected net payoff of a bet will have to be strictly positive for indifference, in the sense that the subject accepts the bet exactly as often as she rejects it. Risk aversion of this sort is consistent with a decision rule that is actually optimal from standpoint of an objective (expected wealth maximization) that involves no “true risk aversion” at all; this bias is consistent with optimality in the same way that perceptual biases can be consistent with optimal inference from noisy sensory data. And not only can our theory explain apparent risk aversion without any appeal to diminishing marginal utility, but it can also explain why the “risk premium” required in order for a risky bet to be accepted over a certain payoff does not shrink to zero (in percentage terms) as the size of the bet is made small, contrary to the prediction of EUM.

This explanation has two important advantages over other proposed explanations. First, it is more parsimonious: rather than introducing separate free parameters to account for risk attitudes on the one hand and the randomness of choice on the other, the same parameter (the degree of noise in internal representations) must account for both phenomena in our decision are imprecise, see Butler and Loomes (1988, 2007) and Bayrak and Hey (2019).

6Our theory is thus similar to proposals in other contexts (such as Koszégi and Rabin, 2008) to interpret experimentally observed behavior in terms of mistakes on the part of decision makers — i.e., a failure to make the choices that would maximize their true preferences — rather than a reflection of some more complex type of preferences.
theory. In addition, the same hypothesis of optimal choice on the basis of noisy internal representations provides a unified explanation for a number of additional experimentally observed phenomena (such as the “isolation effect” and “reflection effect” of Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), that require additional, seemingly independent hypotheses in the account of them given in prospect theory.

And second, the hypothesis that these effects result from imprecision in internal representations, rather than from true preferences and random error in subjects’ reporting of those preferences, suggests that the degree to which both stochastic choice and risk aversion are observed should vary across individuals and situations as a result of variation in the amount of working memory capacity that can be devoted to the representation of the numerical magnitudes involved in a given choice problem. Various pieces of evidence (discussed further in section 5) suggest that this is the case.

Both our own results below and a replication of our work by Garcia et al. (2018) show that subjects whose choices are more random tend to exhibit greater small-stakes risk aversion, and Garcia et al. further show that both the randomness of choice and risk aversion in choices between lotteries correlates with an independent measure of imprecision in subjects’ internal representations of numerical magnitudes. Moreover, subjects’ capacity for representation of numerical magnitudes appears to be subject to experimental manipulation. Authors such as Gerhardt et al. (2016) find that increased “cognitive load” increases the apparent risk aversion of subjects, while Frydman and Jin (2019) show that choice between lotteries can be made less stochastic by reducing the range of payoffs used across different trials. None of these effects can be explained by a preference-based account of either small-stakes risk aversion or stochastic choice.

While our approach is based on an analogy with imprecision in perceptual judgments, as modeled in the psychophysical tradition originating with the work of Fechner (1860), it differs from what are sometimes called “Fechnerian” models of stochastic choice (e.g., Block and Marshack, 1960, or Butler, Isoni and Loomes, 2012). In such models, a deterministic valuation of a given lottery is assumed to be precisely computed (say, in accordance with expected utility theory), but then a random term is added to the valuation in any individual trial; such models allow choice to be stochastic, but risk attitudes must still be explained by the “deterministic core” of the model, in a way that is independent of the randomness. In our theory, instead, the randomness in choice is attributed to random errors at an earlier stage in the valuation process, which also give rise to departures from risk neutrality.

At the same time, suggesting an analogy with perceptual biases does not mean that the random errors of interest to us arise only in the perception of data as they are presented to the subject. This is not even true of perceptual judgments, except of the simplest kind. Drugowitsch et al. (2016) consider perceptual comparison tasks in which the properties of two sequences of stimuli must be averaged and then compared with one another, allowing them to determine (from the way in which the degree of randomness in responses varies with changes in the sequences to be compared) how much of the randomness in responses is due to (a) noise in the initial perceptions of individual stimuli, (b) noise in subsequent processing of the initial sensory data to obtain an assessment of the average for the sequence, or (c) noise in reporting the answer implied by those internal computations. They conclude that in their task, the most important source of randomness is of type (b), which the call “inference noise”. Similarly in our case, we suppose that the important source of noise is
error in the representations of numerical magnitudes that are subsequently accessed in the decision process, rather than error in the initial recognition of the meaning of the symbols presented to the experimental subject.

Under our hypothesis about the source of small-stakes risk aversion, it is important to jointly model the determinants of average responses and the randomness in the responses on individual trials. This has implications not only for theoretical modeling, but for the experimental procedures that should be used to measure risk attitudes. One should not expect to be able to measure people’s noise-free preferences by simply measuring modal or median responses, and assuming that a deterministic model of choice should fit those summary data, as is often presumed in the experimental literature, as a way of side-stepping the issue of modeling the noise in individual responses. Instead, the perspective that we propose implies that it is necessary to model the entire distribution of responses that are predicted to occur under any given objective choice situation.

Given this, different experimental procedures are appropriate as well. Rather than seeking to obtain a single measure of what is “really” preferred in a given choice situation — by offering each choice problem only once, and presenting closely related problems together in order to encourage consistent answers across several problems — we instead use methods similar to those of perceptual studies (or papers like Mosteller and Nogee, 1951): individual choice problems are presented repeatedly to the same subject, but in random order so as to encourage an independent judgment in each case. For this reason, we offer new experimental evidence, despite the extensive prior work on choice between simple gambles.

Section 1 reviews evidence regarding the mental representation of numerical magnitudes that motivates our model of noisy coding of monetary payoffs. Section 2 presents an explicit model of choice between a simple risky gamble and a certain monetary payoff, and derives predictions for the both the randomness of choice and the degree of apparent risk aversion implied by an optimal decision rule. Section 3 describes a simple experiment in which we are able to test some of the specific quantitative predictions of this model. Section 4 discusses the implications of our theory for additional phenomena reported in experiments such as those of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Finally, section 5 discusses further evidence suggesting that small-stakes risk aversion reflects imprecise cognition, rather than perfectly understood preferences, and concludes.

1 Imprecision in Numerical Cognition

An important recent literature on the neuroscience of perception argues that biases in perceptual judgments can actually reflect optimal decisions — in the sense of minimizing average error, according to some well-defined criterion, in a particular class of situations that are possible ex ante — given the constraint that the brain can only produce judgments based on the noisy information provided to it by sensory receptors and earlier stages of processing in the nervous system, rather than on the basis of direct access to the true physical properties of external stimuli (e.g., Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006; Wei and Stocker, 2015). The approach has been used to explain systematic biases in perception in a variety of sensory domains (Petzschner et al., 2015; Wei and Stocker, 2017).

The relevance of these observations about perceptual judgments for economic decision
might nonetheless be doubted. Some may suppose that the kind of imprecision in mental coding just discussed matters for the way in which we perceive our environment through our senses, but that an intellectual consideration of hypothetical choices is an entirely different kind of thinking. Moreover, it might seem that typical decisions about whether to accept gambles in a laboratory setting involve only numerical information about potential payoffs that is presented in an exact (symbolic) form, offering no obvious opportunity for imprecise perception. However, we have reason to believe that reasoning about numerical information often involves imprecise mental representations of a kind directly analogous to those involved in sensory perception.

1.1 Imprecise Perception of Numerosity

This is clearest (and has been studied most thoroughly) in the case of perceptions of the number of items present in a visual display. For example, quick judgments can be made about the number of dots present in a visual display of a random cloud of dots, without taking the time to actually count them. As with perceptions of physical magnitudes such as length or area, such judgments of numerosity are subject to random error. And just as in the case of sensory magnitudes, the randomness in judgments can be attributed to randomness in the neural coding of numerosity (Nieder and Merten, 2007; Nieder and Dehaene, 2009; Nieder, 2013).

We can learn about how the degree of randomness of the mental representation of a number varies with its size from the frequency distribution of errors in estimation of numerosity. A common finding is that when subjects must estimate which of two numerosities is greater, or whether two arrays contain the same number of dots, the accuracy of their judgments does not depend simply on the absolute difference in the two numbers; instead, the absolute difference required for a given degree of accuracy grows as the numbers are made larger, and roughly in proportion to their magnitudes — a “Weber’s Law” for the discrimination of numerosity analogous to the one observed to hold in many sensory domains (Ross, 2003; Cantlon and Brannon, 2006; Nieder and Merten, 2007; Nieder, 2013). Moreover, when subjects must report an estimate of the number of dots in a visual array,\(^7\) the standard deviation of the distribution of estimates grows in proportion to the mean estimate, with both the mean and standard deviation being larger when the true number is larger (Izard and Dehaene, 2008; Kramer et al., 2011); similarly, when subjects are required to produce a particular number of responses (without counting them), the standard deviation of the number produced varies in proportion to the mean number of responses produced — the property of “scalar variability” (Whalen et al., 1999; Cordes et al., 2001).

All of these observations are consistent with a theory according to which such judgments of numerosity are based on an internal representation that can be represented mathematically by a quantity that is proportional to the logarithm of the numerical value that is being encoded, plus a random error the variance of which is independent of the numerical value.

\(^7\)Here we refer to arrays containing more than five or so dots. As discussed by Jevons (1871) and many subsequent authors, the numerosity of very small arrays can be immediately perceived (without counting) with high accuracy and confidence; the cognitive process used in such cases, termed “subitizing” by Kaufman et al. (1949), is quite distinct from the ability to estimate the approximate numerosity of larger arrays, to which the statements in the text refer.
that is encoded (van Oeffelen and Vos, 1982; Izard and Dehaene, 2008). Let the number \( n \) be represented by a real number \( r \) that is drawn from a distribution

\[
    r \sim N(\log n, \nu^2),
\]

(1.1)

where \( \nu \) is a parameter independent of \( n \). Suppose furthermore that if two stimuli of respective numerosities \( n_1 \) and \( n_2 \) are presented, their corresponding internal representations \( r_1, r_2 \) are independent draws from the corresponding distributions.

Finally, suppose that a subject judges the second array to be more numerous than the first if and only if the internal representations satisfy \( r_2 > r_1 \). (This is an optimal decision rule, in the sense of maximizing the frequency of correct answers, assuming that any given pair of stimuli are equally likely to be presented in either order.) Then a subject is predicted to respond that array 2 is more numerous with probability

\[
    \text{Prob}[\text{“2 is more”}] = \Phi \left( \frac{\log(n_2/n_1)}{\sqrt{2}\nu} \right),
\]

(1.2)

where \( \Phi(z) \) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variate \( z \).

Equation (1.2) predicts that “Weber’s Law” should be satisfied: the response probability depends only on the ratio \( n_2/n_1 \), and not on the absolute numerosity of either array. And indeed, Garcia et al. (2018) find that response probabilities are close to being scale-invariant in this sense. The equation also predicts that the \( z \)-transformed response probability \( (z(p) \equiv \Phi^{-1}(p)) \) should be an increasing linear function of \( \log(n_2/n_1) \), and hence an approximately linear function of \( n_2 \) (for values of \( n_2 \) near some fixed value of \( n_1 \)), with an intercept of zero when \( n_2 = n_1 \), and a positive slope that decreases for higher values of the reference numerosity \( n_1 \); this is exactly what the discrimination data of Krueger (1984) show.\(^8\)

The observed variability of estimates of numerosity is consistent with the same kind of model of noisy coding. Suppose that the subject’s estimate \( \hat{n} \) of the numerosity of some array must be produced on the basis of the noisy internal representation \( r \) hypothesized above. If we approximate the prior distribution from which the true numerosity \( n \) is drawn (in a given experimental context) by a log-normal distribution, \( \log n \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2) \), then the posterior distribution for \( n \), conditional on an internal representation \( r \) drawn from (1.1), will also be log-normal: \( \log n|r \sim N(\mu_{\text{post}}(r), \sigma_{\text{post}}^2) \). Here \( \mu_{\text{post}}(r) \) is an affine function of \( r \), with a slope \( 0 < \beta < 1 \) given by

\[
    \beta \equiv \frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2 + \nu^2},
\]

(1.3)

while \( \sigma_{\text{post}}^2 > 0 \) is independent of \( r \) (see the online appendix for details).

If we hypothesize that the subject’s numerosity estimate is optimal, in the sense of minimizing the mean squared estimation error when stimuli are drawn from the assumed prior distribution, then we should expect the subject’s estimate to be given by the posterior

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\(^8\)See Figure 5 of Krueger (1984), in which the three panels correspond to three successively larger values of \( n_1 \), and further discussion in Woodford (2019).

\(^9\)We adopt this approximation in order to allow a simple analytical calculation of the posterior distribution, even though in the experiments referred to here, the value of \( n \) is actually always an integer. Note that in the application of this model in section 2, monetary payments are assumed to be positive real numbers rather than integers.
mean, $\hat{n}(r) = \mathbb{E}[n|r]$. In this case, $\log \hat{n}(r)$ will be an affine function of $r$, with a slope of $\beta$. This result, together with (1.1), implies that conditional on the true numerosity $n$, the estimate $\hat{n}$ will be log-normally distributed: $\log \hat{n} \sim N(\mu(n), \sigma^2)$, where $\mu(n)$ is an affine function of $\log n$ with slope $\beta$, and $\sigma^2$ is independent of $n$. It then follows from the properties of log-normal distributions that

$$\frac{\text{SD}[\hat{n}]}{\mathbb{E}[\hat{n}]} = \sqrt{e^{\sigma^2} - 1} > 0,$$

regardless of the true numerosity $n$. Thus the property of scalar variability is predicted by a model of optimal estimation.

A further implication of a Bayesian model of numerosity estimation is that the average subjective estimate $\mathbb{E}[\hat{n}|n]$ should in general differ from the true numerosity $n$: subjects’ estimates should be biased. Specifically, the model just proposed implies a power-law relationship,

$$\mathbb{E}[\hat{n}|n] = An^\beta$$

for some $A > 0$, where $0 < \beta < 1$ is again defined by (1.3). This implies over-estimation of small numerosities (greater than five), but under-estimation of larger numerosities, to a progressively greater extent the larger the true numerosity $n$. This kind of “regressive bias” in subjects’ estimates of numerosity is characteristic of all experiments in this area, beginning with the classic study of Kaufman et al. (1949). In fact, authors often report that average estimates can be fit reasonably well by a concave power law (or log-log plot), of the kind derived above (Krueger, 1972, 1984; Indow and Ida, 1977; Kramer et al., 2011). The cross-over point, however, at which the bias switches from over-estimation to under-estimation varies across studies; Izard and Dehaene (2008) point out that it depends on the range of numerosities used in the study in question. This is clearly shown by Anobile et al. (2012), who find different concave mappings from $n$ to $\mathbb{E}[\hat{n}|n]$ in two experiments using similar methodologies, but different ranges for the true numerosities used in the experiment (1 to 30 dots in one case, 1 to 100 dots in the other).

As shown in the online appendix, this is just what the Bayesian model proposed above would predict: if we vary $\mu$ across experiments, holding the other parameters fixed, the cross-over point is predicted to vary in proportion to the variation in the prior mean of $n$. The Bayesian model also predicts, for a given prior, that increased imprecision in mental coding (a larger value of $\nu$) should result in a lower value of $\beta$, and hence a more concave relationship between the true and estimated numerosities; and this is what Anobile et al. (2012) find when subjects’ cognitive load is increased, by requiring them to perform another perceptual classification task in addition to estimating the number of dots present. Thus many quantitative features of observed errors in judgments of numerosity are consistent with a model of optimal judgment based on a noisy internal representation of numerosity, and a specific (log-normal) model of the noisy coding of numerical magnitudes in such cases.

### 1.2 Symbolically Presented Numerical Information

The well-documented imprecision in people’s perception of visually presented numerical information might seem, however, to be irrelevant for typical laboratory decisions under risk,
in which the relevant monetary amounts are described to the decision maker using number symbols. One might reasonably suppose that symbolically presented numbers are generally understood precisely by the hearer; and to the extent that perceptual errors do occur, they should not generally be expected to conform to Weber’s Law, as in the case of sensory magnitudes. (If it were a simple matter of sometimes mis-hearing numbers stated by an experimenter, one might expect that $34.13 could more easily be mistaken for $44.13 than for $34.89.)

Nonetheless, there is a good deal of evidence suggesting that even when numerical quantities are presented using symbols such as Arabic numerals, the semantic content of the symbol is represented in the brain in a way that is similar to the way in which magnitudes are represented — involving imprecision, just as with the representation of physical magnitudes, and with similar quantities represented in similar ways, so that nearby numerical magnitudes are more likely to be confused with one another (Dehaene, 2011). This is not the only way in which numerical information is understood to be represented in the brain; according to the well-known “triple-code model” of Dehaene (1992), numbers are represented in three different ways (three “codes”), in circuits located in different regions of the brain, each with a distinct function. An “Arabic code” is used for explicit multi-digit arithmetic calculations, while simple verbal counting and retrieval of memorized facts of arithmetic are instead executed via a “verbal code.”

Yet a third code, the “analog magnitude code,” is drawn upon in tasks involving number comparisons and approximation. This is thought to be a “semantic” representation of the size of the quantity represented by a given number — “the abstract quantity meaning of numbers rather than the numerical symbols themselves” (Dehaene et al., 2003, p. 492) — and to be independent of the symbolic form in which the number is presented. Scalp EEG recordings while subjects process information presented in the form of Arabic numerals also indicate that the neural patterns evoked by particular numbers vary continuously with numerical distance, so that (for example) the neural signals for “3” are more similar to those for “4” than to those for “5” (Spitzer et al., 2017; Teichmann et al., 2018; Luyckx et al., 2018).

The existence of an approximate semantic representation of numerical quantities, even when numbers are presented symbolically, can also be inferred behaviorally from the ability of patients with brain injuries that prevent them from performing even simple arithmetic (using the exact facts of arithmetic learned in school) to nonetheless make fairly accurate approximate judgments (Dehaene and Cohen, 1991). In normal adult humans, this approximate “number sense” seems also to be drawn upon when number comparisons are made very quickly, or when previously presented numerical information that has not been precisely memorized must be recalled (Moyer and Landauer, 1967; Dehaene et al., 1990).

Moreover, there is evidence that the mental representation of numerical information used for approximate calculations involves the same kind of logarithmic compression as in the case of non-symbolic numerical information, even when the numerical magnitudes have originally been presented symbolically. Moyer and Landauer (1967), Buckley and Gillman (1974), and Banks et al. (1976) find that the reaction time required to judge which of two numbers (presented as numerals) is larger varies with the distance between the numbers on a compressed, nonlinear scale — a logarithmic scale, as assumed in the model of the coding of numerosity sketched above, or something similar — rather than the linear (arithmetic) distance between them. Further evidence suggesting that such judgments are based on
imprecise analog representations of the numbers presented comes from the finding of Frydman and Jin (2019) that the distance between numbers required for their relative size to be correctly judged with a given probability shrinks when the range of variation in the numbers presented in the experiment is smaller; such an effect is difficult to explain if errors are attributed to mistakes in processing the presented number symbols.\(^\text{10}\)

In an even more telling example for our purposes, Dehaene and Marques (2002) showed that in a task where people had to estimate the prices of products, the estimates produced exhibited the property of scalar variability, just as with estimates of the numerosity of a visual display. This was found to be the case, even though both the original information people had received about prices and the responses they produced involved symbolic representations of numbers. Evidently, an approximate analog representation of the prices remained available in memory, though the precise symbolic representation of the prices could no longer be accessed.

Not only is there evidence for the existence of an approximate semantic representation of numerical information that is presented symbolically; it seems likely that this “analog magnitude code” is the same representation of number that is used when numbers are presented non-symbolically. The region in the intraparietal sulcus that is thought to be the locus of the analog magnitude code seems to be activated by the presentation of numerical stimuli, regardless of the format in which the information is presented: written words or Arabic numerals, visual or auditory presentations, symbolic or non-symbolic (Piazza et al., 2004; Brannon, 2006). If this is true, it means that we should expect the quantitative model of imprecise internal representations that explains the perception of numerosity, a context in which the statistical structure of errors has been documented in more detail, to also apply to the imprecise internal representations that are drawn upon when fast, approximate judgments are made about symbolically presented numerical information. We shall explore the implications of this hypothesis for risky choice.

More specifically, our hypothesis is that when people must decide whether a risky prospect (offering either of two possible monetary amounts as the outcome) is worth more or less than another monetary amount that could be obtained with certainty, they can make a quick, intuitive judgment about the relative value of the two options using the same mental faculty as is involved in making a quick estimate (without explicit use of precise arithmetic calculations) as to whether the sum of two numbers is greater or less than some other number.

If this is approached as an approximate judgment rather than an exact calculation (as will often be the case, even with numerate subjects), such a judgment is made on the basis of mental representations of the monetary amounts that are approximate and analog, rather than exact and symbolic; and these representations involve a random location of the amount on a logarithmically compressed “mental number line.” The randomness of the internal representation of the numerical quantity (or perhaps, of its value to the decision maker) then provides an explanation for the randomness in laboratory decisions as to whether to accept simple gambles; and as we show below, the logarithmic compression provides an explanation for subjects’ apparent risk aversion, even in the case of gambles for fairly small stakes.

\(^{10}\)Their result can instead be explained by the model of logarithmic coding presented in the previous section, under a small extension of the model discussed in the online appendix.
Note that we do not assume that all decisions involving money are made in this way. If someone is asked to choose between $20 and $22, either of which can be obtained with certainty, we do not expect that they will sometimes choose the $20, because of noise in their subjective sense of the size of these two magnitudes. The question whether $20 is greater or smaller than $22 can instead be answered reliably (by anyone who remembers how to count), using the “verbal code” hypothesized by Dehaene (1992) to represent the numbers, rather than the “analog magnitude code.”

Likewise, we do not deny that numerate adults, if they take sufficient care (and consciously recognize the problem facing them as having the mathematical structure of a type of arithmetic problem), are capable of exact calculations of averages or expected values that would not introduce the kind of random error modeled in the next section. Nonetheless, we hypothesize that questions about small gambles in laboratory settings (even when incentivized) are often answered on the basis of an intuitive judgment based on approximate analog representations of the quantities involved. Note also that our hypothesis does not depend on an assumption that numerical quantities are mis-perceived at the time that the problem is described to the subject; our model of lottery choice is perfectly consistent with the subject being able to repeat back to the experimenter the quantities that he has been told are at stake. But even when the subject knows exactly what the numbers are (i.e., has access to an exact description of them using the “verbal code”), if the decision problem is not trivial to answer on the basis of these numbers, we suppose that he may resort to an approximate judgment on the basis of the imprecise semantic representation of the numbers, present in the brain at the same time.

While our results here cannot prove this, we suspect that many economic decisions in everyday life are also made on the basis of approximate calculations using imprecise semantic representations of numerical magnitudes. The situation in typical laboratory experiments studying choice under risk is actually the one that is most favorable to the use of explicit mental arithmetic: the possible payoffs are completely enumerated and explicitly stated, and the associated probabilities are explicitly stated as well. If, as our results suggest, choices can be based on approximate calculations of the kind that we model even in such a simple and artificial setting, it seems even more likely that cognitive mechanisms of this kind are employed in real situations where the relevant data are only estimates to begin with.

2 A Model of Noisy Coding and Risky Choice

We now consider the implications of a model of noisy internal representation of numerical magnitudes for choices between simple lotteries. We assume a situation in which a subject is presented with a choice between two options: receiving a monetary amount $C > 0$ with certainty, or receiving the outcome of a lottery, in which she will have a probability $0 < p < 1$ of receiving a monetary amount $X > 0$. We wish to consider how decisions should be made if they must be based on imprecise internal representations of the monetary amounts rather than their exact values.

We hypothesize that the subject’s decision rule is optimal, in the sense of maximizing the expected value of $U(W)$, subject to the constraint that the decision must be based on an imprecise representation $r$ of the problem, rather than the true data. Here $W$ is the
subject’s final wealth at the end of the experiment, and \( U(W) \) is an indirect utility function, assumed to be smooth and strictly increasing, indicating the (correctly assessed) expected value to the subject of a given wealth. Note that our conceptualization of the subject’s objective (from the standpoint of which the decision rule can be said to be optimal) involves no “narrow bracketing” of the gains from a particular decision: it is assumed that only final wealth \( W \) matters, and not the sequence of gains and losses by which it is obtained. The expected value is defined with respect to some prior probability distribution over possible decision situations (here, possible values of \( X \) and \( C \) that might be offered).

Let \( W^a \) be the random final wealth if option \( a \) is chosen. If we consider only gambles for small amounts of money, we can use the Taylor approximation

\[
U(W^a) \approx U(W_0) + U'(W_0) \cdot \Delta W^a,
\]

where \( W_0 \) is the subject’s wealth apart from any gain or loss from the experiment, \( \Delta W^a \) is the random monetary amount gained in the experiment if option \( a \) is chosen, and \( U'(W_0) \) is positive for all possible values of \( W_0 \). If we assume furthermore that the subject’s information about \( W_0 \) is coded by some internal representation \( r_0 \), with a distribution that is independent of the details of the gains offered by the decision problem, while the quantities \( X \) and \( C \) have internal representations \( r_x \) and \( r_c \) respectively, that are distributed independently of \( W_0 \), then

\[
E[U(W^a)|r] \approx E[U(W_0)|r_0] + E[U'(W_0)|r_0] \cdot E[\Delta W^a|r_x,r_c]
\]

will be an increasing function of \( E[\Delta W^a|r_x,r_c] \), regardless of the value of \( r_0 \).

It follows that, as long as stakes are small enough, an optimal decision rule is one that chooses the action \( a \) for which the value of \( E[\Delta W^a|r_x,r_c] \) is larger; we therefore consider the hypothesis that decisions are optimal in this sense. Note that our theory’s predictions are thus consistent with “narrow bracketing”: the choice between two risky prospects is predicted to depend only on the distributions of possible net gains associated with those prospects, and not on the level of wealth \( W_0 \) that the subject has from other sources. But for us this is a conclusion (a property of optimal decision rules) rather than a separate assumption. Note also that while we do not deny the reasonableness of assuming that the function \( U(W) \) should involve diminishing marginal utility of wealth (in the case of sufficiently large changes in wealth), the degree of curvature of the function \( U(W) \) plays no role in our predictions. Thus small-stakes risk aversion is not attributed to nonlinear utility of income or wealth in our theory.

In line with the evidence discussed in the previous section regarding internal representations of numerical magnitudes, we assume more specifically that the representations \( r_x \) and \( r_c \) are each a random draw from a probability distribution of possible representations, with distributions

\[
r_x \sim N(\log X, \nu^2), \quad r_c \sim N(\log C, \nu^2).
\]

Here \( \nu > 0 \) is a parameter that measures the degree of imprecision of the internal representation of such quantities (assumed to be the same regardless of the monetary amount that is represented); we further assume that \( r_x \) and \( r_c \) are distributed independently of one another. We treat the parameter \( p \) as known (it does not vary across trials in the experiment described below), so that the decision rule can (and indeed should) depend on this parameter as well.\(^{11}\)

\(^{11}\)See section 4.1 for discussion of an extension of the model in which \( p \) is also imprecisely represented.
As in the model of numerosity perception presented in section 1.2, these representations do not themselves constitute perceived values of the monetary amounts; instead, the internal representations must be “decoded” in order to provide a basis for decision, in the case of a given decision problem. The optimal decision in the case of a pair of mental representations \( \mathbf{r} = (r_x, r_c) \) depends not only on the specification (2.1) of the noisy coding, conditional on the true magnitudes, but also on the relative ex ante likelihood of different possible decision situations, which we specify by a prior probability distribution over possible values of \((X, C)\). We can then consider the optimal decision rule from the standpoint of Bayesian decision theory. It is easily seen that \( \mathbb{E}[\Delta W^a | r_x, r_c] \) is maximized by a rule under which the risky lottery is chosen if and only if

\[
p \cdot \mathbb{E}[X | r_x] > \mathbb{E}[C | r_c],
\]

which is to say if and only if the expected payoff from the risky lottery exceeds the expected value of the certain payoff.\(^{12}\)

The implications of our logarithmic model of noisy coding are simplest to calculate if (as in the model of numerosity estimation) we assume a log-normal prior distribution for possible monetary quantities. To reduce the number of free parameters in our model, we assume that under the prior \(X\) and \(C\) are assumed to be independently distributed, and furthermore that the prior distributions for both \(X\) and \(C\) are the same (some ex ante distribution for possible payments that one may be offered in a laboratory experiment). It is then necessary only to specify the parameters of this common prior:

\[
\log X, \log C \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2). \tag{2.3}
\]

Under the assumption of a common prior for both quantities, the common prior mean \(\mu\) does not affect our quantitative predictions about choice behavior; instead, the value of \(\sigma\) does matter, as this influences the ex ante likelihood of \(X\) being sufficiently large relative to \(C\) for the gamble to be worth taking. The model thus has two free parameters, to be estimated from subjects’ behavior: \(\sigma\), indicating the degree of ex ante uncertainty about what the payoffs might be, and \(\nu\), indicating the degree of imprecision in the coding of information that is presented about those payoffs on a particular trial.

### 2.1 Predicted Frequency of Acceptance of a Gamble

Under this assumption about the prior, the posterior distributions for both \(X\) and \(C\) are log-normal, as in the model of numerosity estimation in the previous section. It follows that the posterior means of these variables are given by

\[
\mathbb{E}[X | \mathbf{r}] = e^{\alpha + \beta r_x}, \quad \mathbb{E}[C | \mathbf{r}] = e^{\alpha + \beta r_c},
\]

with \(\beta\) is again defined by (1.3). (The details are explained in the online appendix.) Taking the logarithm of both sides of (2.2), we see that this condition will be satisfied if and only if

\[
\log p + \beta r_x > \beta r_c,
\]

\(^{12}\)Note that while the payoff \(C\) is certain, rather than random, once one knows the decision situation (which specifies the value of \(C\)), it is a random variable ex ante (assuming that many different possible values of \(C\) might be offered), and continues to be random even conditioning on a subjective representation of the current decision situation, assuming that mental representations are noisy as assumed here.
which is to say, if and only if the internal representation satisfies

\[ r_x - r_c > \beta^{-1} \log p^{-1}. \]  

(2.4)

Under our hypothesis about the mental coding, \( r_x \) and \( r_c \) are independently distributed normal random variables (conditional on the true decision situation), so that

\[ r_x - r_c \sim N(\log X/C, 2\nu^2). \]

It follows that the probability of (2.4) holding, and the risky gamble being chosen, is given by

\[ \text{Prob} \{\text{accept risky} \mid X, C\} = \Phi \left( \frac{\log X/C - \beta^{-1} \log p^{-1}}{\sqrt{2\nu}} \right). \]  

(2.5)

Equation (2.5) is the behavioral prediction of our model. It implies that choice in a problem of this kind should be stochastic, as is typically observed. Furthermore, it implies that across a set of gambles in which the values of \( p \) and \( C \) are the same in each case, but the value of \( X \) varies, the probability of acceptance should be a continuously increasing function of \( X \). This is in fact what one sees in Figure 1, which plots data from Mosteller and Nogee (1951).\(^{13}\) The figure plots the responses of one of their subjects to a series of questions of the type considered here. In each case, the subject was offered a choice of the form: are you willing to pay five cents for a gamble that will pay an amount \( X \) with probability 1/2, and zero with probability 1/2? The figure shows the fraction of trials on which the subject accepted the gamble, in the case of each of several different values of \( X \). The authors used this curve to infer a value of \( X \) for which the subjects would be indifferent between accepting and rejecting the gamble, and then proposed to use this value of \( X \) to identify a point on the subject’s utility function.

Figure 1 plots the data from Mosteller and Nogee (1951), together with a solid curve that graphs the predicted relationship (2.5), in the case that \( \sigma = 0.26 \) and \( \nu = 0.07 \). Note that these values allow a reasonably close fit to the choice frequencies plotted in the figure from Mosteller and Nogee.

Moreover, the parameter values required to fit the data are fairly reasonable ones. The value \( \nu = 0.07 \) for the so-called “Weber fraction” is less than half the value indicated by human performance in comparisons of the numerosity of different fields of dots (Dehaene, 2008, p. 540); on the other hand, Dehaene (2008, p. 552) argues that one should expect the Weber fraction to be smaller in the case of numerical information that is presented symbolically (as in the experiment of Mosteller and Nogee) rather than non-symbolically (as in the numerosity comparison experiments).\(^{14}\) Hence this value of \( \nu \) is not an implausible degree of noise to assume in the mental representations of numerical magnitudes used in

\(^{13}\)This study is of particular interest for our purposes because the authors use a method intended to elicit repeated, independent decisions about exactly the same pair of gambles at different points during the same study, as is common in psychometric studies of imprecision in perception. We follow the same method in our own experiment, reported in the next section.

\(^{14}\)Garcia et al. (2018) have the same subjects do two versions of such a task, one in which the monetary amounts are presented symbolically (as in the experiment of Mosteller and Nogee) and one in which the amounts \( X \) and \( C \) are presented as visual arrays of euro coins. They find similar stochastic choice curves in both cases, but the implied value of \( \nu \) is larger when the amounts are shown visually.
Figure 1: Theoretically predicted probability of acceptance of a simple gamble as a function of the value $X$ when the gamble pays off, for parameter values explained in the text. Circles represent the data from Mosteller and Nogee (1951).

approximate calculations. The value of $\sigma$ for the degree of dispersion of the prior over possible monetary rewards is also plausible. In fact, the distribution of values of $X$ used in the trials reported in the figure is one in which the standard deviation of log $X$ is 0.34, so that the implicit prior attributed to the subject by our model is of at least the right order of magnitude.

2.2 Explaining the Rabin Paradox

Our model explains not only the randomness of the subject’s choices, but also her apparent risk aversion, in the sense that the indifference point (a value of $X$ around 10.7 cents in Figure 1) corresponds to a gamble that is better than a fair bet. This is a general prediction of the model, since the indifference point is predicted to be at $X/C = (1/p)^{\beta - 1} > 1/p$, where the latter quantity would correspond to a fair bet. The model predicts risk neutrality (indifference when $X/C = 1/p$) only in the case that $\beta = 1$, which according to (1.3) can occur only in the limiting cases in which $\nu = 0$ (perfect precision of the mental representation of numerical magnitudes), or $\sigma$ is unboundedly large (radical uncertainty about the value of the payoff that may be offered, which is unlikely in most contexts).

The model furthermore explains the Rabin (2000) paradox: the fact that the compensation required for risk does not become negligible in the case of small bets. According to EUM, the value of $X$ required for indifference in a decision problem of the kind considered above should be implicitly defined by the equation

$$pU(W_0 + X) + (1 - p)U(W_0) = U(W_0 + C).$$

For any increasing, twice continuously differentiable utility function $U(W)$ with $U'' < 0$, if $0 < p < 1$, this condition implicitly defines a solution $X(C; p)$ with the property that
\( pX(C; p)/C > 1 \) for all \( C > 0 \), implying risk aversion. However, as \( C \) is made small, \( pX(C; p)/C \) necessarily approaches 1. Hence the ratio \( pX/C \) required for indifference exceeds 1 (the case of a fair bet) only by an amount that becomes arbitrarily small in the case of a small enough bet. It is not possible for the required size of \( pX \) to exceed the certain payoff even by 7 percent (as in the case shown in Figure 1), in the case of a very small value certain payoff, unless the coefficient of absolute risk aversion \((-U''/U')\) is very large — which would in turn imply an implausible degree of caution with regard to large bets.

In our model, instead, the ratio \( pX/C \) required for indifference should equal \( \Lambda \equiv p^{-(\beta-1)} \), which is greater than 1 (except in the limiting cases mentioned above) by the same amount, regardless of the size of the gamble. As discussed above, the degree of imprecision in mental representations required for \( \Lambda \) to be on the order of 1.07 is one that is quite consistent with other evidence. Hence the degree of risk aversion indicated by the choices in Figure 1 is wholly consistent with a model that would predict only a modest degree of risk aversion in the case of gambles involving thousands of dollars.

It is also worth noting that our explanation for apparent risk aversion in decisions about small gambles does not rely on loss aversion, like the explanation proposed by Rabin and Thaler (2001). Our model of the mental representation of prospective gains assumes that the coding and decoding of the risky payoff \( X \) are independent of the value of \( C \), so that small increases in \( X \) above \( C \) do not have a materially different effect than small decreases of \( X \) below \( C \).

Instead, in our theory the EUM result that the compensation for risk must become negligible in the case of small enough gambles fails for a different reason. Condition (2.4) implies that the risky gamble is chosen more often than not if and only if \( p \cdot m(X) > m(C) \), where \( m(\cdot) \) is a power-law function of a kind that also appears in (1.4). It is as if the decision maker assigned a nonlinear utility \( m(\Delta W^a) \) to the wealth increment \( \Delta W^a \). Our model of optimal decision on the basis of noisy internal representations explains why the ratio \( m(X)/m(C) \) is in general not approximately equal to \( X/C \) even in the case that \( X \) and \( C \) are both small.

### 3 An Experimental Test

A notable feature of the behavioral equation (2.5) is that it predicts that subjects’ choice frequencies should be \textit{scale-invariant}, at least in the case of all small enough gambles: multiplying both \( X \) and \( C \) by an arbitrary common factor should not change the probability of the risky gamble being chosen. This feature of the model makes it easy to see that the Rabin paradox is not problematic for our model. In order to test this predictions of our model, we conducted an experiment of our own, in which we varied the magnitudes of both \( X \) and \( C \). We recruited 20 subjects from the student population at Columbia University, each of whom was presented with a sequence of several hundred trials. Each individual trial presented the subject with a choice between a certain monetary amount \( C \) and a probability \( p \) of receiving a monetary amount \( X \).

\[ 15 \text{ The experimental design is discussed further in the online appendix. Our procedures were approved by the Columbia University Institutional Review Board, under protocol IRB-AAAQ2255.} \]
The probability $p$ of the non-zero outcome under the lottery was 0.58 on all of our trials, as we were interested in exploring the effects of variations in the magnitudes of the monetary payments, rather than variations in the probability of rewards, in order to test our model of the mental coding of monetary amounts. Maintaining a fixed value of $p$ on all trials, rather than requiring the subject to pay attention to the new value of $p$ associated with each trial, also made it more plausible to assume (as in the model above) that the value of $p$ should be known precisely, rather than having to be inferred from an imprecisely coded observation on each occasion.

We chose a probability of 0.58, rather than a round number (such as one-half, as in the Mosteller and Nogee experiment discussed above), in order not to encourage our subjects to approach the problem as an arithmetic problem that they should be able to solve exactly, on the basis of representations of the monetary amounts using the “Arabic code” rather than the “analog magnitude code,” in the terminology of Dehaene (1992). We expect Columbia students to be able to solve simple arithmetic problems using methods of exact mental calculation that are unrelated to the kind of approximate judgments about numerical magnitudes with which our theory is concerned, but did not want to test this in our experiment. We chose dollar magnitudes for $C$ and $X$ on all trials that were not round numbers, either, for the same reason.

The value of the certain payoff $C$ varied across trials, taking on the values $5.55, 7.85, 11.10, 15.70, 22.20, or 31.40. (Note that these values represent a geometric series, with each successive amount $\sqrt{2}$ times as large as the previous one.) The non-zero payoff $X$ possible under the lottery option was equal to $C$ multiplied by a factor $2^{m/4}$, where $m$ took an integer value between 0 and 8. There were thus only a finite number of decision situations (defined by the values of $C$ and $X$) that ever appeared, and each was presented to the subject several times over the course of a session. This allowed us to check whether a subject gave consistent answers when presented repeatedly with the same decision, and to compute the probability of acceptance of the risky gamble in each case, as in the experiment of Mosteller and Nogee. The order in which the various combinations of $C$ and $X$ were presented was randomized, in order to encourage the subject to treat each decision as an independent problem, with the values of both $C$ and $X$ needed to be coded and encoded afresh, and with no expectations about these values other than a prior distribution that could be assumed to be the same on each trial.

Our experimental procedure thus differed from ones often used in decision-theory experiments, where care is taken to present a sequence of choices in a systematic order, so as to encourage the subject to express a single consistent preference ordering. We were instead interested in observing the randomization that, according to our theory, should occur across a series of genuinely independent reconsiderations of a given decision problem; and we were concerned to simplify the context for each decision by eliminating any obvious reason for the data of one problem to be informative about the next.

We also chose a set of possible decision problems with the property that each value of $X$ could be matched with the same geometric series of values for $C$, and vice versa, so that on each trial it was necessary to observe the values of both $C$ and $X$ in order to recognize the problem, and neither value provided much information about the other (as assumed in our theoretical model). At the same time, we ensured that the ratio $X/C$, on which the probability of choosing the lottery should depend according to our model, always took
Figure 2: The probability of choosing the risky lottery, plotted as a function of the risky payoff $X$ (data pooled from all 20 subjects). (a) The probability plotted as a function of $X$, for each of the different values of $C$ (indicated by darkness of lines). (b) The same figure, but plotted against log $X$ for each value of $C$.

on the same finite set of values for each value of $C$. This allowed us to test whether the probability of choosing the lottery would be the same when the same value of $X/C$ recurred with different absolute magnitudes for $X$ and $C$.

3.1 Testing Scale-Invariance

Figure 2 shows how the frequency with which our subjects chose the risky lottery varied with the monetary amount $X$ that was offered in the event that the gamble paid off, for each of the five different values of $C$.\textsuperscript{16} (For this first analysis, we pool the data from all 20 subjects.) Each data point in the figure (shown by a circle) corresponds to a particular combination $(C, X)$.

In the first panel, the horizontal axis indicates the value of $X$, while the vertical axis indicates the frequency of choosing the risky lottery on trials of that kind $[\text{Prob}(\text{Risky})]$. The different values of $C$ are indicated by different colors of circles, with the darker circles corresponding to the lower values of $C$, and the lighter circles the higher values. (The six successively higher values of $C$ are the ones listed above.) We also fit a sigmoid curve to the points corresponding to each of the different values of $C$, where the color of the curve again

\textsuperscript{16}The data used to produce this and all subsequent figures, as well as the results reported in the tables, can be found in Khaw, Li and Woodford (2020).
identifies the value of $C$. Each curve has an equation of the form

$$\text{Prob}(\text{Risky}) = \Phi(\delta_C + \gamma_C \log X), \quad (3.1)$$

where $\Phi(z)$ is again the CDF of the standard normal distribution, and the coefficients $(\delta_C, \gamma_C)$ are estimated separately for each value of $C$ so as to maximize the likelihood of the data corresponding to that value of $C$. Note that for each value of $C$, we obtain a sigmoid curve similar to the one in Figure 1, though the fit is less perfect (at least partly because here, unlike in Figure 1, we are pooling the data from 20 different subjects).

The similarity of the curves obtained for different values of $C$ can be seen more clearly if we plot them as a function of $\log X$, rather than on a scale that is linear in $X$, as shown in the second panel of Figure 2. (The color coding of the curves corresponding to different values of $C$ is again the same.) The individual curves now resemble horizontal shifts of one another. The elasticity $\gamma_C$ is similar for each of the values of $C$ (with the exception of the highest value, $C = \$31.40$), and the value of $\log X$ required for indifference increases by a similar amount each time $C$ is multiplied by another factor of $\sqrt{2}$.

These observations are exactly what we should expect, according to our logarithmic coding model. Condition (2.5) implies that a relationship of the form

$$\text{Prob}(\text{Risky}) = \Phi(\delta + \gamma \log(X/C)) \quad (3.2)$$

should hold for all values of $C$, meaning that in equation (3.1), $\gamma_C$ should be the same for each value of $C$, and that the value of $\log X$ required for indifference should equal a constant.
plus log $C$. We can see more clearly the extent to which these precise predictions hold by plotting the curves in Figure 2(b) as functions of $\log(X/C)$, rather than as functions of $\log X$; this is done in the first panel of Figure 3. The six different curves come close to falling on top of one another, as predicted by the model (although, again, the curve for $C = $31.40 is somewhat out of line with the others). If we instead simply estimate parameters ($\delta, \gamma$) to maximize the likelihood of the pooled data under the model (3.2), we obtain the single choice curve shown in the second panel of Figure 3. This fits the data for the different values of $X/C$ slightly worse than the individual choice curves shown in the previous panel, but not by much. (The maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for the different choice curves, and the associated likelihoods, are reported in the online appendix.)

We can consider quantitatively the extent to which our data are more consistent with the more flexible model (3.1) than with the more restrictive predictions of (3.2), in two different ways. First, we consider the in-sample fit of the two models by selecting a subset of our observations (the “calibration dataset”), and find the parameter estimates for each model that maximize the likelihood of this dataset. The column labeled $LL_{\text{calibration}}$ in Table 1 reports the average maximized value of the log-likelihood of the data in the calibration dataset, when it is chosen in each of four different ways. We use a “four-fold cross-validation” approach, in which the complete dataset is divided into four parts, each containing exactly 1/4 of the observations, and the model parameters are estimated four different times; each time, one of the four parts of the data is held out to be the “validation dataset,” and the other three parts are used as the “calibration dataset.” Thus in the overall exercise, each observation is used equally many times as part of the calibration dataset as every other. The figures in Table 1 report the average values of the statistics obtained in the four different estimations. With regard to in-sample fit, of course, $LL_{\text{calibration}}$ is higher for the more flexible model, since (3.2) is nested within this class of models as a special case.

A more relevant comparison between the in-sample fits of the two models is given by the Bayes information criterion (BIC) statistic, also reported in the table for each model, which penalizes the use of additional free parameters. This is defined as $BIC = -2LL + k\log N_{\text{obs}}$, where $k$ is the number of free parameters (adjusted to maximize the likelihood) for a given model, and $N_{\text{obs}}$ is the number of observations in the calibration dataset. The data provide more evidence in favor of the model with the lower BIC statistic. In particular, for any two models $M_1$ and $M_2$, the Bayes factor $K$ defined by

$$\log K_1 = \frac{1}{2} [BIC(M_2) - BIC(M_1)]$$

is the multiplicative factor by which the relative posterior probability that $M_1$ rather than $M_2$ is the correct model of the data is increased by the observations in the calibration dataset. (See, for example, Burnham and Anderson (2002), p. 303.)

We can also compare the out-of-sample fit of the two models, by reserving some of our observations (the “validation dataset”), and not using them to estimate the model parameters. The column labeled $LL_{\text{validation}}$ in Table 1 then reports the average log-likelihood of the data in the validation dataset under each model, when the parameter values are used

\footnote{Again, the BIC statistics reported in the table are actually the average values of the four BIC statistics obtained for the four different choices of calibration dataset. And as elsewhere in the paper, “log” refers to the natural logarithm.}
<table>
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<th>( LL_{\text{calibration}} )</th>
<th>( BIC )</th>
<th>( LL_{\text{validation}} )</th>
<th>( \log K )</th>
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</table>

Table 1: In-sample and out-of-sample measures of goodness of fit compared for the scale-invariant model (our logarithmic coding model) and an unrestricted statistical model in which a separate choice curve is estimated for each value of \( C \). In the top panel, each model is fit to the pooled data from all 20 subjects. In the bottom panel, separate model parameters are fit to the data for each subject. (See text for further explanation.)

that were estimated using the calibration dataset. If we update the posterior probabilities that the two models \( M_1 \) and \( M_2 \) are correct after observing the validation dataset as well, we obtain a composite Bayes factor \( K = K_1 \cdot K_2 \), where

\[
\log K_2 = LL_{\text{validation}}(M_1) - LL_{\text{validation}}(M_2)
\]

by Bayes’ Rule. The logarithm of the composite Bayes factor \( K \) is reported in the final column of the table, as an overall summary of the degree to which the data provide support for each model, averaged across four different ways of choosing the validation dataset. (In each case, \( M_1 \) is the scale-invariant model, while \( M_2 \) is the alternative model considered on that line of the table; thus values \( K > 1 \) indicate the degree to which the data provide more support for the scale-invariant model than for the alternative.)

In Table 1, we compare two models: our scale-invariant model (3.2) and the unrestricted alternative in which a separate probit model (3.1) is estimated for each of the six values of \( C \), as in Figure 2.\footnote{Note that the scale-invariant model and unrestricted alternative referred to in Table 1 do not correspond precisely to the predictions shown in Figures 2 and 3, since in Figures 2 and 3 the parameters of both models are fit to our entire dataset, while in Table 1 the parameters are estimated using only a subset of the data.} In the case of the scale-invariant model, \( N_{\text{obs}} \) is the total number of observations in the calibration dataset, pooling the data for all six values of \( C \), and there are \( k = 2 \) free parameters in the single model fit to all of these data. In the case of the unrestricted model, a separate probit model (each with \( k = 2 \) free parameters) is estimated for each value of \( C \), and a BIC statistic is computed for that model (where \( N_{\text{obs}} \) is the number of observations in the calibration dataset with that value of \( C \)); the BIC reported in the “Unrestricted” row of the table is then the sum of the BIC statistics for these six independent probit models, just as \( LL_{\text{calibration}} \) is the sum of the log likelihoods for the six models. (More precisely, the table shows the average value of this sum of BIC statistics, for each of the four different “folds” of the data.) In the top panel of the table, the two models are compared when a common set of parameters is used to fit the pooled data from all 20 subjects, as in Figures 2 and 3. In the lower panel, instead, individual model parameters are estimated for each subject, and the statistics reported are sums over all subjects of the corresponding model fit statistics for each subject.
Whether we assume a common set of parameters or subject-specific parameters, we see that the BIC statistic is lower for the scale-invariant model. This means that while the unrestricted model achieves a higher likelihood (necessarily), the data are not fit enough better to justify the use of so many additional free parameters; thus based on the calibration dataset alone, we would have a Bayes factor $K_1 > 1$, meaning an increase in the relative posterior probability of the scale-invariant model (compared to whatever relative probability was assigned to that model in one’s prior). When we then consider out-of-sample fit of the two models, if we assume a common set of parameters for all 20 subjects, the out-of-sample fit is slightly better for the unrestricted model. However, the fit is only modestly better, and when one takes into account both the in-sample and out-of-sample fit of the two models, we obtain an overall Bayes factor $K > 400,000$, greatly increasing the relatively probability of the scale-invariant model.\footnote{Moreover, the slight inferiority of the scale-invariant model with regard to out-of-sample fit is due primarily to the data for a single subject (subject 9), whose choice curves do not satisfy scale-invariance, as shown in the online appendix. If we fit a single set of parameters to the pooled data for all subjects except subject 9, the scale-invariant model fits better both in-sample and out-of-sample.}

If we instead fit separate parameters for each subject, then as shown in the bottom panel of Table 1, the aggregate evidence provides more support for the scale-invariant model both in-sample and out-of-sample. In this case, the overall Bayes factor is greater than $10^{674}$. Thus if we assume that either the scale-invariant model or the more flexible alternative must be the correct model for all subjects (though the parameters may differ across subjects), the evidence is overwhelming in favor of the scale-invariance hypothesis.

Figure 4: In-sample and out-of-sample model comparison statistics, for each of the 20 individual subjects, when separate parameters are estimated for each subject. (See explanation in text.)
In fact, the scale-invariant model fits reasonably well for most of the subjects considered individually. Figure 4 shows a scatter plot of the values of the BIC difference, and the overall Bayes factor $K$, for each individual subject, when separate choice curves are estimated for each subject. Here each open dot corresponds to one subject. The vertical axis plots the amount by which the BIC statistic for the unrestricted model is greater than the one for the scale-invariant model ($\Delta BIC$), divided by $N$, the number of trials for that subject, in order to obtain a measure that is more comparable across subjects. The horizontal axis plots the value of $\log K$, again divided by $N$. (In both cases, the values plotted for each subject are the average of the values obtained for the four different “folds” of the data.) The dashed line identifies points at which $\log K = (1/2) \Delta BIC$, which is to say, points at which there is no difference in $LL_{valuation}$ between the two models. Points to the right of the dashed line are thus those for which $LL_{valuation}$ is higher for the scale-invariant model than for the unrestricted model. We see that the overall Bayes factor favors the scale-invariant model for all but one of the subjects (subject 14). Moreover, the scale-invariant model fits better (or approximately as well) out-of-sample in the case of all of those 9 subjects; while it is favored in-sample by the BIC criterion for 15 out of 20 (only fitting substantially worse in-sample for subject 9).

Garcia et al. (2018) and Frydman and Jin (2019) repeat versions of our experiment, and similarly find near scale-invariance of the choice curves associated with different values of $C$, though they do not report statistical tests of scale invariance like those above. See, for example, the bottom panel of Figure B2 in Frydman and Jin.

Despite this degree of support for our model’s prediction, our data are nonetheless not perfectly scale-invariant. We see in Figure 3 that the estimated choice curve (using pooled data) in the case $C = $31.40 is not a perfect horizontal translation of the others, but instead is somewhat flatter. This may indicate inaccuracy of the assumption of a log-normal prior (2.3), used in our theoretical calculations above for convenience. Under the assumption of a log-normal prior, $\log E[X|r_x]$ is a linearly increasing function of $r_x$, with constant slope $\beta$. But if people instead form correct inferences based on a prior under which monetary payments greater than $50$ are less likely than a log-normal prior would allow, then $\log E[X|r_x]$ would increase less rapidly with further increases in $r_x$, for values of $r_x$ above log 50. This would result in a frequent failure to recognize how attractive the risky lottery truly is when $X$ exceeds $50$, and hence less frequent acceptance of the risky lottery in such cases than the scale-invariant model would predict, as can be observed in Figure 2. (We leave for future work more detailed consideration of the extent to which our data may be better explained by a more subtle account of subjects’ prior beliefs, or by a model of noisy coding that is not exactly logarithmic.)

Holt and Laury (2002) also obtain nearly perfect scale-invariant choice curves (see their Figure 1), when the amounts offered in hypothetical gambles are scaled up by a factor as large as 90 times those used in their small-stakes gambles. They find, however, that their subjects’ apparent degree of risk aversion increases when the scale of the gambles is increased, in the case of gambles for real money (their Figure 2). It is unclear whether this difference

\[Note however that this curve is also less well estimated than the others shown in the figure, as a number of our subjects were not presented with trials including values of $C$ this large, so that the $N_{obs}$ for this case is smaller, as indicated in Table 3 in the online appendix.\]
Table 2: In-sample and out-of-sample measures of goodness of fit for three models: our logarithmic coding model and two additive random-utility models. The format is the same as in Table 1. (See text for further explanation.)

from our results (which also involve real money) reflects a difference in the kind of gambles presented to their subjects, or the fact that their large gambles involved greater amounts of money than even our largest gambles (hundreds of dollars rather than mere tens of dollars). Further studies would be desirable to clarify this.

3.2 Comparison with Random Expected Utility Models

As noted in the introduction, both the random variation in subjects’ choices between simple gambles and existence of small-stakes risk aversion are often explained, in the experimental economics literature, by positing (i) “narrow bracketing” of the choice problem, so that the small amounts that can be gained in the experiment are not integrated with the subject’s overall wealth (or overall lifetime budget constraint), (ii) significant concavity of the utility function that is used to value different possible monetary gains in the experiment, and (iii) a random term in the utility function, so that the expected utility assigned to a given probability distribution over possible gains is not always the same. We have offered an alternative model of both the randomness and the degree of apparent risk aversion in the choices of our subjects that we regard as more theoretically parsimonious, and in our view this theoretical parsimony should be a reason to prefer our interpretation, even if the competing views were equally consistent with the data from a single experiment such as this one. Nonetheless, it is interesting to ask whether our data could not be equally well explained by a more familiar model.

Table 2 compares the fit of our model with two variants of an additive random-utility model (ARUM). In the case of each of the ARUMs, the subject is assumed to choose the option for which $E[u(Y)] + \epsilon$ is larger, where $Y$ is the monetary amount gained from the experiment (a random quantity, in the case of a risky prospect), $u(Y)$ is a nonlinear utility function.

Note that it is perfectly consistent with our model to suppose that diminishing marginal utility of wealth becomes an additional source of risk aversion in the case of large gambles, as we would expect to be the case. It should also be noted that our model implies scale-invariance under the assumption that the DM’s prior should be the same on the trials with different values of $C$; this makes sense in the context of our experiment (where trials with different values of $C$ are randomly interleaved), but less obviously so in the experiments of Holt and Laury.
function for such gains (valued separately from the subject’s other wealth), and $\epsilon$ is a random term (drawn at the time of choice) that is independent of the characteristics of the option, and also independent of the corresponding random term in the value assigned to the other option. In the ARUMs considered in the table, $u(Y)$ is assumed to be of the CRRA form, $u(Y) = Y^{1-\gamma}/(1-\gamma)$, for some $\gamma \geq 0$. The random term $\epsilon$ is assumed either to be normally distributed (the ARUM-Probit model), or to have an extreme-value distribution (the ARUM-Logit model). Thus each of the ARUMs has two free parameters (the coefficient of relative risk aversion $\gamma$ and the standard deviation of $\epsilon$), like the logarithmic coding model.

As in the case of Table 1, we consider both in-sample and out-of-sample measures of model fit, where the calibration dataset and validation dataset are the same as in the earlier table. In each case, we find that our model based on logarithmic coding provides a better fit to the experimental data, both in-sample and out-of-sample. The alternative model which comes closest to being a competitor is the ARUM-logit model, when separate parameters are estimated for each subject. Yet even in this case, the implied Bayes factor $K > 10^{26}$. If one of the models considered must represent the correct statistical model of our data, then the evidence overwhelmingly favors the model based on logarithmic coding.

In the online appendix, we report similar statistics for additional variants. Allowing $U(Y)$ to belong to the more general class of HARA utility functions does not improve the fit of the ARUMs, once the penalty for the additional free parameter is taken into account. We also consider an alternative model of stochastic choice proposed by Apesteguia and Ballester (2018), based on expected utility maximization with a random parameter in the utility function, and show that this formulation does not better explain our data, either. The ARUMs above can also be considered random variants of prospect theory, in which $u(Y)$ is the Kahneman-Tversky value function for gains, but we use the true probabilities of the two outcomes as weights rather than distorted weights of the kind posited by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In the online appendix, we show that allowing for a probability weight different from the true probability does not improve the fit of the random version of prospect theory, once the penalty for the additional free parameter is taken into account. Thus our model compares well with many of the most frequently used empirical specifications.

4 Further Implications of the Theory

We have shown that it is possible to give a single unified explanation for the observed randomness in choices by subjects evaluating risky income prospects on the one hand, and the apparent risk aversion that they display on average on the other, as natural consequences of people’s intuitions about the value of gambles being based on imprecise internal representations of the monetary amounts that are offered. Our theory explains the possibility of small-stakes risk aversion without implying any extraordinary degree of aversion to larger gambles in other contexts. Moreover, it can also explain the fact (demonstrated in our experiment) that the degree of risk aversion, as measured by the percentage by which the

\[22\] In the online appendix, we also discuss the degree to which our data are consistent with random versions of the model proposed by Bordalo et al. (2012), in which risk attitudes result from differences in the salience of alternative outcomes. The consistency of such a model with our data depends greatly on the way in which the qualitative and deterministic model in their paper is made quantitative and stochastic.
expected value of a random payoff must exceed the certain payoff in order for a subject to be indifferent between them, is relatively independent of the size of the stakes (as long as these remain small), contrary to what should be found if risk aversion were due to diminishing marginal utility.

We have argued in the introduction that we find this theory particularly compelling on account of its parsimony: the introduction of a new parameter (the parameter \( \nu \) indicating the degree of imprecision of a subject’s internal representation of monetary amounts) in order to account for the degree of randomness of a subject’s choices also immediately implies their apparent degree of risk aversion, rather than this being controlled by a separate parameter. Moreover, the same basic theory (that intuitive judgments are made in accordance with an optimal decision rule, subject to their having to be based on noisy internal representations of the decision problem) has implications for a number of other types of decision problems, beyond the simple type of experiment considered in sections 2 and 3. In particular, our model can also account for a number of other anomalous features of subjects’ choices with regard to small gambles that are documented by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992).

The “reflection effect.” Kahneman and Tversky report that if subjects must choose between a risky loss and a certain loss — with similar probabilities and monetary quantities as in the kind of problem considered above, but with the signs of the monetary payoffs reversed — risk seeking is observed more often than risk aversion (something they call the “reflection effect”). The coexistence of both risk-averse choices and risk-seeking choices by the same subject, depending on the nature of the small gambles that are offered, is a particular puzzle for the EUM account of risk attitudes, since a subject should be either risk averse or risk seeking (depending whether the subject’s utility of wealth is concave or convex) regardless of the sign of the gambles offered.

The explanation of risk aversion for small gambles offered here instead naturally implies that the sign of the bias (i.e., of the apparent risk attitude) should switch if the signs of the monetary payoffs are switched. Consider instead the case of a choice between a risky gamble that offers a probability \( p \) of losing an amount \( X \) (but losing nothing otherwise), and the option of a certain loss of an amount \( C \). If we assume that the quantities \( X \) and \( C \) are mentally represented according to the same logarithmic coding model as above, regardless of whether they represent gains or losses, then in the case of losses, the subject’s expected wealth is maximized by a rule under which the risky lottery is chosen if and only if

\[
p \cdot \mathbb{E}[X|r_x] < \mathbb{E}[C|r_c],
\]

reversing the sign in (2.2).

The set of internal representations \((r_x, r_c)\) for which this holds will be the complement of the set discussed earlier, so that the model predicts

\[
\text{Prob}[\text{accept risky}|X, C] = \Phi \left( \frac{\beta^{-1} \log p^{-1} - \log X/C}{\sqrt{2\nu}} \right).
\]

Indifference again will require \( pX > C \), but this will now count as risk-seeking behavior; when \( pX = C \), the risky loss should be chosen more often than not.
This explanation for the “reflection effect” is not fundamentally different from those of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) or Bordalo et al. (2012), who attribute it to the fact that diminishing marginal sensitivity exists for losses as well as for gains. The additional insight offered by our model is its provision of a further account of the origin of diminishing marginal sensitivity, and in particular, the demonstration that it is consistent with a hypothesis that subjects’ responses maximize the utility that subjects obtain (on average) from the use of their total monetary wealth, without any assumption of an intrinsic concern with gains or losses.

A framing effect. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) further show that subjects’ preferences between a risky and a safe outcome can be flipped, depending whether the options are presented as involving gains or losses. In one of their problems, subjects are asked to imagine being given a substantial monetary amount $2M$, and then being presented with a choice between (a) winning an additional $M$ with certainty, or (b) a gamble with a 50 percent chance of winning another $2M$ and a 50 percent chance of winning nothing. In a second problem, the initial amount was instead $4M$, and the subsequent choice was between (a) losing $M$ with certainty, and (b) a gamble with a 50 percent chance of losing $2M$ and a 50 percent chance of losing nothing.

These two problems are equivalent, in the sense that in each case the subject chooses between (a) ending up with $3M$ more than their initial wealth with certainty, or (b) a gamble under which they have an equal chance of ending up with $2M$ or $4M$ more than their initial wealth. Nonetheless, a substantial majority of their subjects chose (a) in the first problem, while a substantial majority chose (b) in the second. This contradicts any theory (not just EUM) under which people should have a consistent preference ranking of probability distributions over final wealth levels.

Our theory easily explains this finding. If the initial gift is denoted $G$, and the monetary amounts $G$, $X$, and $C$ defining the decision problem must each be independently represented in the fashion postulated above, then in the first problem, an expected wealth-maximizing decision rule will choose (b) if and only if

$$E[G|r_g] + p \cdot E[X|r_x] > E[G|r_g] + E[C|r_c],$$

which is equivalent to (2.2), while in the second problem it will choose (b) if and only if

$$E[G|r_g] - p \cdot E[X|r_x] > E[G|r_g] - E[C|r_c],$$

which is equivalent to (4.1). We then get different probabilities of choosing (b) in the two cases, given by equations (2.5) and (4.2) respectively.

Note that our theory assumes that the decision rule is in all cases the one that maximizes expected final wealth, so that only the sum of the initial gift and the additional gain or loss from the further option is assumed to matter to the decision maker; there is no intrinsic interest assumed in gains or losses relative to what one had in the past or what one expected to have. The relevance of the sequence of gains and losses by which one arrives at a given final wealth comes not from the decision maker’s assumed objective, but from the need to mentally represent the quantities used in the description of the options, in the form in which they are presented, before integrating the separate pieces of information in further
calculations. If this representation were possible with infinite precision (and subsequent operations could also be perfectly precise), then different ways of presenting information that imply the same possible final wealth levels would indeed be equivalent, and lead to the same choices. But when the precision with which each monetary amount can be represented is limited, mathematically equivalent problems are not processed in identical ways, and the resulting behavior can be different as a result, despite its optimality in each case (conditional on the mental representation).

**Loss aversion.** In the discussion above, we assume that the unsigned magnitudes of monetary losses are encoded and decoded in exactly the same way as the magnitudes of monetary gains. While this leads to an especially parsimonious mathematical specification, the logic of our theory does not require us to assume this. In particular, the model should only be symmetric in the way that losses as opposed to gains are treated if the prior distribution from which potential losses are drawn is assumed to be the same as the prior distribution for potential gains; yet it is hardly obvious that this is true. If we assume that both gains and losses are log-normally distributed, but with different parameterizations of the two priors, then the theory developed above can be generalized (as shown in the online appendix) to one in which the biases in the average subjective valuations of losses differ in size from those in the case of subjective valuations of gains. In particular, parameterizations of the model are possible in which it predicts that subjects should exhibit “loss aversion” of the kind also posited by prospect theory. For example, in order for subjects to be indifferent between accepting and rejecting a gamble that offers an equal chance of a gain of size $G$ and a loss of size $L$, it may be necessary for the ratio $G/L$ to be well above 1, as found by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).

As shown in the appendix, the parametric assumptions about the respective prior distributions for gains and losses required for this to be true are consistent with the assumptions needed to obtain the predictions regarding choices between risky gains and certain gains that we test above, as well as those needed to obtain the predictions regarding choices between risky losses and certain losses that we have just discussed. Whether the assumptions regarding priors that would be needed are also reasonable ones for settings such as the experiment reported by Tversky and Kahneman is a topic that deserves further elaboration in future studies.

**Imprecise representation of probabilities.** Tversky and Kahneman (1992) document other respects in which subjects make both risk-averse choices and risk-seeking choices with respect to small gambles, depending of the nature of the problem. For example, their subjects are more often risk-seeking when choosing between a small certain gain and a small probability of a considerably larger gain; but they are more often risk-averse when choosing between a modest certain loss and a small probability of a considerably larger loss. Prospect theory explains such cases by postulating that in the case of a risky prospect, the values assigned to the various possible gains or losses are weighted not in proportion to each outcome’s probability of occurrence (as required by EUM), but rather using weights that represent a nonlinear transformation of the true probabilities.23

Choices of this kind are consistent with our model, if the model is generalized to assume

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23Prelec (1998) and Gonzalez and Wu (1999) provide important further discussions of the properties that such a nonlinear transformation should satisfy.
(in the case of simple gambles of the kind discussed above) that the probability \( p \) of the non-zero outcome also has an internal representation \( r_p \) that is probabilistic. In the analysis above, we have assumed for simplicity that the exact value of \( p \) is available as an input to the decision rule. This is not inconsistent with our general view of the internal representation of numerical information; for in the situation considered in our theoretical model (and in our experiment), there is a single value of \( p \) that is used in all trials (though \( X \) and \( C \) vary from trial to trial). Thus if we assume that the prior for which the subject’s decision rule has been optimized represents the distribution of possible decision situations in this specific experiment, the prior (in this type of experiment) would allow for only a single value of \( p \) — and the Bayesian posterior would similarly have this single value of \( p \) in its support, regardless of the noisy representation \( r_p \).

Nonetheless, it is clearly of interest to consider the case in which the prior is non-degenerate (either because \( p \) varies from trial to trial, or because the decision maker has not had enough experience with a particular context for her decision rule to be adapted to the precise statistics of that context). Let us again assume for simplicity that under the prior, the quantities \( p, X \) and \( C \) are distributed independently of one another; that the distribution of the representation \( r_p \) depends only on \( p \) (not on the values of \( X \) or \( C \)), and that the conditional distribution of \( r_p \) is independent of the realizations of \( r_x \) or \( r_c \); and similarly for the other components of the internal representation \( r \). Then condition (2.2) for an optimal decision rule takes the more general form

\[
E[p|r_p] \cdot E[X|r_x] > E[C|r_c],
\]
or alternatively (given the model proposed above for the noisy coding of monetary amounts),

\[
r_x - r_c > \beta^{-1} \rho, \quad \rho \equiv -\log E[p|r_p],
\]

generalizing (2.4). Here \( \rho \) is a random variable (because it depends on the realization of \( r_p \)), conditional on the true probability \( p \).

This generalization of the decision rule (2.2) results in an additional source of randomness in choice (namely, random variation in \( \rho \)); but in general, it also results in an additional source of bias (because \( \rho \) also differs from \( \log p \) on average). As a simple example, suppose that the noise in the internal coding of \( X \) and \( C \) is negligible (\( \nu \) is extremely small), but that the internal representation \( r_p \) is drawn from a distribution

\[
r_p \sim N(z(p), \nu_p^2),
\]

where \( z(p) \equiv \log(p/1-p) \) are the log odds of the two outcomes, and \( \nu_p \) is non-negligible. Suppose furthermore that the log odds are normally distributed under the prior,

\[
z(p) \sim N(\mu_p, \sigma_p^2)
\]

Then the posterior log odds, conditional on the representation \( r_p \), are also normally distributed, with a mean \( \bar{m}(r_p) \) that is a weighted average of \( r_p \) and the prior mean log odds, and a variance \( \bar{\sigma}^2 \) that is independent of \( r_p \).

In this case, (4.3) requires that the value of \( \log(X/C) \) required for indifference (acceptance of the gamble exactly half the time) will be equal to the median value of \( \rho \), which (given
that \( r_p \) has a symmetric distribution) is the value of \( \rho \) when \( r_p \) is equal to the true log odds. Alternatively, the value of the ratio \( C/X \) required for indifference is given by a function \( w(p) \), where

\[
w(p) \equiv \mathbb{E}[F(z(p), \epsilon)], \quad F(z, \epsilon) \equiv \frac{\exp[\bar{m}(z) + \epsilon]}{1 + \exp[\bar{m}(z) + \epsilon]},
\]

and \( \epsilon \) is a random variable distributed \( N(0, \bar{\sigma}^2) \). This function plays a role similar to the probability weighting function of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). And as long as the variance \( \bar{\sigma}^2 \) is not too great, the model implies that \( w(p) \) will have the inverse-S shape assumed by Kahneman and Tversky.

Both Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Gonzalez and Wu (1999) argue that this shape for the probability weighting function can be understood as another example of diminishing marginal sensitivity — in this case, diminishing with distance from either of the two extreme probabilities 0 and 1. Our model shows more precisely how the same principle (noisy coding combined with Bayesian inference from the noisy internal representation) naturally gives rise to diminishing marginal sensitivity to larger monetary gains or losses and to effectively nonlinear probability weighting.

In particular, if we fix the ratio \( \nu_p/\sigma_p \) but make both \( \sigma_p \) and \( \nu_p \) small, then in the limit as \( \sigma_p, \nu_p \to 0 \), we obtain an analytical solution of the form

\[
w(p) = \frac{\alpha p^\beta}{(1 - p)^\beta + \alpha p^\beta}, \quad (4.4)
\]

for certain coefficients \( \alpha > 0, 0 < \beta < 1 \), which depend on the ratio \( \nu_p/\sigma_p \) and the prior mean log odds \( \mu_p \). (See the online appendix for details.) This function has the inverse-S shape assumed by Kahneman and Tversky; indeed, the two-parameter family of weighting functions (4.4) has often been assumed in econometric implementations of prospect theory.\(^24\)

In this case, the model predicts risk-seeking in the case of gains for low values of \( p \), but risk-aversion for larger values of \( p \), and risk-aversion in the case of losses for low values of \( p \), but risk-seeking for larger values of \( p \), all as found by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The model is also consistent with the occurrence of Allais-type paradoxes, as discussed further in the online appendix.

5 Evidence of a Connection Between Risk Aversion and Cognitive Imprecision

Thus far, we have argued that our theory offers a unified explanation of a wide range of phenomena that are not only well-documented, but that, in previous accounts, have required a number of seemingly unrelated features to be added to a descriptive model of choice behavior. However, we have discussed only phenomena that are also predicted by a variety of already existing models of choice under risk. A further virtue of our theory is that it also

\(^{24}\)Stott (2006) calls this family of weighting functions the “Goldstein-Einhorn” specification, and reviews the various authors (including some prior to the work of Kahneman and Tversky) who have proposed versions of it.
leads to a variety of predictions that would not be predicted by other accounts, that do not tie risk attitudes with respect to small gambles to cognitive imprecision.

**Implications of heterogeneity in cognitive precision.** We have shown above (Tables 1 and 2) that our experimental data are better fit by allowing the parameters of the scale-invariant psychometric function to vary across subjects. There is an obvious reason, in the context of our theory, for the choice curves of different subjects to be different: there is no reason to suppose that the parameter $\nu$, indicating the degree of imprecision of internal representations of monetary amounts, is the same for all people. However, our theory implies that increasing $\nu$ should both increase the randomness of the subject’s choices and imply greater apparent risk-aversion, as measured by the value of $X/C$ required for indifference. To the extent that variation in this single factor is the main reason for differences in the behavior observed for different subjects, we should expect to see a positive correlation between randomness of choice and degree of risk aversion.

We can test this prediction by further examining the variation in behavior across subjects. We focus here on the scale-invariant model, which as argued above is best supported by our data, and estimate a scale-invariant choice curve for each of the 19 subjects other than subject 9. (We omit subject 9 from the discussion in this section, since as shown in Figure 4, this subject’s data are not well-described by a scale-invariant model.) Our theoretical model implies not only that a scale-invariant curve (3.2) should describe each subject’s data, but also that the coefficients for each subject should satisfy the inequalities

$$
\gamma \geq 0, \quad -\frac{\delta}{\gamma} \geq \log p^{-1},
$$

(5.1)

which are required in order for there to exist values of $\sigma^2$ and $\nu^2$ consistent with those coefficients. Hence in estimating the subject-specific models, we impose the further restriction that the value of $\gamma$ be non-negative.\(^{25}\)

In comparing the choice curves of the different subjects, it is useful to parameterize them not by $\gamma$ and $\delta$, but instead by the values of $\gamma$ and $\pi \equiv e^{\delta/\gamma}$.

In terms of this alternative parameterization, the theoretical constraints (5.1) can be written:

$$
\gamma \geq 0, \quad \pi \leq p.
$$

(5.2)

Note that when $\delta/\gamma \leq 0$ (as required by our theoretical model), $0 \leq \pi \leq 1$, and $\pi$ has the interpretation of a “risk-neutral probability”: the subject’s indifference point is the same as that of a risk-neutral, optimizing decision maker who believes that the probability of the non-zero lottery payoff is $\pi$ (rather than the true probability $p$). The prediction that $\pi \leq p$ is another way of saying that our theoretical model predicts apparent risk aversion; and the degree to which a subject’s estimated $\pi$ is less than $p$ provides a simple measure of the degree of apparent risk aversion.

\(^{25}\)For all but one subject, the estimated value of $\gamma$ would be positive, even without imposing the restriction, and even for that one, the value of $\gamma$ is only slightly negative; we presume that this estimate reflects sampling error, and treat this subject as having a $\gamma$ of zero.
Figure 5: Heterogeneity in subjects’ choice curves. Each shaded region indicates the credible region for an individual subject’s parameters $\gamma$ and $\pi$, with an open circle at that subject’s maximum-likelihood values. The dashed line shows the theoretical relationship between $\gamma$ and $\pi$ that should exist if all subjects share a common prior, under which $\sigma = 0.35$.

Figure 5 shows the estimated values of $\gamma$ and $\pi$ for each of the 19 subjects for whom it is not grossly inaccurate to estimate a scale-invariant choice curve (now imposing the theoretical constraint that $\gamma \geq 0$). For each subject, an open circle indicates the parameter values that maximize the likelihood of the data for that subject (the ML estimate), and the surrounding shaded region indicates the set of parameter values for which the log likelihood of the data is no more than 2 points lower than at the maximum. Thus the shaded region indicates a Bayesian credible region for the parameter estimates, under the assumption of a uniform prior for those parameters. The boundary of each maximum-posterior density credible region is chosen according to a criterion which, in the case of a Gaussian posterior for a single variable, would report the interval corresponding to the mean estimate plus or minus two standard deviations.

The largest value of $\pi$ that would be consistent with prediction (5.2) is indicated by the horizontal dotted line in Figure 5; we see that for all but one of the 19 subjects, the credible region includes points consistent with this prediction. Thus the individual choice curves of 18 out of our 20 subjects are reasonably consistent with both the model prediction of scale invariance and with the coefficient constraints (5.2).

If we further assume a common log-normal prior (2.3) for all subjects, but allow the precision of mental coding of monetary amounts (i.e., the parameter $\nu^2$) to vary across subjects, then the values of $\gamma$ and $\pi$ estimated for each subject are predicted by the model to be linked by a relationship of the form

$$\pi = p^{1+(2\sigma^2\gamma^2)^{-1}}, \quad (5.3)$$

where $\sigma^2$ is a parameter common to all subjects. This is an upward-sloping relationship, of the kind illustrated by the dashed curve in Figure 5, which graphs equation (5.3) in the case
that $\sigma = 0.35$. Here $\nu^2$ is decreasing (the precision of mental coding is increasing) as one moves up and to the right along the dashed curve.

If we estimate a choice curve for each subject without imposing the restriction of a common $\sigma^2$, the estimated coefficients do not all line up perfectly on a curve consistent with (5.3); nonetheless, there is a strong positive correlation between the ML estimates of $\gamma$ and $\pi$ for the various subjects, as can be seen in Figure 5. That is, the degree of apparent risk aversion (measured by the degree to which $\pi$ is less than $p$) is generally greater for those subjects whose choices are less sensitive to variation in $X/C$ (measured by the size of $\gamma$). The fact that these two features of behavior go hand in hand is consistent with our theory. Models such as EUM or prospect theory, extended to allow for stochastic choice as in section 3.2, instead provide no reason to expect such a relationship, since in these theories the degree of randomness of choice and the degree of risk aversion are determined by independent parameters.

The predictions of our theory will be more flexible — and arguably more consistent with our experimental data — if we allow different subjects to have different priors (more specifically, different values for $\sigma^2$). This might reflect imperfect learning of the prior (not surprising given the subjects' finite experience in this environment), in ways that differ across subjects.

**Correlation with imprecision in number processing more generally.** The positive correlation shown in Figure 5 is also found in a replication of our study by Garcia *et al.* (2018). They show furthermore that both the randomness and the apparent risk aversion in choice under risk can be predicted by the degree of randomness of the subjects responses in an independent numerosity comparison task of the kind discussed in section 1.1 — that is, by the subject-specific value of $\nu$ estimated using equation (1.2). This not only supports the hypothesis that small-stakes risk aversion results from noisy coding of monetary amounts, but suggests that the cognitive imprecision involved may be related to imprecision in the internal representation of numerical magnitudes more generally.

Schley and Peters (2014) also report greater apparent risk aversion in subjects who represent numbers less precisely in other types of tasks. These authors also offer an explanation for apparent risk aversion that is based on the idea that the perception of the numerical magnitudes of prospective monetary payoffs is biased, and more specifically that perceived magnitudes are an increasing, strictly concave function of the magnitudes. Like us, they base their proposal on limitations on people’s general ability to accurate represent numbers mentally, rather than on the true utility obtained from having more money (as in the EUM explanation of risk aversion) or a theory of distorted valuations that is specific to the domain of value-based decision making (as with prospect theory). In support of this proposal, they show that subjects who less accurately represent numbers for other purposes also exhibit greater apparent diminishing marginal utility of income and greater apparent risk-aversion in choices between risky gambles.

However, their discussion assumes that less capacity for symbolic number mapping results in a deterministic distortion of perceived numerical magnitudes (a true quantity $X$ is always perceived as exactly $\hat{X} = AX^\beta$), rather than in a more random mental representation as in our theory. This means that they do not explore the connection between the randomness of subjects’ choices and apparent risk aversion, as Garcia *et al.* and we do; and their theory
provides no explanation for why people should value lotteries according to the average value of the perceived payoffs $\hat{X}_i$ instead of, say, according to the average value of $\hat{X}_i^{1/\beta}$ — a criterion that would reliably maximize expected wealth, taking into account the perceptual distortion.

**Effects of varying cognitive load.** Thus far, we have discussed implications of our model, taking the precision of coding (parameterized by $\nu$) to be fixed. But the model also makes predictions about the effects of varying $\nu$, which might be subject to predictable variation for a variety of reasons. For example, one might well suppose that increased time pressure, distraction or cognitive load should reduce the cognitive resources used to represent the monetary magnitudes that define a particular decision problem, and that this should correspond, in our model, to an increase in $\nu$. According to our model, this should result in both decreased sensitivity of a subject’s decisions to variations in the risky payoff $X$ that is offered (i.e., a lower value of $\gamma$) and increased apparent risk aversion (a value of $\pi$ that is lower relative to $p$). This is an example of a prediction of our theory that is not made by theories like prospect theory, that attribute departures from the predictions of EUM to (presumably stable) distortions in the way that subjects evaluate monetary gains or probabilities.

In fact, a number of authors have found that increasing cognitive load (for example, by requiring subjects to concurrently maintain a list of random letters or numbers in memory) causes subjects to make more risk-averse choices (Whitney et al., 2008; Benjamin et al., 2013; Deck and Jahedi, 2015; Gerhardt et al., 2016). This is often interpreted as support for a “dual systems” view of decision making, in which increased cognitive load makes it harder for subjects to employ a deliberative system that would be called upon under other circumstances, so that emotional reactions or simpler heuristics are relied upon instead. Our theory provides an alternative interpretation, in which the same cognitive mechanism might be employed in both cases, but it relies upon an imprecise analog representation with a degree of precision that depends on the number of other claims on working memory. The fact that our subjects display a range of degrees of apparent risk aversion, as well as a range of degrees of randomness in their choices, as shown in Figure 5 — rather than simply two clusters corresponding to the users of two very different mental systems — is more easily explained under the theory that we propose.

**Effects of varying the range of possible monetary payoffs.** Another reason for the parameter $\nu$ to possibly vary across experimental settings is change in the ranges of monetary payoffs $X$ and $C$ that need to be represented. While we have found that we can account fairly well for the imprecision in our subjects’ evaluations of the gambles presented to them under the hypothesis that the coding noise parameter $\nu$ is the same on all trials, it remains possible that the value of $\nu$ adapts depending on the prior distribution from which $X$ and $C$ are expected to be drawn. Frydman and Jin (2019) report an experiment similar to ours, in which however the parameter $\sigma$ of the log-normal distributions from which the monetary amounts $X$ and $C$ are drawn is different in two different blocks of trials. They observe

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26 Olschewski et al. (2018) instead find that increased cognitive load increases the randomness of choice, but only increases risk aversion by a small (statistically insignificant) amount. Their measure of risk aversion, however, is based on an “ARUM-probit” model that, as shown in section 3.2, is not consistent with the predictions of our model, and does not fit our own experimental data as well as the logarithmic coding model.
probabilistic dependence of choice on the payoffs offered on a given trial (as in our Figures 2 and 3), but find that the choice curves are steeper (when plotted as a function of log$(X/C)$) in the data from the sessions in which $\sigma$ was smaller. They interpret this result as showing that the precision of internal representations of the monetary payoffs depends on the range of values that the decision maker expects to encounter in a given context, in a way that allows the brain to make optimal use of a finite capacity for discriminating between different amounts (“efficient coding”).

Our theory is easily extended to predict such an effect. Suppose that the limit on the precision of numerical representations comes not from some “hard-wired” system of number representation (so that the degree of overlap between the distributions of internal representations of the quantities $28$ and $30$, say, is independent of the prior distribution from which these quantities may have been drawn), but from a limit on the information-processing capacity of the system used to represent analog magnitudes. As a concrete example of such a theory, suppose that the representation $r_x$ of any quantity $X$ is given by an independent draw from a distribution $N(m, \omega^2)$, where $m = \phi(X)$ is a nonlinear transformation of the true magnitude. If we assume that production of representations with this degree of fidelity requires that the variance of the distribution of values for $m$ be less than some finite upper bound $\Omega^2$, then the system has a finite information-theoretic “channel capacity” determined by the ratio $\Omega/\omega$ — essentially, a measure of the effective number of distinct cases that can be accurately discriminated. (See Cover and Thomas, 2006, chap. 9.)

Let us suppose that $\omega$ and $\Omega$ are given parameters (reflecting the limited acuity of a person’s semantic representations of numerical magnitudes), but that the transformation $\phi(X)$ is optimized for a given environment. More specifically, suppose that the transformation is of the form $\phi(X) = \xi + \psi \log X$, with parameters $\xi, \psi$ that are optimized for a given environment (that is, for a given prior distribution for $X$). We show in the online appendix that if the prior is of the form $X \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2)$, then the optimal encoding rule leads to a noisy internal representation of the kind assumed in section 2, but with a value of $\nu$ that varies endogenously with the prior. In fact, $\nu = (\omega/\Omega)\sigma$, so that $\nu$ is predicted to grow in proportion to the value of $\sigma$. Combining this result with prediction (2.5) for the probability of acceptance of the risky bet, we see that the model predicts the effect observed by Frydman and Jin (2019), in which a lower value of $\sigma$ results in a steeper choice curve.\textsuperscript{27}

An important implication of both the results of Frydman and Jin, and the studies suggesting that manipulations of cognitive load can affect apparent risk aversion, is that an aspect of choice behavior commonly attributed to preferences — which are usually assumed to remain invariant across choice situations — may actually be malleable: subject to variation from one situation to another, and potentially subject to systematic influence by the designer of a choice environment.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{27}Frydman and Jin (2019) also propose a model of efficient coding that can explain their finding. However, their formulation has other quantitative predictions that are at odds with our experimental data; for example, their model implies that choice curves should not be scale-invariant. The efficient coding model proposed here is instead consistent with both our findings and theirs.

\textsuperscript{28}See Payzan-LeNestour and Woodford (2020) for further discussion. “Evolutionary” theories of the origin of preferences, such as those of Robson (2001), Rayo and Becker (2007), and Netzer (2009), suggest that this could be possible as well, though it is often unclear over what time scale the “evolution” is thought to occur in such theories.
topic for further study.

The theory proposed here (and the experimental results that we report) neither requires that this be the case, nor precludes it; our main results simply assume a particular model of (and degree of precision of) noisy coding of numerical information about the choice options, without asking where it came from, and assume a decision rule that is optimal for a particular prior distribution over choice situations, without asking how the optimal rule (or the prior relative to which it is optimal) is learned. But exactly because we seek to ground risk taking in more general features of cognition rather than appealing to preferences, it is natural to consider how these features of a given person’s cognitive functioning may be shaped by their experience.\(^{29}\) Extension of the theory to incorporate learning dynamics and adaptation of internal representations to the statistics of a given environment should be an important next step in the research agenda.

\(^{29}\)For an example of a model of a dynamic process through which a noisy coding scheme might adapt to a changing environment, see Robson and Whitehead (2019).
References


ONLINE APPENDIX

Khaw, Li, and Woodford, “Cognitive Imprecision and Small-Stakes Risk Aversion”

A A Bayesian Model of Numerosity Estimation

Suppose that a stimulus of numerosity \( n \) results in an internal representation \( r \) that is drawn from a distribution

\[
 r \sim N(\log n, \nu^2), \tag{A.1}
\]

where the noise parameter \( \nu \) is independent of \( n \). Then if the prior distribution from which \( n \) is drawn is approximated by a log-normal distribution,

\[
 \log n \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2),
\]

as proposed in the text (section 1.1), the pair of random variables \( (\log n, r) \) have a joint distribution of the bivariate Gaussian family. It follows from this that the distribution of \( \log n \) conditional on the value of \( r \) will be a Gaussian distribution,

\[
 \log n | r \sim N(\mu_{\text{post}}(r), \sigma^2_{\text{post}}), \tag{A.2}
\]

where the mean \( \mu_{\text{post}}(r) \) is an affine function of \( r \), and the variance \( \sigma^2_{\text{post}} \) is the same for all \( r \). This will give the posterior distribution for \( \log n \) (and hence a posterior distribution for \( n \)) that is implied by Bayes’ Rule, starting from the Gaussian prior for \( \log n \) and updating on the basis of the noisy evidence \( r \). Since the posterior distribution for \( \log n \) is normal, the posterior distribution for \( n \) is log-normal, as stated in the text.

It further follows from the properties of a bivariate Gaussian distribution that the conditional mean (mean of the posterior distribution) of \( \log n \) is given by the linear projection

\[
 \mu_{\text{post}}(r) = \mathbb{E}[\log n | r] = \mu + \beta \cdot (r - \mu), \tag{A.3}
\]

where \( \mu \) is the unconditional mean of both \( \log n \) and \( r \), and the slope coefficient (linear regression coefficient) is given by

\[
 \beta \equiv \frac{\text{cov}(\log n, r)}{\text{var}(r)} = \frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2 + \nu^2}, \tag{A.4}
\]

as stated in the text at (1.3). The conditional variance of \( \log n \) is then given by

\[
 \sigma^2_{\text{post}} = \text{var}(\log n - \mu_{\text{post}}(r)) = \text{var}(\log n - \beta r) \\
 = \text{var}((1 - \beta) \log n) + \text{var}(\beta r | n) = (1 - \beta)^2 \sigma^2 + \beta^2 \nu^2 \\
 = \frac{\nu^4 \sigma^2}{(\sigma^2 + \nu^2)^2} + \frac{\sigma^4 \nu^2}{(\sigma^2 + \nu^2)^2} = \frac{\sigma^2 \nu^2}{\sigma^2 + \nu^2}. \tag{A.5}
\]

The predicted distribution of numerosity estimates then depends on how we assume that the subject’s estimate of the stimulus numerosity relates to the posterior distribution over

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possible numerosities implied by the internal representation \( r \). Consider first the hypothesis that the subject’s numerosity estimate \( \hat{n} \) is optimal, in the sense of minimizing the mean squared estimation error, \( \text{MSE} \equiv \mathbb{E}[(n - \hat{n})^2] \), among all possible estimation rules under which \( \hat{n} \) is some function of \( r \). The rule that is optimal from the standpoint of this objective would be the one under which \( \hat{n}(r) = \mathbb{E}[n|r] \) for all \( r \).\(^{30}\)

It follows from the properties of a log-normal distribution that if the posterior distribution for \( n \) is given by (A.2), the posterior mean will be given by

\[
\mathbb{E}[n|r] = \exp(\mu_{\text{post}} + (1/2)\sigma_{\text{post}}^2).
\]

Hence in this case, the Bayesian model predicts that

\[
\log \hat{n}(r) = \log \mathbb{E}[n|r] = \mu_{\text{post}}(r) + (1/2)\sigma_{\text{post}}^2
\]

Thus as stated in the text, \( \log \hat{n}(r) \) is predicted to be an affine function of \( r \) with slope \( \beta \).

Since \( r \) is a random variable, conditional on the numerosity \( n \) of the stimulus, it follows that \( \hat{n}(r) \) is also a random variable conditional on \( n \). More specifically, since \( r \) is normally distributed, conditional on \( n \), and \( \log \hat{n}(r) \) is an affine function of \( r \), \( \log \hat{n} \) will be normally distributed conditional on \( n \):

\[
\log \hat{n} \sim N(\hat{\mu}(n), \hat{\sigma}^2),
\]

as stated in the text. The mean and variance of this conditional distribution are given by

\[
\hat{\mu}(n) \equiv \mathbb{E}[\log \hat{n}|n] = \mu + \beta \cdot (\mathbb{E}[r|n] - \mu) + (1/2)\sigma_{\text{post}}^2
\]

\[
\hat{\sigma}^2 \equiv \text{var}(\log \hat{n}|n) = \beta^2 \text{var}(r|n)
\]

Thus as stated in the text, \( \hat{\mu}(n) \) is an affine function of \( \log n \) with slope \( \beta \), and \( \hat{\sigma}^2 \) is independent of \( n \).

Conditional on \( n \), \( \hat{n} \) is log-normally distributed with the parameters just stated. It then follows from the properties of a log-normal distribution that

\[
\mathbb{E}[^{\hat{n}}|n] = \exp(\hat{\mu}(n) + (1/2)\hat{\sigma}^2),
\]

\[
\text{var}[^{\hat{n}}|n] = [\exp(\hat{\sigma}^2) - 1] \cdot \exp(2\hat{\mu}(n) + \hat{\sigma}^2).
\]

Hence

\[
\frac{\text{SD}[^{\hat{n}}|n]}{\mathbb{E}[^{\hat{n}}|n]} = \sqrt{\exp(\hat{\sigma}^2) - 1} > 0
\]

regardless of the value of \( n \), as stated in the text. This delivers the property of scalar variability discussed in the text.

\(^{30}\)The calculations in this case coincide with the ones needed for the Bayesian model of optimal choice between lotteries, presented in section 2, even though the reason why it is optimal to base the subject’s decision on an estimate of this kind is different in that context.
One also observes that (A.8) implies that
\[ \log \mathbb{E}[\hat{n}|n] = \hat{\mu}(n) + (1/2)\hat{\sigma}^2 = \log A + \beta \log n, \]
where
\[ A \equiv \exp((1 - \beta)\mu + (1/2)\sigma^2_{\text{post}} + (1/2)\hat{\sigma}^2) > 0. \]
This yields the power-law relationship stated as (1.4) in the text for the mean estimated numerosity as a function of the true numerosity.

As discussed in the text, this implies a “regressive bias.” Specifically, \( \mathbb{E}[\hat{n}|n] > n \) for all \( n < n^* \), while \( \mathbb{E}[\hat{n}|n] < n \) for all \( n > n^* \), where the “cross-over point” \( n^* \) is given by
\[ \log n^* \equiv \frac{\log A}{1 - \beta} = \mu + c, \tag{A.10} \]
using the expression
\[ c \equiv \frac{1}{2} \frac{\sigma^2_{\text{post}} + \hat{\sigma}^2}{1 - \beta} > 0 \]
for a quantity that depends on \( \sigma \) and \( \nu \), but is independent of the prior mean \( \mu \). Thus if in different experiments, the degree of prior uncertainty about the stimulus numerosity is the same in percentage terms (that is, the value of \( \sigma \) is the same), while the average numerosity presented is different (implying a different value of \( \mu \)), the model implies that the cross-over point \( n^* \) should vary in proportion to \( e^\mu \). Alternatively, \( n^* \) should vary in proportion to the prior mean numerosity \( \mathbb{E}[\hat{n}] \) (which is equal to \( e^\mu \) times a constant that depends only on \( \sigma \)), as stated in the text.

If instead we assume that the prior is fixed across experiments, but that \( \nu \) is varied (for example, by varying cognitive load, as in the experiments of Anobile et al., 2012), then both of the coefficients \( A \) and \( \beta \) in relation (1.4) are predicted to change across experiments. When \( \nu \) is larger (internal representations are less precise), the model predicts that \( \beta \) will be smaller (though still positive), so that \( \mathbb{E}[\hat{n}|n] \) will be a more concave function of \( n \), as stated in the text.

These qualitative conclusions about subjective estimates of numerosity do not depend on assuming that the subject’s estimate must equal the posterior mean, conditional on the internal representation \( r \). If we assume instead that the subject’s estimate minimizes the mean squared percentage error in the estimates, \( \mathbb{E}[(\log \hat{n} - \log n)^2] \), then the Bayesian estimate \( \hat{n}(r) \) should satisfy
\[ \log \hat{n}(r) = \mathbb{E}[\log n|r] = \mu_{\text{post}}(r). \]
From the above characterization of the posterior distribution, we would again find that \( \log \hat{n}(r) \) is predicted to be an affine function of \( r \), with a slope of \( \beta \); only the intercept of the function is different in this case. The same argument as above then once again implies (A.7), where \( \hat{\mu}(n) \) is again an affine function of \( \log n \) with a slope of \( \beta \), though with a different intercept than the one derived above.

Alternatively, if we assume that the subject’s estimate is given by the posterior mode (or “maximum a posteriori estimate”), then the properties of a log-normal distribution imply that
\[ \log \hat{n}(r) = \log \text{mode}[n|r] = \mu_{\text{post}}(r) - \sigma^2_{\text{post}}. \]
Thus once again, \( \log \hat{n}(r) \) is predicted to be an affine function of \( r \) with slope \( \beta \), though with yet another value for the intercept term. This again allows us to derive (A.7), in which \( \hat{\mu}(n) \) is again an affine function of \( \log n \) with a slope of \( \beta \).

In each of these cases, the same derivations as above allow us to obtain the predictions (A.9) and the power law (1.4). Again the equation for the cross-over point is of the form (A.10); only the expression for the constant \( c \) is different in each case. Thus in any of these cases, we obtain the following common predictions: (i) \( \log E[\hat{n}|n] \) should be an affine function of \( \log n \) [a log-log plot should be affine] with a slope \( 0 < \beta < 1 \); only the intercept of the log-log plot should be different in the three cases. (ii) Fixing \( \sigma \) and \( \nu \), but allowing \( \mu \) to vary across experiments, the cross-over point \( n^* \) should be a constant multiple of the prior mean \( E[n] \); only the positive multiplicative factor is different in the three cases. (iii) In any given experiment, the standard deviation of \( \hat{n} \) should grow in proportion to the mean estimate as \( n \) is increased [the property of scalar variability]. As discussed in the text, there is support for all of these predictions in experiments on estimation of numerosity (as well as a number of other sensory contexts, as reviewed in Petzschner et al., 2015).

B A Bayesian Model of Lottery Choice

As explained in the text, we assume that the quantities \( X \) and \( C \) are respectively represented by quantities \( r_x \) and \( r_c \), independent random draws from the conditional distributions

\[
\begin{align*}
  r_x &\sim N(\log X, \nu^2), \\
  r_c &\sim N(\log C, \nu^2),
\end{align*}
\]

where the precision parameter \( \nu > 0 \) is the same for both monetary amounts. We assume that the subject’s decision rule is optimized (that is, that it maximizes the subject’s expected financial gain from the decision) for an environment in which the true values \((X,C)\) defining a given decision problem are assumed to be drawn from a prior distribution under which \( X \) and \( C \) are distributed independently of each other, and each have a common (log-normal) marginal distribution

\[
\log X, \log C \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2).
\]

Under these assumptions, the posterior distribution for \( X \) conditional on the internal representation \( r \equiv (r_x, r_c) \) depends only on \( r_x \), and the posterior distribution for \( C \) similarly depends only on \( r_c \).

We wish to determine which of the two options available to the subject on the given trial would maximize the expected financial gain \( E[\Delta W^\text{a}|r] \), given that the decision must be based on the imprecise internal representation \( r \) of the decision problem. In the case of the risky option, the expected financial gain is\(^{31}\)

\[
E[\Delta W^{\text{risky}}|r] = p \cdot E[X|r_x],
\]

\(^{31}\)Here we assume that the zero financial gain in the case of the zero outcome is internally represented as precisely zero. This is consistent with our logarithmic coding model (which implies that extremely small financial gains have virtually zero probability of being mistaken for a financial gain of one cent or more). As discussed in the text, we also assume here that the probabilities of the different outcomes are represented with perfect precision; this last assumption is relaxed in section E below.
while in the case of the certain option, it is
\[ E[\Delta W^{\text{certain}}|r] = E[C|r_c]. \]
Hence the risky option is predicted to be chosen if and only if
\[ p \cdot E[X|r_x] > E[C|r_c], \tag{B.3} \]
as stated in the text at (2.2).

Furthermore, for either of the monetary amounts considered individually \((Y = X \text{ or } C)\),
the model just proposed implies that the joint distribution of \(\log Y\) and \(r_y\) is a bivariate
Gaussian distribution, of the same form as the joint distribution of \(\log n\) and \(r\) in the model
of numerosity estimation. Just as in the calculations in the previous section of this appendix,
the distribution of \(\log Y\) conditional on the value of \(r_y\) will be a Gaussian distribution,
\[ \log Y|r_y \sim N(\mu_{\text{post}}(r_y), \sigma^2_{\text{post}}), \tag{B.4} \]
where the mean \(\mu_{\text{post}}(r_y)\) is an affine function of \(r_y\), defined by the same equation (A.3) as
above; and the variance \(\sigma^2_{\text{post}}\) is the same for all \(r_y\), and again given by (A.5). Thus the
conditional distribution for \(Y\) will be log-normal.

It then follows (just as in the model of numerosity estimation) that the conditional
expectation of either monetary amount will be given by
\[
E[Y|r_y] = \exp[\mu_{\text{post}}(r_y) + (1/2)\sigma^2_{\text{post}}] \\
= \exp[\mu + \beta \cdot (r_y - \mu) + (1/2)\sigma^2_{\text{post}}] \\
= \exp[\alpha + \beta r_y],
\]
as stated in the text, where
\[ \alpha \equiv (1 - \beta)\mu + (1/2)\sigma^2_{\text{post}} = (1 - \beta) \left[ \mu + (1/2)\sigma^2 \right] \]
and \(\beta\) is again defined in (A.4). Substituting this expression for the conditional expectations
in (B.3), and taking the logarithm of both sides of the inequality, we find that the risky
option should be chosen if and only if the internal representations satisfy
\[ \log p + \beta r_x > \beta r_c, \]
as stated in the text.

This in turn implies that the risky option should be chosen if and only if \(r_x - r_c\) exceeds
the threshold stated in (2.4). The proposed model of noisy coding implies that, conditional
on the true data \((X, C)\) defining the decision problem, \(r_x - r_c\) will be a Gaussian random
variable,
\[ r_x - r_c \sim N(\log X - \log C, 2\nu^2). \]
Hence the transformed variable
\[ z \equiv \frac{(r_x - r_c) - \log(X/C)}{\sqrt{2} \cdot \nu} \]

will have a distribution \( N(0, 1) \), and a cumulative distribution function \( \Phi(z) \). In terms of this transformed variable, the condition (2.4) for acceptance of the risky option can be expressed as

\[
z > z_{\text{crit}} \equiv \frac{\beta^{-1} \log p^{-1} - \log(X/C)}{\sqrt{2} \cdot \nu}.
\]

The probability of this occurring is \( \Phi(-z_{\text{crit}}) \), as stated by equation (2.4) in the text.

C Endogenizing the Precision of the Internal Representations of Numerical Quantities

Instead of simply postulating the rules (B.1), where the precision parameter \( \nu \) is treated as exogenously given, we may instead suppose (as discussed in the text in section 5) that the internal representation \( r_x \) of a numerical magnitude \( X \) is a draw from a distribution

\[
r_x \sim N(m, \omega^2),
\]

where \( m \) is a monotonic transformation of the monetary amount \( X \)

\[
m = \phi(X) = \xi + \psi \log X,
\]

with parameters \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) that may depend on the statistics of a particular environment, while the precision parameter \( \omega \) is assumed to be exogenously given. We assume that the cognitive processes that produce this representation are only capable of generating representations with the degree of precision indicated in (C.1) in the case that the “encoded value” \( m \) does not vary in too extreme a way; specifically, we suppose that the system is subject to a “power constraint” which requires that the average value of \( m^2 \) be within some finite bound,

\[
E[m^2] \leq \Omega^2 < \infty.
\]

Such a model has the mathematical form of what is called a “Gaussian channel” in the communications engineering literature. We can think of the system as one in which an original message \( X \) must be encoded through a rule such as (C.2) in order to allow it to be transmitted to another location using a communication channel with particular physical properties. Here \( m \) is the input that is supplied by a “sender” to the channel (encoding in some convenient way the information in the message \( X \)), while \( r_x \) is the output of the channel to the “receiver”, on the basis of which some action can then be taken. The statistical relationship (C.1), together with the power constraint (C.3), specifies the kind of messages that can be transmitted over the channel, independently of what particular encoded values \( m \) mean (what value of \( X \) in the world is mapped into a particular encoded value \( m \)), and the way in which recovered signals \( r_x \) will be interpreted. The “channel capacity” of such a channel is a quantitative upper bound on the amount of information that can be transmitted over the channel, per transmission, regardless of the encoding rule (and regardless of the domain of values \( X \) about which one may wish to communicate); this is equal to

\[
C = \log \frac{\sqrt{\Omega^2 + \omega^2}}{\omega},
\]
an increasing function of $\Omega/\omega$, as stated in the text.\footnote{See Cover and Thomas (2006), chap. 9, for explanation and proof. $C$ can be understood as the logarithm of the effective number of distinct values of $m$ that can be differentiated on the basis of the output signal $r_x$.} The problem of optimally choosing a mapping (C.2) in order to make the output $r_x$ useful to the receiver, given the constraints on what can be transmitted over the channel, is then what is known as an “optimal source coding” problem in the communications literature.

C.1 An Efficient Coding Model of Numerosity Estimation

As an example of such a problem, suppose that a cognitive system must generate an internal representation $r_x$ of a numerical magnitude $X$, on the basis of which an estimate $\hat{X}$ of that magnitude will have to be produced. Suppose further that the goal of the design problem is to have a system that will achieve as low as possible a mean squared error of the estimate $\hat{X}$, when $X$ is drawn from a log-normal prior distribution, \( \log X \sim N(\mu, \sigma^2) \), as in the model of numerosity estimation in section A.

In this problem, the estimate $\hat{X}$ must be a function of the representation $r_x$. But any function of $r_x$ can also be expressed as a function of the transformed variable $\tilde{r}_x \equiv (r_x - \xi)/\psi$, so we can equivalently treat $\tilde{r}_x$ as the internal representation, and restrict attention to estimation rules that make $\hat{X}$ a function of $\tilde{r}_x$. But in any representation scheme of the proposed form, it follows from (C.1)–(C.2) that $\tilde{r}_x \sim N(\log X, \omega^2/\psi^2)$. Thus we have a representation of the form (A.1), with $\nu = \omega/\psi$. It follows that all of the calculations in section A continue to apply, with this interpretation of the parameter $\nu$, and with the variable $r$ in that section understood to refer to $\tilde{r}_x$.

It follows that the optimal (minimum-MSE) estimation rule in the case of any encoding rule (C.2) will be given by (A.6), as in section A, and the MSE associated with this rule will be given by

\[
MSE = \exp(2\mu + 2\sigma^2) \cdot [1 - \exp(-(1 - \beta)\sigma^2)].
\]

For a fixed prior, this is a decreasing function of $\beta$, and hence an increasing function of $\nu$. Thus it is desirable (in order to make the MSE as small as possible) to make $\nu$ as small as possible. Since $\nu = \omega/\psi$, it follows that it would be desirable to make $\psi$ as large as possible, consistent with the power constraint (C.3).

In the case of the kind of prior assumed, the power constraint becomes

\[
(\xi + \psi \mu)^2 + \psi^2\sigma^2 \leq \Omega^2.
\]

The maximum value of $\psi$ consistent with this constraint is achieved when

\[
\xi = -\psi \mu, \quad \psi = \frac{\Omega}{\sigma}.
\]

(C.4)

In this case, we have

\[
\nu = \frac{\Omega}{\omega} \cdot \sigma.
\]

(C.5)
Thus the optimal endogenous encoding rule makes $\nu$ vary in proportion to $\sigma$, the prior standard deviation of $\log X$.

If we assume that imprecise internal representations of this kind are drawn upon in a number-comparison task, then it follows from the derivation in section A above that the probability of judging a number $X_2$ to be larger than some reference number $X_1$ should be given by

$$\text{Prob}["X_2 \text{ is greater}"] = \Phi \left( \frac{\Omega}{\sqrt{2}\omega \sigma} \log(X_2/X_1) \right).$$

(C.6)

This implies that the $z$-transformed probability should be an increasing linear function of $\log X_2$, with a slope that increases if $\sigma$ is reduced. This predicted slope increase is exactly what Frydman and Jin (2018) find, both for their pooled data and for most of their subjects individually.

In the derivation above, we have assumed that the goal of the encoding scheme is to minimize the MSE of the estimated value $\hat{X}$ that could be based on the imprecise internal representation of a numerical quantity. In the case of an experiment like that of Frydman and Jin, one might ask whether it would not be more appropriate to assume that the encoding scheme is optimized so as to maximize performance in this particular task. But also under this criterion, reduction of $\nu$ clearly increases performance. Hence the optimal encoding rule in the family (C.2) will be the one that minimizes $\nu$ (which is to say, that maximizes $\psi$), from among those consistent with the power constraint. The optimal encoding rule is the same as above, leading again to the prediction (C.5) for the endogenous value of $\nu$, and to (C.6) as the prediction regarding response frequencies in the Frydman-Jin experiment.

### C.2 An Efficient Coding Model of Lottery Choice

Now let us turn again to the model of lottery choice, but now endogenizing the precision with which numerical magnitudes are internally represented. As in section B, we assume here that both the quantities $X$ and $C$ are encoded in the same way. Here this means that both are encoded using the system (C.1)–(C.2), with the same noise parameter $\omega$ for the “capacity-constrained channel,” and the same parameter values $(\xi, \psi)$ for the encoding function in both cases. The internal representations $r_x, r_c$ are assumed to be independent draws from their respective distributions

$$r_x \sim N(m_x, \omega^2), \quad r_c \sim N(m_c, \omega^2).$$

The parameters of the common encoding rule (C.2) must satisfy the power constraint (C.3), where the expectation is taken under the prior $N(\mu, \sigma^2)$, from which both $X$ and $C$ are assumed to be drawn.

The implications of a common encoding rule of this kind can be derived along similar lines as in the previous section. The assumption that a DM’s decision rule must be a function of $r_x$ and $r_c$ is equivalent to assuming that it must be based on the transformed quantities $\tilde{r}_x$ and $\tilde{r}_c$ (defined as in the previous section); and these transformed quantities will be independent draws from the distributions specified in (B.1), where we define $\nu = \omega/\psi$, as in the previous section. Using the same argument as in section B, we can show that in the case of any
encoding rule of the form (C.2), the optimal decision rule will choose the risky lottery if and only if
\[ \tilde{r}_x - \tilde{r}_c > \theta, \]  
for an appropriately chosen threshold \( \theta \). Moreover, under any threshold rule of this kind, the implied probability of acceptance of the risky lottery will be given by the function
\[ P(X/C; \theta, \nu) \equiv \Phi \left( \frac{\log X/C - \theta}{\sqrt{2\nu}} \right), \]  
generalizing condition (2.5) in the text.

In order to consider the optimal endogenous determination of the encoding rule (C.2), we must be able to measure the degree to which the DM achieves her objective under different parameterizations of the rule. Under any encoding rule and any decision rule of the threshold form (C.7), the DM’s expected loss (that is, the amount by which the mean monetary reward falls short of what could have been obtained through correct choice on each trial) is given by the function
\[ L(\theta, \nu) \equiv E[\max(C - pX, 0) \cdot P(X/C; \theta, \nu)] + E[\max(pX - C, 0) \cdot (1 - P(X/C; \theta, \nu))], \]  
where the expectation is over possible draws of \( X \) and \( C \) from the prior distribution. For any value of \( \nu \), the optimal threshold \( \theta^*(\nu) \) will minimize this function. This requires that at the optimal threshold \( \theta^*(\nu) \), the first-order condition
\[ \frac{\partial L}{\partial \theta}(\theta^*) = E[(C - pX) \frac{\partial P(X,C)}{\partial \theta}(\theta^*)] \]
\[ = -\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\nu}} E \left[ (C - pX) f \left( \frac{\log X/C - \theta}{\sqrt{2\nu}} \right) \left( \log X/C - \theta^* \right) \right] = 0 \]  
(C.9)

must be satisfied, where \( f(z) \) is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution.

In fact, we can use the same argument as in section B to show that the optimal threshold is \( \theta^* = \beta^{-1} \log p^{-1} \), so we do not need condition (C.9) to determine \( \theta^* \); however, it will be useful for us to know that (C.9) must hold when \( \theta = \theta^*(\nu) \).

Assuming an optimal decision criterion, the DM’s expected loss in the case of a given encoding rule is then equal to
\[ L^*(\nu) \equiv \max_\theta L(\theta, \nu). \]

We wish to know how this changes if \( \nu \) changes as a result of a change in the encoding rule. Differentiating this definition and using the envelope theorem, we obtain
\[ \frac{dL^*}{d\nu} = \frac{\partial L}{\partial \nu}(\theta^*(\nu), \nu) \]
\[ = -\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\nu^2}} E \left[ (C - pX) f \left( \frac{\log X/C - \theta}{\sqrt{2\nu}} \right) \left( \log X/C - \theta^* \right) \right] \]
\[ = -\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\nu^2}} E \left[ (C - pX) f \left( \frac{\log X/C - \theta}{\sqrt{2\nu}} \right) \left( \log X/C - \log p^{-1} \right) \right] \]
\[ + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\nu^2}} E \left[ (C - pX) f \left( \frac{\log X/C - \theta}{\sqrt{2\nu}} \right) (\theta^* - \log p^{-1}) \right]. \]  
(C.10)
The final term in (C.10) is equal to zero, because of (C.9). Hence only the first term on the right-hand side of (C.10) matters, and this term can be unambiguously signed. Because

\[ C - pX < 0 \iff \log X/C - \log p^{-1} > 0 \]

the expression inside the square brackets in this term is never positive, and is negative with probability 1 (under the joint prior for \( X \) and \( C \)). Hence the expected value of the expression inside the brackets is negative, and we find that

\[ \frac{dL^*}{d\nu} < 0 \]

necessarily.

It follows that the DM’s expected financial gain (the objective assumed in our model of the DM’s behavior) is maximized by choosing an encoding rule consistent with (C.3) that makes \( \nu \) as small as possible. As in the previous section, this requires that the encoding rule be given by (C.4), as a result of which the endogenously determined value of \( \nu \) is again given by (C.5).

As in the previous section, we conclude that reducing the parameter \( \sigma \) of the prior distributions from which the values of \( X \) and \( C \) are chosen should reduce the value of \( \nu \), in order for efficient use to be made of the system’s finite capacity for representing different numerical magnitudes. The probability of a subject’s accepting the risky lottery should be given by (C.8), setting \( \theta = \theta^*(\nu) = \beta^{-1} \log p^{-1} \). It then follows that reducing \( \sigma \) should increase the steepness of the choice curve, when the acceptance probability is plotted as a function of \( \log X/C \), as discussed in the text. This is exactly what Frydman and Jin (2018) find in their experiment.\(^{33}\)

## D Accounting for Loss Aversion

In the case of risky prospects that involve losses, it is natural to suppose that the (unsigned) numerical magnitude of each possible loss is imprecisely encoded in exactly the same way as the monetary amounts that represent possible gains. If we suppose that the distribution of possible internal representations of a loss of size \( L \) is encoded by a quantity \( r_L \sim N(\log L, \nu^2) \), where the precision parameter \( \nu \) is exactly the same as in the case of gains, and we similarly assume that the prior over the (unsigned) numerical magnitudes of possible losses is the same as the prior distribution (B.2) from which possible gains are drawn, then the optimal subjective estimate of a loss based on its noisy internal representation will be given by

\[ E[L|r_L] = \exp[\alpha + \beta r_L], \]

where \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are the same coefficients as in the case of gains. The probability distribution of estimated values conditional on the true magnitude \( G \) will again be a log-normal distribution, the mean of which depends on \( G \) in exactly the same way as in the case of gains. Under these assumptions, we obtain the prediction that a random loss will be preferred to a certain

\(^{33}\)Frydman and Jin also interpret their finding as an implication of efficient coding, though their derivation of this conclusion is somewhat different from the one presented here based on our logarithmic coding model.
loss with the probability (4.2) stated in the text, where the parameters $\beta$ and $\nu$ are the same as in the corresponding equation in the case of risky prospects involving only gains. This provides an explanation for Kahneman and Tversky’s “reflection effect,” as mentioned in the text.

It need not be the case, however, that the prior distributions over potential gains and losses are the same. Suppose that in the case of gains, the prior distribution over possible magnitudes $G$ is given by

$$\log G \sim N(\mu_G, \sigma_G^2),$$

while in the case of losses the prior distribution is given by

$$\log L \sim N(\mu_L, \sigma_L^2).$$

To reduce the number of free parameters in our theory, let us suppose that the precision of encoding of both gains and losses is endogenously determined in the way discussed above. Thus a gain of magnitude $G$ will have an imprecise internal representation drawn from the distribution

$$r_G \sim N(\log G, \nu_G^2),$$

while a loss of magnitude $L$ will have a representation drawn from the distribution

$$r_L \sim N(\log L, \nu_L^2),$$

in which the ratio $\nu_L^2/\sigma_L^2$ is the same ratio as $\nu_G^2/\sigma_G^2$ because of (C.5).

It then follows from the discussion above that the optimal subjective estimate of a monetary payoff of either sign, conditional on its internal representation, will be given by

$$E[G | r_G] = \exp[\alpha_G + \beta r_G]$$

in the case of a gain, but by

$$E[L | r_L] = \exp[\alpha_L + \beta r_L]$$

in the case of a loss. Here the coefficient

$$\beta = \frac{\sigma_G^2}{\sigma_G^2 + \nu_G^2} = \frac{\sigma^2}{\sigma^2 + \nu^2} \quad (D.1)$$

will be the same for both gains and losses, while the coefficients

$$\alpha_G \equiv (1 - \beta) \left[ \mu_G + (1/2)\sigma_G^2 \right]$$

$$\alpha_L \equiv (1 - \beta) \left[ \mu_L + (1/2)\sigma_L^2 \right]$$

are different in the two cases.

This generalization of the model does not change the conclusions derived in the main text; we still obtain (2.5) in the case of a choice between a risky gain and a certain gain and (4.2) in the case of a choice between a risky loss and a certain loss, with the qualification that in the former formula $\nu$ should be understood to refer to $\nu_G$ while in the latter formula it refers to $\nu_L$. The question whether the parameters are the same for gains and losses matters.
more, however, in the case of a “mixed prospect,” i.e., one in which either a gain or a loss may occur.

Tversky and Kahneman (1992) report an experiment in which subjects must choose whether or not to accept a gamble which involves an equal probability of obtaining a gain \( G \) and a loss \( L \). (The alternative, if the gamble is not accepted, is to obtain nothing with certainty.) If the two monetary magnitudes \( G \) and \( L \) in such a decision problem are encoded in the way proposed above, then an optimal decision rule will result in acceptance of the gamble if and only if \( E[G|r_G] - E[L|r_L] > 0 \). Substituting the formulas above for the conditional expectations, this condition will be satisfied if and only if the internal representations satisfy

\[
r_G - r_L > (\alpha_L - \alpha_G)/\beta.
\]

Under our assumptions about the distributions from which the internal representations are drawn, the probability of this condition being satisfied is equal to

\[
\text{Prob}[\text{accept}] = \Phi \left( \frac{\log(G/L) - \beta^{-1}(\alpha_L - \alpha_G)}{\sqrt{(\beta^{-1} - 1)(\sigma_G^2 + \sigma_L^2)}} \right). \quad (D.2)
\]

If the priors are the same for losses and for gains, we have \( \alpha_L = \alpha_G \), and (D.2) will imply a probability of acceptance greater than one-half (i.e., that the subject should more often accept the gamble than reject it) if and only if \( G > L \). But if we suppose that \( \mu_L \geq \mu_G \), \( \sigma_L \geq \sigma_G \), and that at least one of these inequalities is strict, we will have \( \alpha_L > \alpha_G \). In this case, the value of \( G/L \) required for indifference (equal probability of acceptance and rejection) will be greater than one. Thus a decision maker would be predicted to be averse to gambles of this mixed type, unless the prospective gain is a sufficiently large multiple of the prospective loss; and the ratio \( G/L \) required for acceptance more often than not will remain the same even in the case of very small stakes (the predicted behavior is scale-invariant). Thus the decision maker would exhibit “loss aversion,” just as the experimental subjects of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) do.

Prospect theory explains this kind of behavior by postulating a kink in the “value function” at the reference point. In the theory proposed here, there is no deterministic value function, but rather a probability distribution of subjective value estimates corresponding to any given objective payoff. If, however, we let \( v(X) \) be the mean subjective estimate of the signed monetary payoff \( X \) — that is, the mean value of the estimate \( \hat{v}(X) \equiv E[X|r_x] \), integrating over the distribution of possible internal representations \( r_x \) conditional on the true payoff \( X \) — then the generalized version of our model presented in this section implies that

\[
v(X) = AX^\beta \quad \text{for } X \geq 0,
\]

\[
v(X) = -\lambda A(-X)^\beta \text{ for } X \leq 0.
\]

Here \( 0 < \beta < 1 \) is the coefficient defined in (D.1), the multiplicative factor \( A > 0 \) in the case of gains is the same one that appears in (1.4), and the additional multiplicative factor \( \lambda > 0 \) in the case of losses is given by

\[
\lambda \equiv \exp \left[ (1 - \beta)(\mu_L - \mu_G) + (1/2)(1 - \beta^2)(\sigma_L^2 - \sigma_G^2) \right].
\]
Thus if $\mu_L \geq \mu_G, \sigma_L \geq \sigma_G$, and at least one of these inequalities is strict, the model predicts that $\lambda > 1$, and the function $V(X)$ will have a kink at $X = 0$, just like the value function posited by prospect theory.

Thus our model is perfectly consistent with the existence of loss aversion, but does not require that it must exist; whether it should exist depends on the asymmetry, if any, in the prior distributions for losses as opposed to gains. Under more general assumptions about the determinants of the precision with which gains and losses are encoded, additional reasons for asymmetry in the subjective estimation of losses as opposed to gains would be possible. We leave this further development of the theory, and consideration of the extent to which the sources of asymmetry required by this theory can explain the cases in which loss aversion is observed in practice, for more detailed discussion elsewhere.

### E Testing Scale-Invariance: Additional Statistics

We begin with a further discussion of the degree to which the choice curves (psychometric functions) for the different values of $C$ shown in Figures 2 and 3 satisfy the property of scale-invariance predicted by our model. The maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for the different choice curves (estimates of (3.1) for each of the individual values of $C$, and the estimate of (3.2) using the pooled data) are shown in Table 3. For each estimated model, the table also indicates the number of observations $N_{obs}$ used to estimate the parameters, and the maximized value of the log-likelihood of the data, LL. We can use this information to compute a Bayes information criterion (BIC) statistic for each model, defined as

$$BIC \equiv -2LL + 2\log N_{obs},$$

since each model has two free parameters.

We can consider quantitatively the extent to which our data are more consistent with the more flexible model (3.1) than with the more restrictive predictions of our theory, using the BIC to penalize the use of additional free parameters. If we consider as one possible model of our complete data set a theory according to which there is a curve of the form (3.1) for each value of $C$, with parameters that may differ (in an unrestricted way) for different values of $C$, then the BIC associated with this theory (with 12 free parameters) is the sum of the BICs reported in the last column of Table 3 for the individual values of $C$, equal to 7545.5. The BIC associated with our more restrictive theory (with only two free parameters) is instead only 7521.0, as reported in the bottom row of the table.\(^{35}\)

---

\(^{34}\)Here, as elsewhere in the paper, “log” refers to the natural logarithm.

\(^{35}\)Here the BIC is equal to minus 2 times the log-likelihood of the complete data set under the optimized parameters, plus a penalty of $N_{obs}(\theta)$ for each free parameter $\theta$, where $N_{obs}(\theta)$ is the number of observations that are fit using the parameter $\theta$. In the present application, this is the sum of the BICs reported for the models fit to the data for individual values of $C$.

\(^{36}\)Our theory implies not only that choice probabilities should be given by a relationship of the form (3.2), but also that the parameters must satisfy conditions (5.1) stated below. However, the unrestricted maximum of the likelihood is attained by parameter values (shown in the bottom line of Table 3) that satisfy these restrictions, so that the best-fitting parameter estimates consistent with our theory, and the associated BIC, are the ones given in the table.
The more restrictive model is therefore preferred under the BIC: it leads to a lower value of the BIC, since the increase in the log-likelihood of the data allowed by the additional free parameters is not large enough to offset the penalty for additional free parameters. In fact, the BIC for our more restrictive model is lower by 24.6 points, corresponding to a Bayes factor of $K = e^{12.3}$. Thus the data increase the relative posterior probability of the restrictive model being the correct one, over whatever prior probability may have been assigned to this, by a factor of more than 200,000.

As indicated in the text, the individual choice curves of one subject, subject 9, are much farther from exhibiting scale-invariance than those of the other subjects. If we instead pool the data of all subjects except subject 9, the sum of the BIC statistics from the choice curves for individual values of $C$ would equal 7143.4, while the BIC statistic for the restricted (scale-invariant) model equal only 7104.1.\(^{37}\) Thus in this case, the BIC for our more restrictive model would be lower by 39.3 points, corresponding to a Bayes factor in favor of the scale-invariant model that is greater than 300 million.

This is of course purely a test of in-sample fit of the scale-invariant model. In the text, we instead emphasize tests in which the parameters of each model are estimated using only $3/4$ of each subject’s trials (the “calibration dataset”), and the remaining data (the “validation dataset”) are used for an out-of-sample test of fit. In the first panel (“Pooled Data”) of Table 1 in the text, the statistics reported in the first two columns correspond to the statistics presented in Table 3, except that the statistics correspond to choice curves estimated using only the “calibration dataset.”\(^{38}\) (The values given for both the log likelihood and the BIC statistic are smaller in Table 1 because of the smaller sample.) In this case, the overall Bayes factor in favor of the scale-invariant model is not as large (when the pooled data are used), as shown in Table 1; but the scale-invariant model is still strongly favored. When we instead estimate separate choice curves for each subject, and then pool the log likelihoods and corresponding BIC statistics across subjects, the scale-invariant model is much more strongly favored, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 1 in the text.

\(^{37}\)With the smaller number of subjects, the parameter estimates for the restricted model are $\delta = -1.95, \gamma = 2.47$, rather than the values shown on the bottom line of Table 3.

\(^{38}\)As discussed in the text, the values reported in Table 1 are actually averages of the values obtained for four different choices as to which quarter of the subjects’ data to subtract from the calibration dataset.
Table 4: In-sample and out-of-sample measures of goodness of fit compared for the scale-invariant model (our logarithmic coding model) and an unrestricted statistical model, using the same format as in Table 1 in the text. In the top panel, each model is fit to the pooled data from all 19 subjects other than subject 9. In the middle panel, separate model parameters are fit to the data each of the 19 subjects other than subject 9. In the bottom panel, separate model parameters are fit to the data for subject 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>$LL_{calibration}$</th>
<th>$BIC$</th>
<th>$LL_{validation}$</th>
<th>log $K$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pooled Data [all but Subject 9]</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale-invariant</td>
<td>-2656.6</td>
<td>5330.5</td>
<td>-887.56</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrestricted</td>
<td>-2644.4</td>
<td>5371.0</td>
<td>-887.60</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Heterogeneous Parameters [all but Subject 9]</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale-invariant</td>
<td>-1719.5</td>
<td>3654.2</td>
<td>-632.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrestricted</td>
<td>-1514.3</td>
<td>3841.4</td>
<td>-2003.1</td>
<td>1464.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subject 9 Only</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale-invariant</td>
<td>-133.9</td>
<td>278.5</td>
<td>-45.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrestricted</td>
<td>-41.8</td>
<td>120.8</td>
<td>-211.7</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first two panels of Table 4 repeat the analyses shown in the corresponding panels of Table 1, but using only the data for the 19 subjects other than subject 9. The corresponding statistics when only the data for subject 9 are used are shown in the bottom panel of the table. (Note that if one sums each of the entries in the bottom two panels of Table 4, one obtains the statistics given in the bottom panel of Table 1 in the text.)

If the data for subject 9 are excluded, then even when a common set of parameters is estimated for all of the other 19 subjects, one finds that the scale-invariant model fits better, both in-sample and out-of-sample. (In the first panel of Table 1, instead, $LL_{validation}$ is higher for the unrestricted model, meaning that this model fits slightly better out-of-sample, even though the in-sample fit is better for the scale-invariant model, once one penalizes the additional free parameters of the unrestricted model, and the overall Bayes factor in support of the scale-invariant model is relatively large.) The degree to which the overall Bayes factor favors the scale-invariant model is also considerably larger when subject 9 is excluded: we now find that log $K = 20.3$, meaning that $K > 650$ million.

The bottom panel of Table 4 shows that while the scale-invariant model fits more poorly in-sample for subject 9, the unrestricted model fits much less well out-of-sample, and the overall Bayes factor is actually positive for subject 9 individually. (This can be seen from the location of the dot for subject 9 in Figure 4.) While the behavior of subject 9 is not fit well by our model, it is also not described well by any stable choice curves for individual values of $C$.

We do not attempt to model the behavior observed in the case of subject 9. However, one way in which this subject fails to conform to our model is clear: the subject’s apparent degree of risk-aversion increases notably as the size of the certain payment $C$ is increased, as shown in Figure 6. In fact, subject 9 is risk-seeking (in the sense that the risky option is accepted more than half the time even for values of $X/C < 1/p$) when $C$ equals $5.55$ or $7.85$, but risk-averse (in the sense that the risky option is declined more than half the
Figure 6: Choice curves for subject 9, for each of five different values of $C$, plotted as functions of $\log X/C$, as in the first panel of Figure 3. Note that this subject was not presented any trials in which $C = $31.40.

In the context of our Bayesian model, the sharp increase in risk aversion for larger values of $C$ could be interpreted as optimal behavior on the part of a subject with a prior regarding the possible values of $X$ that implies greater skepticism about the likelihood of larger payments than the log-normal prior assumed in our model would imply (perhaps because of prior experience with the amounts paid in campus decision-making experiments). Alternatively, it might reflect a subject for whom the amounts potentially earned in the experiment were of sufficient immediate usefulness for there to be a significant degree of diminishing marginal utility.

F Comparison with Alternative Models: Additional Alternatives

F.1 More General Additive Random Expected-Utility Models

In the text, we consider two kinds of additive random-utility models (ARUMs). In each model, the subject is assumed to choose the option for which $E[u(Y)] + \epsilon$ is larger, where $Y$ is the monetary amount gained from the experiment and $\epsilon$ is a random term (drawn at the time of choice) that is independent of the characteristics of the option. In the “ARUM-Probit” model, the random term $\epsilon$ is assumed to be drawn from a normal distribution,
whereas in the “ARUM-Logit” model, $\epsilon$ is assumed to be drawn from an extreme-value distribution. In each case, the nonlinear utility function $u(Y)$ is assumed to be of the CRRA form, $u(Y) = Y^{1-\gamma}/(1 - \gamma)$, for some $\gamma \geq 0$.

Here we consider whether the fit of a nonlinear expected utility model might be improved by allowing a more general form of utility function, specifically, a function in the HARA class. This is the two-parameter family of utility functions $u(Y; \alpha, \beta)$ for which the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion $\rho(Y) \equiv -u''(Y)/u'(Y)$ is a hyperbolic function of $Y$: $\rho(Y) = (\alpha + \beta Y)^{-1}$, for some constant coefficients $\alpha, \beta$. We assume that these coefficients are such that $\alpha + \beta Y > 0$ for all values of $Y$ in the interval $(0, \bar{Y})$, where $\bar{Y} = $125.60 is the largest monetary amount used in the experiment, so that $u(Y)$ is an increasing, concave function over the range of values $0 < Y < \bar{Y}$. (This assumption requires that $\alpha \geq 0$ and that $\beta$ not be too negative; it is satisfied if $\alpha, \beta \geq 0$ and at least one of them is positive.) This family of functions nests the CRRA family (the case in which $\alpha = 0, \beta > 0$), but also allows other cases, including the familiar CARA family (the case in which $\alpha > 0, \beta = 0$). Again we can consider both Probit and Logit cases of the random-expected-utility model with HARA utility. In each case, we have a three-parameter model, in which the free parameters are the preference parameters $\alpha, \beta$, and the standard deviation of $\epsilon$.\(^{39}\)

If we estimate a single utility function for all 20 subjects, then the generalization to HARA utility makes no difference for our results, for in fact the best-fitting member of the HARA family of utility functions is a member of the CARA family. (That is, when we optimize the parameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$, the optimal parameter values are on the boundary of the admissible region where $\alpha = 0$. Because $\alpha$ is constrained, there are no more free parameters than in the CRRA case, and the BIC statistics also remain the same.) This is true for both the Probit and Logit versions of the ARUM; regardless of whether we estimate the common model parameters pooling the data of all 20 subjects, or only using the data for the 19 subjects other than subject 9.

If instead we estimate a separate utility function for each subject, then for some individual subjects the best-fitting HARA utility function involves $\alpha > 0$, so that the generalization to HARA utility does allow a better in-sample fit (in the sense of a higher value for the likelihood). However, if we use the BIC criterion to penalize the additional free parameters in the case of the more flexible family of utility functions, the restricted CRRA model still fits the data better, at least if we sum the BIC statistics of the different subjects (so as to compare the two hypotheses under which either CRRA is the right model for all subjects, or the HARA model is). The BIC statistics for these model comparisons are shown in Table 5.\(^{40}\)

In each row of Table 5, the statistics given show the sum of the BIC statistics for the models estimated for the individual subjects. (The first column shows the sum of these statistics for all 20 subjects; the second column shows the sum for all subjects other than

\(^{39}\)The parameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$ only identify the function $u(Y)$ up to an arbitrary affine transformation; the exact function can be pinned down by further specifying two values such as $u(\bar{Y})$ and $u'(\bar{Y})$. These latter parameters can be chosen arbitrarily. The value of $u(\bar{Y})$ has no consequences for predicted choices (since it does not affect the expected utility difference between any two lotteries); the value of $u'(\bar{Y})$ amounts to a choice of the units in which the standard deviation of $\epsilon$ is measured.

\(^{40}\)Here we consider only in-sample fit of the various models to the complete data set, rather than undertaking the kind of cross-validation exercise reported in Table 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Sum of BIC over Subjects</th>
<th>All Subjects</th>
<th>All but S9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log coding</td>
<td>5223.0</td>
<td>4854.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Random Expected-Utility Models</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRRA - Probit</td>
<td>5526.0</td>
<td>5183.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRRA - Logit</td>
<td>5359.0</td>
<td>5015.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARA - Probit</td>
<td>5571.1</td>
<td>5229.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARA - Logit</td>
<td>5411.0</td>
<td>5067.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Random Prospect-Theory Models</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT - Probit</td>
<td>5535.0</td>
<td>5218.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT - Logit</td>
<td>5377.0</td>
<td>5058.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Random Salience-Theory Models</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience - Probit</td>
<td>5822.3</td>
<td>5506.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience - Logit</td>
<td>5616.0</td>
<td>5297.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Model comparison statistics for alternative models in which separate parameters are estimated for each subject. (The alternative models are explained in the text.) In each case, the statistic given is the sum of the BIC statistics for the models estimated for the individual subjects.

subject 9.) A comparison of the BIC statistics between any two rows can then be used to judge the relative fit of the two models in question; in particular, the difference in the BIC statistics in any two rows (of the same column) can be used to compute a Bayes factor $K$ for comparison of the two hypotheses that one model or the other is the correct model for all subjects (all of those considered in that column).

For reference, the first row of the table shows the BIC statistics for our logarithmic coding model.\textsuperscript{41} The second and third rows show the corresponding statistics for the CRRA-Probit and CRRA-Logit models, the models called “ARUM-Probit” and “ARUM-Logit” in the text. The fourth and fifth rows then show these statistics for the cases in which the function $u(Y)$ is allowed to be any member of the HARA family. We see that regardless of the assumed distribution for the noise term $\epsilon$, and regardless of whether we use all 20 subjects or we exclude subject 9, the conclusion is the same: allowing the more general form of utility function raises the log likelihood (not shown in the table), but also results in a larger BIC statistic.

In each case, we would therefore have a Bayes factor $K$ much greater than 1 in favor of the CRRA specification. (For example, in the case of the logit specification and using the data of all 20 subjects, the BIC for the CRRA case is 5359.0, while for the HARA case it is 5411.1. The BIC statistic is larger by 52.1 points, so that $\log K = 26.0$, implying a Bayes factor greater than 200 billion.) Of course, as discussed in the text, the logarithmic coding model fits better than either of the ARUMs based on CRRA utility; regardless of whether we exclude subject 9, the BIC statistics in the first row are lower than those in any other

\textsuperscript{41}The BIC statistics shown in the first column differ from those in the bottom of panel of Table 2 in the text, because here we fit the models to the complete dataset, rather than only to the “calibration dataset” as in Table 2.
F.2 The Random Parameter Model of Apesteguia and Ballester (2018)

Apesteguia and Ballester (2018) propose an alternative way of generalizing the standard theory of expected utility maximization in order to allow for stochastic choice: rather than adding a random term to the level of expected utility associated with a given gamble, they propose that the expected utility of each gamble is computed using a utility with a parameter that varies randomly from trial to trial, so that the ranking of different lotteries according to their expected utility need not be the same on each trial. On any trial, however, a single utility function is used to evaluate all of the choice options considered on that trial. Thus all choices are made in a way that is optimal from the standpoint of a coherent set of preferences that satisfy standard (normatively appealing) axioms; apparent inconsistencies between choices made in different trials simply reflect the fact that preferences are different across trials, and not a failure to choose optimally within any trial.

Apesteguia and Ballester argue that this kind of model should be more appealing on normative grounds than the kind of ARUMs discussed above and in the main text. And it might seem that their approach should have more promise as an explanation of our experimental data, as well. The key failing of the ARUMs discussed above, responsible for their fitting the data considerably less well than does our logarithmic coding model, is the fact that they imply a particular kind of deviation from scale-invariance that is not observed.\footnote{The ARUMs imply that if one multiplies all monetary amounts by a factor of 5, while keeping the probability \( p \) unchanged, the values \( u(X) \) and \( u(C) \) become larger by a factor much larger than 1 — and hence the expected utilities associated with the two lotteries are each scaled up by this factor, as is the difference between the expected utilities of the two lotteries — while the distribution of the error terms remains unchanged. This means that the choice between any two lotteries (that are not precisely equal in expected utility) should become much less noisy if the monetary payoffs are all scaled up in this way. We do not observe such an effect in our data at all.}

The random parameter model can instead easily be specified to be scale-invariant. In fact, the specification used in the quantitative analysis of Apesteguia and Ballester — in which the utility function is of the CRRA form, but with a randomly varying coefficient of relative risk aversion — would imply scale-invariance.

Nonetheless, the random parameter model does not fit our data even as well as the ARUMs discussed in the text (or above). This is because it implies that a dominated lottery should never be chosen, despite the fact that choices between two lotteries neither of which dominates the other will generally be random (with each of them chosen with positive probability). In the case of our experiment, this means that subjects should never choose the risky lottery on a trial in which \( X = C \), since in this case the certain payment (receiving \( C > 0 \) with certainty) dominates the lottery (receiving \( C \) only with probability \( p < 1 \), and otherwise nothing). But our subjects do choose the risky lottery occasionally on trials when \( X = C \) (in fact, 50 times out of 1,044 such trials). Because ARUMs allow this to occur with positive probability (like our model), they outperform the random parameter model on likelihood-based model selection criteria of the kind that we discuss above; but as shown above, they nonetheless do not fit nearly as well as our model of logarithmic coding.
F.3 Stochastic Versions of Prospect Theory

In order to test the ability of prospect theory to explain our data — at least in a way that puts the theory on the same footing as the others considered here, and allows likelihood-based model comparisons — it is necessary to extend the original theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to make it stochastic. A standard approach in econometric tests of prospect theory (as reviewed in Stott, 2006) is to add a random term $\epsilon$ to the valuation of each risky prospect that would be specified by Kahneman and Tversky. It is then assumed that the option chosen on a given trial will be the one with the higher value of

$$\sum_i w(p_i)v(Y_i) + \epsilon,$$

where $i$ indexes the possible outcomes under the risky prospect; $p_i$ is the objective probability of outcome $i$ and $Y_i$ the associated net monetary gain; $w(p)$ is the Kahneman-Tversky probability “weighting function” and $v(Y)$ their “value function”; and $\epsilon$ is a random term, drawn independently for each prospect.$^{43}$ Once again, we can consider both the case in which $\epsilon$ is assumed to be drawn from a normal distribution and the case in which it has an extreme-value distribution.

As noted in the text, the ARUMs based on a CRRA utility function (considered in Table 2, and in Table 5 above) can also be considered to represent stochastic versions of prospect theory, in which the weighting function is assumed to be linear ($w(p) = p$) and the value function is of the CRRA form. This form of value function is in fact the one most commonly used in empirical tests of prospect theory (following Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; again, see Stott, 2006, for a review of the literature). But the assumption that $w(p) = p$ is of course contrary to what Kahneman and Tversky propose; and one might wonder whether a stochastic version of prospect theory that incorporates a nonlinear probability weighting function would better explain our experimental data than the random expected-utility models considered above.

Since in our experiment, the probability $p$ of the non-zero outcome under the risky alternative is always equal to 0.58, it only matters what numerical value we propose for the probability weight $\hat{p} \equiv w(0.58)$. $^{44}$ Kahneman and Tversky assume an “inverse-S” shape for $w(p)$, implying that there exists an intermediate probability $\hat{p}$ such that $p < w(p) < 1$ for all $0 < p < \hat{p}$ but $0 < w(p) < p$ for all $\hat{p} < p < 1$. They further assume a “sub-additivity” property for the weighting function, that requires that $\hat{p} < 1/2$ (so that in the case of two equally likely outcomes, $w(1/2) < 1/2$). Since in our experiment, $p = 0.58 > 1/2$, the assumptions of Kahneman and Tversky would imply that $0 < \hat{p} < 0.58$.

Our noisy prospect-theory models therefore assume that

$$v(Y) = Y^{1-\gamma}/(1 - \gamma)$$

$^{43}$Except for the presence of the $\epsilon$ term, this is the model of the valuation of risky prospects proposed in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Because in this paper we consider only simple gambles in which there are at most two possible outcomes $i$, the further refinement of cumulative prospect theory, introduced in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), is not relevant here.

$^{44}$Kahneman and Tversky assume that $w(0) = 0$ and $w(1) = 1$. The only other probability that occurs in our examples is 0.42, the probability of the zero outcome under the risky alternative. However, Kahneman and Tversky also assume that $v(0) = 0$, so that the value of $w(p_i)$ for this alternative does not matter.
and \( w(0.58) = \tilde{p} \), where the parameters \( \gamma \) and \( \tilde{p} \) satisfy the theoretical restrictions \( \gamma \geq 0 \) and \( 0 \leq \tilde{p} \leq 0.58 \). There are two versions of the model, “PT-Probit” in which \( \epsilon \) is drawn from a normal distribution, and “PT-Logit” in which it is drawn from an extreme-value distribution. In each case, the noisy prospect-theory model has three free parameters: the values of \( \gamma, \tilde{p} \), and the standard deviation of \( \epsilon \).

If we fit the noisy prospect-theory models to our data assuming common parameter values for all subjects, then the results are the same as in the case of the CRRA random expected-utility models discussed in the text. For we find that the best-fitting parameter values involve \( \tilde{p} = 0.58 \), so that the upper bound is a binding constraint. In this case, the noisy prospect-theory model reduces to a model that is mathematically equivalent to the CRRA random expected-utility model; there is also the same number of free parameters (given that \( \tilde{p} \) is constrained), and hence the same BIC statistic as for the CRRA-ARUM.

If instead we fit a separate noisy prospect-theory model to the data for each subject, then we do find that the data can be better fit by a model with \( 0 < \tilde{p} < 0.58 \) for some subjects. However, as in the case of the more flexible class of utility functions considered in the previous subsection, the degree to which the likelihood of the data is increased is not great enough to justify the inclusion of the additional free parameters, if free parameters are penalized according to the BIC criterion. The sixth and seventh rows of Table 5 show the BIC statistics (again, summed over the subjects) for the “PT-Probit” and “PT-logit” models. In each case, the BIC statistics are higher for the less restrictive model (in which \( \tilde{p} \) is allowed to be less than 0.58) than if the theoretical assumption that \( \tilde{p} = 0.58 \) is imposed. Thus these models do not fit better than the random expected-utility models already considered, and \textit{a fortiori} are not competitive with the logarithmic coding model as an explanation for our experimental data.

**F.4 Stochastic Versions of Salience Theory**

Bordalo et al. (2012) propose an alternative theory of risk attitudes, according to which deviations from risk-neutral choice result from differential weighting of the different possible outcomes of a gamble according to their degree of “salience.” In the case of a simple comparison between a certain outcome and a risky option with two possible outcomes, of the kind considered here, their theory is relatively simple. There are only two possible outcomes to take into account, the good outcome for the risky option (the one in which \( X \) is received) and the bad outcome (the one in which zero is received). It is assumed that the relative weight placed on the good outcome as opposed to the bad outcome is greater than the relative probability of that state if and only if the outcome in which the risky option yields \( X \) is the more salient of the two possible outcomes.

Algebraically, the theory predicts that the risky gamble should be chosen if and only if\(^{45}\)

\[
\sum_i g_i p_i Y_i > C,
\]

\(^{45}\)The theory of Bordalo et al. (2012) also allows the utilities associated with different outcomes to be different from the net financial gains in each case, as assumed here. However, none of the interpretations of experimental findings with regard to risk attitudes in laboratory settings proposed in their paper depends on assumption of nonlinear utility. So here we test a more parsimonious specification in which utility is assumed to be linear, for small gambles of the kind presented in our experiment.
where $g_i > 0$ is the “salience weight” associated with outcome $i \ (i = hi, lo)$, and $Y_i$ is the monetary payoff on the risky gamble in that state. The salience weights are normalized so that $\sum_i g_i p_i = 1$ (which is why the salience weights do not appear on the right-hand side of the above inequality). Finally, the relative salience weights associated with the different possible outcomes depend on the degree of contrast between the monetary payoffs in the different outcomes (a comparison between the payoffs $X$ and $C$ in the case of the $hi$ state and between 0 and $C$ in the $lo$ state). This means that each of the weights $g_i$ will be some function of $X$ and $C$.

The criterion for choice of the risky gamble thus reduces to

$$g_{hi}(X, C) \cdot p \cdot X > C, \quad (F.1)$$

or alternatively,

$$\log(X/C) > -\log p - \log g_{hi}(X, C). \quad (F.2)$$

Bordalo et al. (2012) further propose assumptions about the determinants of the salience weights that imply that $g_{hi} < g_{lo}$ if $|X - C| = |0 - C|$, so that $\log g_{hi} < 0$ when $X/C = 2$. Furthermore, their assumptions imply that the relative salience of the $X - C$ comparison should be reduced either by reducing $|X - C|$ (for fixed $C$) or increasing $C$ (for fixed $|X - C|$); hence $\log g_{hi}$ must be negative when $X/C = 1/p$ (the case of equal expected value), given that $1/2 < p < 1$ in our experiment. Thus their theory implies that the “indifference point” should indicate risk aversion in our experiment.

A quantitative test of the theory would however require us to specify aspects of the theory on which Bordalo et al. do not take a definite stand. In particular, we would have to specify a particular function $g_{hi}(X, C)$ for the relative salience weight on the $hi$ state, and we would have to add a source of randomness to make the decision criterion (F.1) stochastic. The degree to which such a model would be consistent with our data depends on how these choices are made.

In particular, we note that it would be possible to make assumptions under which a version of salience theory would be observationally indistinguishable from our own model. The decision criterion (F.1) is scale-invariant if we assume that $g_{hi}(X, C)$ is homogeneous of degree zero. This is not enough, however, for the theory to imply scale-invariant choice curves. Even under this homogeneity assumption, the choice curves will not be scale-invariant if we make the decision criterion stochastic by adding a random term to each side of (F.1), with the random terms drawn from a distribution that is independent of the payoffs $X$ and $C$, as in an ARUM.

On the other hand, we would obtain a prediction of scale-invariant choice curves in the case of multiplicative rather than additive error terms. In that case, (F.2) generalizes to

$$\log(X/C) > -\log p - \log g_{hi}(X/C) + \epsilon_{diff}, \quad (F.3)$$

where $\epsilon_{diff}$ is the difference between the logarithms of the two multiplicative error terms. If the random term $\epsilon_{diff}$ is distributed symmetrically around a median of zero (as will be the

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46 The comparison between 0 and $C$ is assumed to be more salient than the comparison between $X$ and $C$ in this case, owing to diminishing marginal sensitivity.

47 This would be the case if we suppose that it depends only on the contrast measures $|X - C|/|X + C|$ and $|0 - C|/|0 + C| = 1$, with $g_{hi} > g_{lo}$ if and only if the first of these contrasts is greater than the second.
case if the two multiplicative error terms are assumed to be two independent draws from the same distribution), then (F.3) continues to imply an indifference point indicating risk aversion, though choice is now predicted to be stochastic. The model will also be consistent with our statistical evidence in favor of scale-invariant choice curves.

Indeed, if we assume (a) that the relative salience weight is given by

$$g_{hi}(X/C) = (\lambda X/C)^\alpha$$

where $0 < \lambda < 1/2$ and $\alpha > 0$, and (b) that $\epsilon_{diff}$ is the difference between two normally distributed random variables, and hence itself distributed as $N(0, 2\omega^2)$, then the predictions of the stochastic version of salience theory are indistinguishable (in our dataset) from those of our model of logarithmic coding. Note that under these assumptions, the criterion (F.3) becomes

$$(1 + \alpha) \log(X/C) > -\log p - \alpha \log \lambda + \epsilon_{diff},$$

which implies that the probability of choosing the risky gamble, as a function of $X$ and $C$, will be an expression of the same form as equation (2.5), where the coefficients of that equation are chosen so that

$$(\beta^{-1} - 1) \log p = \frac{\alpha}{1+\alpha} \log(\lambda/p) < 0$$

and

$$\nu = \frac{\omega}{1+\alpha}.$$

Hence the data from our study do not allow us to discriminate between these two possible interpretations. Considering subjects’ choices from among a wider range of gambles would instead allow the theories to be distinguished, and it would be desirable for such a comparison to be undertaken in a future study.

G Imprecise Representation of Probability

The model of choice between lotteries presented in section B of this appendix can be generalized to allow for noisy coding of the probability $p$ as well. As explained in the text, if we assume a noisy internal representation $r_p$ of the probability, the distribution of which depends only on the true probability $p$ described to the subject, then the threshold for acceptance of the risky option becomes

$$r_x - r_c > \beta^{-1} p, \quad p \equiv -\log\mathbb{E}[p|r_p],$$

as stated in the text at (4.3).

Suppose that the internal representation $r_p$ is drawn from a distribution

$$r_p \sim N(\log(p/1-p), \nu_p^2),$$

where $\nu_p$ is non-negligible. Suppose furthermore that the log odds $z \equiv \log(p/1-p)$ of the two outcomes are normally distributed under the prior,

$$z \sim N(\mu_p, \sigma_p^2).$$
Then the joint distribution of $z$ and $r_p$ will be a bivariate Gaussian distribution, and calculations similar to those referenced in section B of this appendix can again be used to compute conditional distributions.

In particular, the posterior log odds, conditional on the representation $r_p$, will also have a Gaussian distribution,

$$ z | r_p \sim N(\bar{m}(r_p), \bar{\sigma}^2), \quad (G.3) $$

where

$$ \bar{m}(r_p) \equiv E[z | r_p] = \mu_p + \beta_p \cdot (r_p - \mu_p) $$

using the notation

$$ \beta_p \equiv \frac{\text{cov}(z, r_p)}{\text{var}(r_p)} = \frac{\sigma_p^2}{\sigma_p^2 + \nu_p^2}, $$

and

$$ \bar{\sigma}^2 \equiv \frac{\sigma_p^2 \nu_p^2}{\sigma_p^2 + \nu_p^2}. $$

Note that $\bar{m}(r_p)$ is a weighted average of $r_p$ and $\mu_p$, and $\bar{\sigma}^2$ is independent of $r_p$, as stated in the text.

Since the probability $p$ of the non-zero payoff can be reconstructed from the log odds as $p = e^z/(1 + e^z)$, we obtain

$$ \rho(r_p) = -\log E[p | r_p] = -\log E\left[\frac{e^z}{1 + e^z} | r_p\right], $$

where $z$ is distributed in accordance with (G.3). Note that we can alternatively write this function as

$$ \rho(r_p) = -\log E[F(r_p, \epsilon)], \quad (G.4) $$

where

$$ F(r_p, \epsilon) \equiv \frac{\exp[\bar{m}(r_p) + \bar{\sigma} \epsilon]}{1 + \exp[\bar{m}(r_p) + \bar{\sigma} \epsilon]} \quad (G.5) $$

and the expectation is over realizations of the random variable $\epsilon$, which has a standard normal distribution (and is distributed independently of the value of $r_p$).

Conditional on a given true value of $p$, the internal representation $r_p$ is a random variable with distribution (G.2). The variable $\rho$ is then a nonlinear transformation of $r_p$ defined by (G.4), and so also a random variable with a distribution conditional on the true value of $p$. The distribution of $\rho$ is complicated to characterize, but it is easy to see that the introduction of noise into the encoding of the log odds by $r_p$ results not only in random variation in the value of $\rho$ (which would instead be a constant, equal to $-\log p$ as assumed in equation (2.4), if $p$ were encoded with perfect precision), but also in a median value for $\rho$ that is generally different from the value it would have in the absence of coding noise. Because $\bar{m}(r_p)$ is a monotonically increasing function of $r_p$, $F(r_p, \epsilon)$ is an increasing function of $r_p$ for each value of $\epsilon$; it then follows from (G.4) that $\rho(r_p)$ must be a monotonically decreasing function of $r_p$. The median value of $\rho$ is then the value of the function $\rho(r_p)$ when $r_p$ takes its median value, so that

$$ \text{median}[\rho | p] = \rho(z(p)). $$

65
Since \( e^{-\rho} \) is a monotonically decreasing function of \( \rho \), we similarly have

\[
w(p) \equiv \text{median}[e^{-\rho}|p] = e^{-\rho(z(p))}.
\]

Recalling the definition of \( \rho(r_p) \), we can alternatively define this function as

\[
w(p) = E[F(z(p), \epsilon)]. \tag{G.6}
\]

Although for any \( p \), \( w(p) \rightarrow p \) as the variance \( \nu_p^2 \) of the coding noise is made arbitrarily small, \( w(p) \) is generally not equal to \( p \) (so that correspondingly, the mean value of \( \rho \) is not equal to \( -\log p \)) when the variance of the coding noise is positive. In fact, we can show that \( w(p) \) has many of the properties that Kahneman and Tversky (1979) assume for their probability weighting function.

First, we observe that for any \( 0 < p < 1 \), we have \( 0 < F(z(p), \epsilon) < 1 \) for all \( \epsilon \), so that the expected value of \( F \) must lie between these extremes as well. Then (G.6) implies that \( 0 < w(p) < 1 \) for all \( 0 < p < 1 \). Next, we also observe that the derivative of the function is given by

\[
w'(p) = E \left[ \frac{\partial F(z(p), \epsilon)}{\partial z} \right] \cdot \frac{dz}{dp} = \beta_p (e^z + 2 + e^{-z}) E[(e^{\mu(z)+\epsilon} + 2 + e^{-\mu(z)-\epsilon})^{-1}]. \tag{G.7}
\]

Because this is the expected value of a variable that is always positive, \( w'(p) > 0 \), and we observe that \( w(p) \) must be a monotonically increasing function of \( p \) over its entire range.

We further observe that for any \( \epsilon \), \( F(z(p), \epsilon) \rightarrow 0 \) as \( p \rightarrow 0 \), and \( F(z(p), \epsilon) \rightarrow 1 \) as \( p \rightarrow 1 \). The convergence is also uniform enough in each case to allow one to show that (G.6) implies that \( w(p) \rightarrow 0 \) as \( p \rightarrow 0 \), and \( w(p) \rightarrow 1 \) as \( p \rightarrow 1 \). Finally, (G.7) implies that for small \( p \) \((z << 0)\),

\[w' \sim \beta_p e^{(1-\beta_p)(\mu_p-z)} E[\epsilon],\]

while for large \( p \) \((z >> 0)\),

\[w' \sim \beta_p e^{-(1-\beta_p)(\mu_p-z)} E[\epsilon].\]

From this we see that \( w'(p) \rightarrow +\infty \) as \( p \rightarrow 0 \), and similarly that \( w'(p) \rightarrow +\infty \) as \( p \rightarrow 1 \).

This implies that \( w(p) > p \) for all small enough \( p > 0 \), while \( w(p) < p \) for all large enough \( p \). Thus if we interpret \( w(p) \) as the “average perceived probability” when the true probability is \( p \), the model implies over-estimation of small positive probabilities, and under-estimation of large probabilities less than 1, as with the probability weighting function of Kahneman and Tversky (1979).

We can observe more about the global shape of the \( w(p) \) function if we consider the limiting case in which \( \sigma_p \) and \( \nu_p \) are both small, but we fix the ratio \( \nu_p/\sigma_p \) at some finite positive value \( \gamma \) as \( \sigma_p, \nu_p \rightarrow 0 \). In this limiting case, the value of \( \beta_p \) remains fixed at the value \( \beta_p = 1/(1+\gamma^2) < 1 \), while the value of \( \sigma \) approaches zero at the same rate as \( \sigma_p \) and \( \nu_p \). We then observe from (G.5) that for each value of \( \epsilon \),

\[
F(z, \epsilon) \rightarrow \frac{\alpha_p e^{\beta_p z}}{1 + \alpha_p e^{\beta_p z}} \quad \text{as} \ \bar{\sigma} \rightarrow 0,
\]

66
where \( \alpha_p \equiv e^{(1-\beta_p)\mu_p} > 0 \), and the convergence is sufficiently uniform in \( \epsilon \) to ensure that

\[
\lim_{\bar{\sigma} \to 0} E[F(z, \epsilon)] = \frac{\alpha_p e^{\beta_p z}}{1 + \alpha_p e^{\beta_p z}}
\]

for all \( z \). Thus in the limiting case we obtain

\[
w(p) = \frac{\alpha_p e^{\beta_p}}{(1-p)^{\beta_p} + \alpha_p e^{\beta_p}}.
\] (G.8)

where the parameters satisfy \( \alpha_p > 0, 0 < \beta_p < 1 \).

As noted in the text, this function has the “inverse-S” shape assumed for the probability weighting function in prospect theory; indeed, this two-parameter family of probability weighting functions has sometimes been used in quantitative implementations of prospect theory. The function defined in (G.8) has the property that \( w(p) > p \) for all \( 0 < p < p^* \), while \( w(p) < p \) for all \( p^* < p < 1 \), where the critical probability \( p^* \) is given by

\[
p^* \equiv \frac{e^{\mu_p}}{1 + e^{\mu_p}}.
\]

If \( \mu_p < 0 \), implying that under the prior, \( p < 1/2 \) is more likely than \( p > 1/2 \), then \( \alpha_p < 1 \), and as a consequence \( p^* < 1/2 \), and the function \( w(p) \) has the property of “subadditivity” assumed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).

The nonlinearity of the function \( w(p) \) in the case of noisy coding of the probability biases choice in our model in a similar way as the nonlinear probability weighting function in prospect theory. Consider, as an example, the case in which the noise in the internal coding of \( X \) and \( C \) is negligible (\( \nu \) is extremely small), while \( \nu_p \) remains non-trivial (more precisely, the ratio \( \nu_p/\sigma_p \) is not too small). If the monetary amounts \( X \) and \( C \) are represented with high precision, condition (G.1) for choice of the risky option reduces to

\[
\rho < \log X - \log C.
\]

Here the randomness in \( r_x \) and \( r_c \) have been suppressed as negligible, and \( \beta \) has been replaced by its limiting value of 1; the probability of acceptance of the risky option is then just the probability of a realization of \( \rho \) greater than \( \log(X/C) \).

For any given value of \( p \), this model predicts (like the model presented in section 2 of this paper) that the probability of acceptance of the risky option should depend only on the ratio \( X/C \), and should be monotonically increasing in \( X/C \); thus one should obtain a smooth psychometric function of the kind shown in Figure 1 of the text. But unlike the model in section 2, this model also predicts that the subject’s apparent risk attitude should vary depending on the size of \( p \).

If, as in the experiment discussed in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), we define the “certainty equivalent” \( C^* \) for each risky prospect \((p, X)\) as the value of \( C \) for which the subject is indifferent between the risky prospect and obtaining \( C \) with certainty (i.e., the value of \( C \) for which the probability of choosing the risky option is exactly 1/2), then our model of random choice implies that \( C^* \) should be implicitly defined by

\[
\text{median}[\rho|p] \equiv \log(X/C^*),
\]
so that

\[ C^* = X \cdot e^{-\rho(z(p))} = X \cdot w(p). \]

Thus a plot of \( C^*/X \) as a function of \( p \) should show an increasing function of \( p \) (relatively independent of the size of \( X \)) with the “inverse-S” shape seen in the figures in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). In particular, this simple example suffices to show that our theory is capable of explaining the complete “four-fold pattern of risk attitudes” displayed in those figures.

The fact that the weighting function (G.8) is sub-additive when \( \alpha_p < 1 \) means that our theory can also predict the occurrence of Allais-type paradoxes (in the same way that prospect theory can). Consider the following pair of decision problems, presented to experimental subjects in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In the first problem, the subject must choose between (a) winning $2400 with certainty and (b) a lottery offering a 33 percent chance of winning $2500, a 66 percent chance of winning $2400, and a 1 percent chance of winning nothing. In the second problem, the subject must choose between (a) a lottery offering an 34 percent chance of winning $2400, and otherwise nothing, and (b) a lottery offering a 33 percent chance of winning $2500, and otherwise nothing. Kahneman and Tversky find that experimental subjects are more likely to choose (a) in problem 1, but (b) in problem 2. This is problematic for EUM, which implies (regardless of the utility values assigned to the three possible outcomes) that if (a) is preferred to (b) in one problem it must also be preferred in the other problem, and vice versa, simply as a consequence of the fact that expected utility is a linear function of the probabilities.

If one supposes instead that in the case of each lottery, the probabilities of the outcomes (when different from zero or one) are encoded with noise, and decoded in the manner proposed above\(^{48}\), then in problem 1, the average subjective valuation of option (b) is predicted to be

\[ w(.01) \cdot 0 + w(.66) \cdot 2400 + w(.33) \cdot 2500. \]

If (simply as illustrative values) we suppose that \( \alpha_p = \beta_p = 0.5 \), this quantity will equal $1634.82; hence this option will on average be valued much less than $2400, and subjects should be observed to choose option (a) much more frequently. In the case of problem 2, the average subjective valuation of option (a) will be

\[ w(.66) \cdot 0 + w(.34) \cdot 2400 = \$633.85 \]

using these same parameter values. The average subjective valuation of option (b) will instead be

\[ w(.67) \cdot 0 + w(.33) \cdot 2500 = \$649.40. \]

Thus option (b) will be (weakly) preferred on average in problem 2, although option (a) is preferred on average in problem — even though the same approach to noisy coding of probabilities and Bayesian decoding of the internal representations is used in both cases.

\(^{48}\)In the case of option (b) in problem 1, we assume that the Bayesian decoding of the internal representations of the probabilities of obtaining $2400 or $2500 is done independently for each of these probabilities — that is, treating the two probabilities as two independent draws from the same prior distribution over possible probabilities. This allows us to re-use the calculation of the function \( w(p) \) from the discussion above of lotteries in which there is only a single non-zero outcome. Because this calculation implies that option (b) should be judged on average to be considerably inferior to option (a), it seems unlikely that a more sophisticated Bayesian calculation would overturn the result.
H  Experimental Design: Further Details

H.1  Participants

Twenty adults (10 female, ages 18-28 years) participated in the experiment after giving informed consent. Participants were recruited from the Columbia University community via on-campus informational fliers. Participants completed the experimental procedure in a private room on a single computer station. All procedures involving human subjects were approved by the Institutional Review Board of Columbia University (protocol #IRB-AAAQ2255).

H.2  Experimental Task

Participants completed a task in which they were instructed to choose between a certain monetary payment and a risky payment. Participants were presented with a series of options on the screen and submitted their choices by pressing the left or right arrow keys on the keyboard.

Figure 7 illustrates the screen observed by one of our subjects on a single trial. The two sides of the screen indicate the two options available on that trial; the subject must indicate whether she chooses the left or right option (by pressing the corresponding key). On the left side of the screen, the dollar amount shown is the quantity C that can be obtained with certainty if left is chosen. The right side of the screen shows the possible payoffs if the subject chooses the risky lottery instead. The amounts at the top and bottom of the right side indicate the two possible monetary prizes; the colored rectangular regions in the center indicate the respective probabilities of these two outcomes, if the lottery is chosen. The relative areas of the two rectangular regions provide a visual indication of the relative probabilities of the two outcomes; in addition, the number printed in each region indicates the probability (in percent) that that outcome will occur. (Thus on the trial shown, the subject must choose between a certain payment of $5.55 and a lottery in which there would be a 58 percent chance of receiving $15.70, but a 42 percent chance of receiving nothing.)

Figure 7: The computer screen during a single trial of our experiment. The two sides of the screen show the two options available on this trial.
Participants completed sequences lasting between 280 and 648 choices. The average completion time ranged between 14 minutes (280 choices) and 37 minutes (648 choices). In addition, participants began with instructional and practice session that lasted about 10 minutes. Participants were prompted to take a break after every 100 choices, upon which they could resume the experiment at the press of a button. The experiment interface was created with in-house code designed to run on the Psychophysics Toolbox-3 stimuli presentation package for MATLAB.
H.3 Experimental Task Instruction Slides

Welcome!
You are participating in an experiment on economic decision making and will be asked to make a number of choices. The study will last about an hour.

Your choices are very important in this task and will determine your final payment.

Understanding the lottery display

In this experiment, you will see lottery images like this one.

Each lottery represents the possibility of two different outcomes.
The size of the colored areas and the numbers written inside them represent the probability of each outcome.

In this example, the lottery presents a $20 reward at 75% probability and $0 with 25% probability.

Understanding the task

In each lottery one color will be associated with a zero amount and the other color with a positive amount.
The colors help you disambiguate the outcomes.

They are not always attached to the “good” or “bad” outcome in every case.

The experiment consists of a series of trials.
On each trial, you will be asked to choose between a fixed monetary amount for sure and playing a lottery.

Each trial will start like this:
Your options will be then be presented this way:

After a delay, the options will be followed by the following screen:

You will have 10 seconds to make your choice.

Press "←" for the option on the left or "→" for the option on the right.

If you chose the option on the left, you would see this.

After you have selected one of the options, you will see that choice displayed.

If you chose the option on the right, you would see this.
If you did not choose within **10 seconds**, you will see this.

Make sure you choose carefully on each trial!

One of the trials will be randomly selected at the end of the experiment, and your choice on this trial will determine your earnings.

**Understanding payment**

At the end of the experiment, the computer will draw a random number to determine the trial for which you will be paid.

If in the selected trial you chose the fixed amount, you will receive that amount for sure. If you selected the lottery, you will have the opportunity to play it (the computer will run the lottery).

**If you did not make a choice in this trial, you will not earn anything.**

On top of your earnings, you will receive $10 for participating in this session.

**Practice**

You will now complete 1 block of 10 practice trials. These trials **WILL NOT** count for payment.

This is a good time to ask questions if anything remains unclear.