Securitization and Desecuritization in Egypt 2011-2013: The Muslim Brotherhood, its Allies and the Other

Karim Malak¹

Introduction

Since the 2011 uprising, analysis of Egypt has ignored the issue of security except the occasional mention of security sector reform (SSR) (Al-icmandos, 2011). This chapter moves beyond that by problematizing how societal segments are 'securitized' and made into a security threat. Utilizing the Copenhagen school of security studies approach and the designation of security threats via 'speech-act' this chapter explores how the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its allies have securitized and by association Othered a host of segments within society which they define as outside the mainstream. These include Copts, Shi'tes, Sufis, women and at certain moments in time even 'seculars', as problematic as the term is with its many different meanings. By viewing how the MB and its allies Other these segments of society and how they define what is and is not mainstream we can understand the avenues of resistance and attempts at changing subjectivity to counter such a securitizing performativity. This means analyzing the discursive co-optation and the need for legitimation by the MB and its allies by looking at moments of 'exception' and 'normalization' and how both are defined, as well as how the securitizing referent object, what is to be 'secured', is defined and constantly changing. Only then can we understand why MB strongman and Deputy General Guide Khairat al Shater can come out, at the peak of the November 2012 Constitutional Declaration crisis when MB President Morsi usurped judicial power, and say "80% of protesters outside Itihadiya [the Presidential palace] are Copts" (Ishak, 2013). This can be seen as a bid to desecuritize the protests and make it seem as business as usual and delegitimizing them; the protests were

* All citations, omissions and claims are the responsibility of the author and unless otherwise stated all translation is conducted by the author.

not representative but full of Copts. This is because the realm of 'normal politics' was sealed off completely.

Waever rightly remarks "[…] but if one is actually concerned about something, securitization is an attractive tool that one might end up using [...] *as a political actor*", [emphasis added] (Waever, 2000: 251). By virtue of that, the politics of securitization and desecuritization attest to when there is a need for additional legitimacy and by association a challenge. On the other hand when there is a need for legitimation this usually results in securitization. Examples include such as when Assem Abdel Maged of the Jama Islamiya, an Islamic ar med faction during the 1970's and 80's that supposedly renounced violence, said in May 2013 that those who will protest and call for Morsi's departure will be met with blood, ultimately securitizing the 30th of June protests in 2013, thereby legitimizing Morsi and delegitimizing the protests (N. Malak, 2013). Compared with the Deputy General Guide of the MB, Khairat al Shater's desecuritizing remark during the Constitutional Declaration crisis, the politics of securitization and desecuritization show an acute awareness and attempt to formulate and shape subjectivity during these moments of crises, often reflecting an international dimension and delineation of 'normal low level politics'. What is sometimes the case, and this is the point the chapter builds on theoretically, is when too much securitization happens, 'normal politics' become extremely narrow. This is what is nominally understood as the 'Schmittian bias' in that politics operates in a normal playing field absent of conflict. It is the ability to control that space, expanding it or contracting it, that is problematized in this paper.

Securitization as Emancipation: a False Theoretical Mirage?

Critical security studies, this chapter's approach, has its genealogical roots in the field of International Relations (IR). In the 1990s it was termed 'non-traditional security' (Knudsen, 2001). As the Cold War came to an end so too did the need for traditional security approaches that were state-centric and for 'strategic studies'. The critiques of the new approach, 'non-traditional security studies', were responded to at length as Olav Knudsten says, by Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde and Barry

Buzan (Waever, 1995; Buzan and Waever, 1997). This 'non-traditional' approach came to embody the 'Copenhagen School', which emphasizes that security threats, as the referent and *apriori* object, do not exist. Keith Krause sums up this problem aptly:

> [...] [O]nly by coming to terms with the shifting nature of "the political" in International Relations can we understand the various axes of contemporary debate in security studies. In this light, the very name of the field-security studies- should give us pause. The implication is that scholars in the field are studying security. But what, precisely, does this mean? A moment's reflection reveals a basic problem: security is a derivative concept; it is in itself meaningless. To have any meaning, *security* [original emphasis] *necessarily presupposes something to be secured; as a realm of study it cannot be self-referential* [emphasis added], (Keith Krause and Michael C. William, 1997: ix).

Answers to the question *what is to be secured* have often been met with the increasingly unaccepted answer of 'the state' (Keith Krause and Michael C. William, 1997: ix). This has led authors such as Barry Buzane and Richard Little to say that IR has 'failed' in light of increasing disciplinary rigidity and state-centric approaches. Buzane goes so far as to say one of the failures of IR is in its refusal to integrate security studies and its decision to continue the 'neo-neo' debate of realism and liberalism. One of the symptoms of this failure is that "IR is boxed in [...] Eurocentrism and ahistoricism." (Buzan, 2001: 31). Approaches that seek to remedy this situation include post-colonial analyses that problematize how 'security' has always been defined by Western colonizers and how 'threats' have always been with respect to Western society and increasingly hostile to other societies (Barkawy and Laffey, 2006). Richard Ashley (1988), in his seminal *Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique* showed how unhelpful it is to use the state as a referent object for security as it in turn creates a much reduced picture of the international system. It is in this light that some have posited critical security studies or 'non-traditional security studies' as an emancipatory project. This chapter does not claim to be divorced from politics; any analysis that claims neutrality, as has been demonstrated before, is making a false-claim. Rather this chapter calls

for 'honest theory' which states its constitutive biases and proceeds to its analysis, thus building off calls for constitutive theory as well as Waever's call for attention to the 'politics of securitization', (Waever, 2011; Booth, 1996). That is why this chapter asks the 'how' and not the 'why' when talking about securitization and Othering. The former, executed by looking at 'speech-act', constitutes the latter.

Building on Waever's (2011) call others have sought to give more attention to the politics of securitization and problematize more *apriori* assumptions of what is at stake in securitizing and desecuritizing, and the role and subjectivity of the securitizing actor (Bilgin, 2011). Rather, security is constructed by speech-act. Speech-act is the arbitrary designation of a threat by speaking it which in turn is labeled as exceptional in society and needs to be controlled; this is how it is 'securitized' (Waever, 1995). Desecuritization entails the opposite and is a more positive role for which, conscious of the securitization, aims to show how a threat is constructed similarly by speech-act. This chapter's contribution lies in showing how, contrary to what is nominally considered to be emancipatory, desecuritization can be counter-productive

What little work that has been done has approached the matter from an East-West paradigm. These approaches should be commended as well alongside other attempts to problematize previous 'Middle East-IR' literature that has at times been described orientalist in its treatment of identity as organic and deterministic of the region (Korany, 2011: 8). Stefanie Felsberger's chapter focuses on the contemporary pitfalls of such analysis when looking at the ousting of Morsi. Luca Maveli has talked about Western securitization of Islam and the implications of this on regional dynamics (Maveli, 2013). Maveli's thesis is particularly powerful in its post-modern impetus of recognizing the exclusive nature of 'secularism' as a discursive tool that can be securitized and put in opposition to others.

Nonetheless, approaches such as the Copenhagen School, as championed by Ole Waever, can be accused of being orientalist in reverse (Al-Azm, 1980), meaning that despite its critical impetus to move past Western analysis it nonetheless reproduces it constitutively because its object of study is still the West. The 'East' or 'Islam' is not the referent

object; rather, the interactions of it with the West are. This chapter moves past this by seeking to ground its research in the region itself and firmly anchor it by surveying instances of 'speech-act' securitization. With regards to the securitization and construction of an Other no work has been done to address it or problematize the politics of its construction in Egypt.

Enhancing the theory

Recapturing the theory and reconstituting it for analysis in Egypt means a two-fold theoretical exercise. The first is to understand that such Eurocentric theory has a different genealogical development and that a one-size-fits-all approach is not helpful, particularly when evoking the term 'Middle East' and by association the performativity of the 'Middle East' and how we come to think about this pedagogically (Barkawy, 2008; Khalidi, 1998). Barkawy writes:

> Unless one seriously reflected on the slippage between 'European' and 'international' [...] one would never suspect that it was in fact the imperial state, the empire and, latterly, the international blocs of the Cold War and the western 'international state' that were the dominant political entities in world politics from the sixteenth century, (Barkawy, 2008: 20).

This means looking at genealogical development of securitization in Egypt organically and adapting it. I argue that fundamental to this is the Othering of societal segments in the formulation of identity politics, whatever identity is realized to be. Moreover, building off Maveli's argument it is nearly impossible to tackle securitization in this region while ignoring the secuiritzation of 'secualrism'.

This is a major discursive lacuna in the literature which brings me to the second point: critiquing Eurocentric notions of 'insecurity' that have been transplanted onto the region. A byproduct of this is the failure to realize the subjectivity to a European enlightenment project that Others the voices of their so-called 'securitized actors'. This entails completing a double deconstruction of the securitization analyst and author and his analysis of the securitized actor. Put simply, we must un-

derstand where those who have done securitization analysis have reified existing exclusionary practices and why their subjectivity perpetuates a problem that Others the voices of their subject matter. What is at stake in the designation of a 'victim' (the referent object) of speech-act? Who picks this? How and why are some actors picked and transformed from object to subject while others are not? This is despite some movement by the Copenhagen School to broaden it to regions outside the West:

> Securitization theory is a Western-based theory – one that is possibly even locally rooted, as its nickname the 'Copenhagen School' suggests. Although the theory has been applied to cases worldwide, it has been strongly criticized for primarily being geared to Western contexts [...] It is possible to run this critique in a deductive and definitional manner, whereby Western theories become inapplicable purely by dint of their being Western (Greenwood and Waever 2013: 485).

Yet Greenwood and Waever failed to mention a host of issues in seeking to 'emancipate' and apply the Copenhagen school of security studies outside the West. This is due to his subjectivity and the continuation of state-centric ideas. For example, Greenwood and Waever discussed a host of issues from water security, to the liberal concept of human security and security sector reform (SSR). Additionally they failed to explore the securitization of the 'secular Islamist' divide, which I find to be crucial in understanding securitization in Egypt. Though their field research was conducted in 2011 it is understandable that they see this as a temporary issue; however their decision to postulate as such is surely a Western idea that speaks about a certain path-dependency to a transition process despite increasing voices that critique democratization viewed through a 'transition' lens. In this regard it is telling that since 2011 this issue has 'remained' and that they decided to discard this as a referent object to security but take up a host of other issues. In that regard Greenwood and Waever's discursive lacuna—their exclusion by way of talking about those issues—included women, Copts, Shi'tes and any other form of non-mainstream citizen. Greenwood and Waever took for granted the basic Western assumption that all citizens are held to be equal subjects. Indeed in seeking to mediate and give a

voice to the theoreticians which Greenwood and Waever interviewed, they made the distinction of 'old' and 'new' security. Greenwood and Waever, ignoring Barkawy and Laffey's critique, stated:

> The disconnect between technical specialists and security experts was, if possible, even more apparent after the revolution than before. This problem for the theory is mirrored in one of the non-Western arguments: that the state does not permeate society as homogenously in the Third World as in Western societies (Greenwood and Waever, 2013: 497).

This logic, certainly the result of a deficiency in post-modern critiques of security theory, fails to problematize or view enlightenment projects as exclusionary even within Europe and as having undergone an exclusionary pathway themselves. Greenwood and Waever even admit this when they say "[W]estern societies no longer confront (nor de facto run their politics on real expectations of) this kind of ultra-political moment", (Greenwood and Waever, 2013: 501).

Greenwood and Waever here fail to include either within the definition of 'Western' Ukraine, the suburban (and even in cases 'mass strikes' in Paris such as in 2005 and in 2010 with the student strikes in London) the 'poor' in France and London and the tumultuous events of Greece from 2010-12. By doing so they are ascribing meaning to the 'ultra-political moment' as something outside Europe. In this regard Greenwood and Waever have literally and theoretically (their piece contains an odd subheading titled 'from Copenhagen to Cairo' as they show their subjectivity in installing their framework) come to Cairo with an ontological impediment: their referent object. In talking about what is to be 'secured' and by association the referent object, they have opened up the open-ended question of what is the referent object. Yet, for an article that seeks to move beyond Western theory and address post-colonial critique, it is particularly disappointing—and this cannot be overstated—that Greenwood and Waever have failed to show their Western subjectivity which informs their referent object, positing Europe as stable and the Third World as unstable, Europe as lacking 'ultra political moments' while the Third World is ravaged by them. Even within the wider IR lit-

erature there have been acknowledgements about how the EU is making the region unstable, particularly by furthering its neoliberal agenda post-Arab 'Spring' to countries such as Egypt and Tunisia (Tagma, Kalaycioglu and Akcali, 2013). This disguised assumption, that the region is 'unstable', is reflected methodologically in their decision of the periodization of their article, based on fieldwork and workshops conducted during a visit in early 2011. This is all the while failing to mention that critical security approaches look at larger episodes of time. It is also reflected substantively in their subjectivity as previously stated. Barkawy's words seem highly applicable at this juncture:

> Given the extreme vulnerability of western [sic] societies to determined terrorist attack, it is a matter of utmost urgency that this spiral of violence be headed off. Doing so demands first and foremost that we give up the illusions by which we have distinguished the West from the rest of humanity, as more humane, more rational, more 'free', more willing to undertake sacrifices for the good of others. (Barkawy, 2004: 37).

In this regard stability and security of Western society, as Barkawy argues, need to be viewed outside the narrowed conventional definition of the 'political' while simultaneously looking at the genealogy outside the West, not as inherently 'political', 'unstable' and 'insecure', but rather straight forwardly. This requires unearthing the Other and an important departure from human security, water security, SSR, and problematization of 'ultra political moments' and by looking at societal securitization via 'speech-act'. In fact, as will be demonstrated, Greenwood and Waever seem to have naively fallen for the trap of securitization of the revolution via their focus on the counter-revolution. It is under this umbrella that SSR, as a mechanism for desecuritizing the counter-revolution, however defined, is translated into a political project out of theoretical naivety.

Securitizing the Other

The MB and its allies, the Gama'a Islamiya, the Wasat party, Al Nour party and a constellation of pro-MB sheikhs that belong to MB *da'wa*[2] organizations such as the Shari'a organization for rights and reform, headed by MB deputy guide Khairat al Shater, have all securitized and desecuritized certain segments of society at important junctures between 2011 and 2013. By looking at such a time frame in Egypt's contemporary history, historicized analysis can be made in which several actors undergo speech-act against other segments of society. The first instance in which the MB and its allies, such as Salafis, Jama Islamiya and others, securitized a group was the March 19, 2011 referendum on the roadmap after Mubarak was removed from power on February 11, 2011.

"And the Ballot Boxes said Yes to Religion"

"[...]*w qalt al snadiq naʿam lel dyn"*[3] remarked Sheikh Mohamed Hussein Yaqob to jubilant crowds as the result of the March 19, 2011 referendum on the transition roadmap was approved. Needless to say, in 2013 Egypt found itself at a full circle since the result of the referendum was undone. A yes vote meant that elections for parliament would happen first followed by a constituent assembly. A heightened fear was felt that the only organized forces were the MB and its allies and that rushing to parliamentary elections would only serve to weaken new political forces. These fears were not addressed: on the contrary, they were greatly amplified. Sheikh Mohamed Yaqob did not say the ballot boxes said yes to the roadmap, or the ballot boxes said yes to the 'Islamists' even though that would have still been a stretch; he said the ballot boxes said yes to *religion*. He even went on to state "the country is ours", (El Hadi, 2013). This is despite the subject of the referendum being a set of constitutional amendments for a constitutional declaration

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[2] Such organizations are entrusted with the 'call' to the Islamic religion and adhering to its guidelines. They operate as a semi-religious body that has a welfare arm and controls several mosques throughout the nation.
[3] Direct translation: "and the ballot boxes said yes to religion".

to govern until a parliament convenes and a constitution is drafted versus starting a constitution drafting process immediately followed by legislative and executive elections. This speech-act exemplifies and summarizes the wave of securitization that was happening feverishly before the vote. Sheikh Mohamed Hassan, of the Salafi *da'wa* organization, the mother organization of the Al Nour party, remarked before the referendum:

> I am warning against touching article two [the article spelling out Islam is the religion of the state] of the constitution, let's keep this article and protect it, the people of Egypt and the army will not allow it to be touched, [on the contrary] we are calling for it to be implemented, let the Nazerites [derogatory term for Christians] in Egypt be comforted, Islam is the religion that protected their Churches and children, it is a religion of justice, security, forgiveness and tolerance, Islam must not be a scarecrow to the West and others, it is the religion of justice and truth (Ali and Hussein, 2011).

Not surprisingly the veiled threat materialized and during the referendum some villages, such as Naga Hamadi where overwhelming numbers of Copts presided, were barred from voting and received threats, a constant episode for some Coptic villages during any elections since 2011 (ANHRI, 2011). The Church of Imbaba was also attacked (EIPR 2011a). In some cases MB preachers were present outside electoral stations blasting through microphones: "vote yes to the amendments and don't allow the Copts to rule the state", (ANHRI, 2011). Building on that securitization, similar speech-acts followed in which MB campaigners told people outside polling stations to "vote yes because it is a religious duty [*wagib shar'y*]" (Farouk al Gamal, 2011). The Egyptian Association for Community Participatory Enhancement (EACPE) issued a statement saying:

> The MB and Salafis are the ones who insisted on campaigning inside and outside polling stations and tried to force people to vote yes claiming it will bring *stability* [emphasis added] and mo-

bilizing people *against Copts claiming that [they] need to save article two of the constitution* [emphasis added] which was not even being voted on! [sic][4]

In some cases the MB and its "[…] Salafi allies", according to EACPE, were campaigning to voters with the slogan "yes to article two, yes against Christians".[5] This even spread to 'liberals and seculars' who were repealed after "the victory against them" (Wafi, 2011).

The speech-act materialized beyond the realm of mere speech. In this case Islam was the referent objected that needed to 'be secured' from the Copts so they don't rule. In that sense Copts in Egypt themselves threatened Islam, the referendum was 'on' Islam and by association the state; this is despite the bitter irony of Copts' victimhood since and before the inception of the modern Egyptian state and more recently during the referendum itself. Further, Sufis also had their shrines destroyed by Salafis who stated that they "are simple minded folk who do not know that Shi'tes use these shrines to proselytize" (Oraby, 2013). This contains a half truth which became a self-fulfilling prophecy; though Shi'tes did in fact publicly celebrate in 2011 during March, away from the public eye, they continually exclaimed that "Shi'te celebrations in Egypt do not differ from Sunni celebrations and those of the House of the Prophet, denying that there are any peculiar traditions inside these celebrations" (Osama al Mahdi, 2011b). Therefore the securitization of Sufis by way of Shi'tes aimed to divide subjectivity; Sufis needed to distance themselves lest they be branded enemies.

This was achieved by a similar securitization and speech act: that of the 'counter-revolution' and of the 'ancien regimé' as a viable threat. This created a fear for Sufis who had several National Democratic Party (NDP) cadres, since by virtue of regulating the vast network of Sufi orders across Egypt the state had to intervene and pla-ced people who came to be labeled as NDP-affiliates. Inter-Sufi elections of the several

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[4] See the Arab Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI) coverage of NGO reports of the constitutional declaration, EACPE referendum day 3rd statement, 2011, <http://www.anhri.net/?p=27159>, accessed December 11, 2013.
[5] EACPE referendum day statement number 2 2011, <http://www.mosharka.org/index.php?newsid=350>, accessed December 11, 2013.

hundred orders and of the Supreme Sufi order council required state approval and a presidential decree to recognize the election. This is important in debunking and deconstructing the securitization by the MB and Salafis of Sufis as either 'Shi'te sleeper-cells' or 'NDP counter-revolutionary forces'; never mind their agency in deciding to formulate a subjectivity towards that. It is however the imposition of such a subjectivity by those that securitize Sufis, especially in the wake of the constitutional referendum in March as they organized for a no vote and a campaign for drafting the constitution first, that probably garnered such securitization and resulted in having their shrines demolished (al Mahdi 2011c). The speech-act has been so powerful that Sufis had no choice but to securitize themselves amid destruction of shrines and several decades' long disenfranchisement and securitization by the MB.[6] Mohamed Abu el Azaym, of the old and powerful Azaym Sufi guild warned against "a civil war between Sufis and Salafis because of the increasing episodes of Sufi shrine destruction" (al Mahdi, 2011a).

It is very telling that Abu el Azaym stated "the reason the Sufi Guilds party was founded is to protect their institutions and that they fear the arrival of the MB and Salafis to power", (Osama al Mahdi, 2011a). This later morphed into the 'Al Nasr' party, which became the Sufi mouthpiece. Shi'tes in Egypt also founded a party, the 'Tahrir party' and it was even securitized to the point that its national interests were questioned as well as its possible ties with Hezbollah despite the fact that the political party committee declined its request to be licensed (Talaat Al-Maghrabi, 2011). This phenomenon became so widespread that shrines that were destroyed in Alexandria and Mansoura prompted Mufti Ali

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[6] To see a summary of the ideological competition between the MB and Sufis and how the MB "fights Sufism…and [tries] to reform it" see the MB encyclopedic entry titled "[T]he MB and Sufism"
http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86_%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A9;
http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86_%D9%85%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%84_%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A9

Gom'a to issue a fatwa[7] forbidding the destruction of shrines in an attempt to securitize it by using religious ethos, (Salah, Salah and el Mahdi, 2011). In this regard both actors were securitizing each other. The Mufti and Sufis' decision to securitize the MB, Salafis and even themselves, attest to an extreme nuance in formulating new subjectivity and discursively 'slipping the rug from under them'. On this issue, they seem to have managed to repel the attack, unlike Copts, arguably because they desecuritize themselves in an attempt to legitimize themselves and not securitize the MB and its allies who still maintain some legitimacy by virtue of securitizing Copts and displacing them as an Other. In this regard Shi'tes and Copts seem to be in the same trench while Sufis display resilience in changing the referent object. Copts and Shi'tes still define themselves in relation to the state and naively desecuritize themselves claiming they are not a threat. In this regard 'normal' politics and the 'state' are firmly the domain of the MB, its allies, and much to their chagrin, Sufis too momentarily. Yet, the securitization was so powerful that Shi'tes and Sufis remain in two different positions, each with their own political party; this has not been desecuritized and Shi'tes are still a taboo.

It would be perhaps more beneficial to change subjectivity and have Shi'tes and Sufis both securitize the MB and Salafis instead of being divided, with Shi'tes desecuritizing themselves alone to no avail. Copts, like Shi'tes, continue to choose to desecuritize themselves despite failing to overcome the heightened securitization by the MB and its allies. This seems to be the case with the Maspero massacre of Copts, which will be discussed next.

Maspero

The Maspero Massacre is a case that demonstrates the flip-flop of subjectivity and jump from securitization and desecuritization of the MB from late 2011 to after June 30th, 2013. After an attack on a church in Idfo, Aswan, protestors marched to the State Broadcasting Headquarters, 'Maspero', to demand coverage of the attacks, only to be met with violence from the army. Not only did the MB securitize Copts, claiming

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[7] A religious edict historically issued by a *qady*, a religious scholarly judge.

that some elements of the Coptic protesters attacked the army, but this reached epic proportions in the state TV coverage which said "Christians were burning Qur'ans [...] citizens should go and protect their armed forces" (EIPR, 2011b; Fathi, 2011; el Husseiny, 2011). Copts were quickly securitized as a threat that needed to be dealt with swiftly. What is worrying is that this furthered MB political ends: securitization of the 'counter-revolution'; ultimately pitting Copts, the victims of the massacre, in the same position as former NDP members who were about to stand trial. The state was under threat, existentially and literally, by virtue of the security risk attached to Copts. Their voices were Othered and the reason they marched to the state TV building, symbolically asking for coverage to the Idfo Church attacked in Aswan, were forgotten. In fact the MB released a statement asking Copts to use legitimate channels to resolve such a "small incident in the south of Egypt".

The realm of politics, as was the case 70's to 1970s and the word "celebrated" to "observed": "The realm of politics, as was the case since the early 1970s, yet again excluded them... observed the anniversary of the massacre and even as-ked for justice from the military perpetrators of the attack". This is despite the demand in 2011 that the issue be investigated to reveal the conspiracy against Egypt. An archived statement in English by the MB, now deleted, is quite revealing and important to quote at length:

> Does what happened last night around Maspero make sense? Especially amongst those who were taking turns to pray every Friday in Tahrir Square, with Christians pouring water for fellow Muslims to wash, those who belong to two religions calling for love, peace, kindness and fairness? And all supposedly because of a small incident in the far south of the country? [...] Needless to say, the number of dead and wounded and the extent of the destruction all prove that these events are not merely the result of the Edfu, Aswan Church, but the work of domestic and foreign hands endeavouring [sic] to abort the revolution and disrupt the march towards freedom, justice and democracy, even if that leads to civil war between brothers who share and have always shared homeland, blood and history, as some declared openly. Legitimate demands can be dealt with through proper

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channels, in appropriate ways and at the right time. All the Egyptian people have grievances and legitimate demands, not only our Christian brothers. Certainly, this is not the right time to claim them. The current government is only transitional, and the general conditions of our country are uniquely chaotic and confused [...] wait for a government elected by the people, which derives its legitimacy from the public, is loyal to the masses, and endeavours [sic] to meet their fair and legitimate demands, especially on the eve of free elections that we have always sought, and should make them happen without delay. [...] This injustice was committed by a corrupt despot who did not respect religion and betrayed the trust of the people. This injustice was inflicted upon all the Egyptian people. It is no secret that the Muslim Brotherhood were subjected to many times the suffering and injustice inflicted upon others. It is not right, nor is it the right time to seek retribution and vent anger now at this critical period in Egypt's history, not on the current transitional government which is not responsible for whatever happened in the past [...] Finally, we remind those who have already forgotten what General Amos Yadlin, former Director of Israeli Military Intelligence, said and published in newspapers on 2/November/2010, before the revolution: "Egypt represents the biggest playing field for Israeli military intelligence activity. This activity has developed according to plan since 1979. We have penetrated Egypt in many areas, including the political, security, economic, and military spheres. We have succeeded in promoting sectarian and social tension there so as to create a permanent atmosphere of turmoil, in order to deepen the discord between Egyptian society and the government and make it difficult for any regime following that of Hosni Mubarak to alleviate this discord". Is it time to wake up?[8]

In this regard multiple instances of securitization and desecuritization are at play on a two-dimensional scale. The clear securitization of Copts

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[8] The MB 'Ikhwanweb' website has been categorically deleting press coverage on its website where its members have given controversial statements. See the archived and deleted statement here:
http://web.archive.org/web/20111226200806/http://ikhwanweb.com/iweb/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32515:an-appeal-by-the-muslim-

and a foreign plot is visible and is normalized by electoral logic and immediate gain for the MB. That is why General Guide Mohamed Badi'e stated that "violence went both ways", despite NGO reports that prove otherwise.[9] He also stated that "once an elected parliament is in place, ministers and government officials will be closely monitored to avoid a repeat of the Mubarak era" (Ikhwanweb 2011a). In a separate issue it was known that the entire opposition, save for the MB and its allies, wanted to postpone elections and the ruling military government did in fact postpone it for a few months. In this regard securitization served immediate gain for the MB and was made yet again with reference to the state that needed to be secured against a foreign plot, which was being activated by these Copts who could not wait to voice their 'small' grievances via 'normal channels'. The desecuritization is subtler and is observed in the belittling of Copts' cause: it is understood that if their cause was so pressing that it would need to be addressed. They are simultaneously securitized and desecuritized, they are both a threat and a non-issue (since Egypt's society lives harmoniously) and their cause for justice to those attacked in Idfo is desecuritized as a non-issue so it can be delegitimized. In this regard a post-modern observation can be made: the 'normal realm' of politics encompasses only Sunni-mainstream MB backed rights, but when it comes to the rights of Others they are excluded. When a problem occurs, such as the root cause of the problem—the attack on the Idfo Church—it is desecuritized in order to maintain the fabric of the nation as well. In fact in looking at the spectrum of likeminded people such as the MB we see Fahmy Howeidy, whose father was in the MB, defend it exceptionally and at times even support its party line (Mahmoud Al Kerdosy, 2013). That is why securitization need not focus solely on the MB but also on its allies, which it outsources to. Take Howeidy's insistence that Copts attacked the army

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brotherhood-to-all-egyptians&catid=10388:paragraphs&Itemid=794; see also MB affiliated NGO Sawasiya and its blame of the attack of Israel and the West: http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29351

[9] Badi'es worrying collectivization of violence and failure to distinguish between Copts as victims who use stones as self defense against bullets is not the first time and is a recurring theme of handing down mutual blame. For more see EIPR, 2011 Maspero report, October 16 2011, <http://eipr.org/en/pressrelease/2011/10/16/1268>, accessed December 16 2013.

in Maspero (Howeidy, 2011a; 2011b), and his ultimate change of position in asking for an apology, then his mention of the need to fight the counterrevolution and proceed to elections. All fit the pattern of securitization for electoral ends.

Fast forward to the time when the MB wanted to install its own government. During the transition in March 2012, it shifted its focus to trying to install a government before legislative elections. Soon however a shift in position occurred and the MB issued a statement in which it used the Maspero massacre, amidst other protests such as the 'Cabinet' protests and 'Mohamed Mahmoud' protests[10]—two protests it had previously sought to delegitimize—as reasons for the government to resign (Ahmed Elebia, 2013). Here desecuritization sought to rob agency of all those victims in those protests and securitized the government vis-à-vis the state. Therefore we see a shift in the referent object and designation of a new security threat, one that coincidentally happens to be the MB's enemy. However it is the discursive ability to transform it to a public enemy that is notable. This portrays an unavoidable flip flop on their 'third party narrative', which they now questioned. MB spokesperson Mahmoud Ghozlan stated:

> Today, however, we realize [sic] that the incumbent government is no different from its predecessor. No one was arrested for the massacres at Maspero, Mohamed Mahmoud Street and Qasr Al-Aini under the Sharaf government, which insisted on blaming all the problems on a 'third party' (Ahmed Elebia, 2013).

This is a massive change of position from the MB's own designation of a 'third party' responsible for the massacre. However it shows the trajectory the MB was likely, and did in fact, adopt when they exited from

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[10] The Mohamed Mahmoud clashes, so named after the street they took place in, involved clashes with protesters and police forces that started within Tahrir Square and then spread to its perimeter. The protests resulted in a televised addressed by Field Marshall Hussein Tantawi in which he promised a date for presidential elections by June 2012. The Cabinet Clashes were the second wave of protests that followed the Mohamed Mahmoud clashes as several protesters left Tahrir Square some decided to shift their sit-in to the Cabinet headquarters to protest the new Prime Minister Kamal al Ganzouri a previous Prime Minister under Mubarak.

power and held a vigil protest on the anniversary of the massacre calling for justice against the Army (Galhoum, 2013).

The Mohamed Mahmoud clashes

The Mohamed Mahmoud clashes are an important marker in the events of 2011. The MB had not called for them nor did it participate in them. On the contrary the MB vindicated and demonized the protests by securitizing them. On November 18, 2011 a number of activists called for a protest in Tahrir Square to expedite the transition process after a number of 'massacres'[11] had taken place, such as those mentioned previously. Eventually the protests resulted in an expedited timetable for handover of power by August 2012. They became known as the Mohamed Mahmoud clashes after the security forces dispersed a protest at Tahrir on 19 August, 2011 resulting in several deaths. The situation soon escalated and the Ministry of Interior's mechanism for saving face was by claiming that they were merely protecting the Ministry of Interior's headquarters that was several streets away from Mohamed Mahmoud, a tributary of Tahrir Square.[12] The MB warned of a

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[11] The decision to place the word in quotation marks is not to mean that this is disputed, rather, it is to free it of any value laden connotations and realize that its interpretation and acknowledgment depends largely on the politics of securitization and desecuritization. It is interesting to see how during 2011 in the transition process several protests were able to successfully securitize the ruling Military council, at times to the benefit of the incoming incumbent, the MB, other times unsuccessfully when the MB sided against them in the 'constitution first versus elections first' debacle. This is largely the reason for MB animosity, particularly post-Mohamed Mahmoud as will be demonstrated. Hitherto these clashes the MB had been able to build a liberal image of cooperation with protesters. This is a fundamental point in looking how securitization works and at times can be the function of a securit*izing* agent's politics in choosing to let others accept said securitization.

[12] Again, the securitization practiced by the Ministry of Interior is a marker of the larger politics at play, showing the intent on elongating the transition process. This would have helped forces other than the MB yet the MB capitalized on this, despite not participating, and securitizing the transition process itself; showing that the ruling security forces were part of the 'counter-revolution'. Needless to say the deaths committed at protests helped to sell the MB's politics of securitization and were detrimental to the transition government's attempts to counter it with its own securitization. The importance lay not in whether protesters were trying to breach the Ministry of Interior HQ, even this was a hard sell, but it lay in the deployment of such a

foreign plot to attack the Ministry HQ (al-Ghonemy, 2012). The interesting thing here was the silence on the part of the MB amidst their absence (Sayed, 2011), which eventually led to chants of: "the MB sold out the revolution, oh the shame!" (Ahmed, 2011). This resulted in a new development for the MB since the protestors ostracized them. This coincided with the parliamentary elections and therefore several election campaigns were suspended to observe the protests and honor the fallen.

Needless to say the elections went ahead, for the first round. Less than a month later on the 17 December, 2011 the MB caught up and issued a statement saying: "we call on the Supreme Council of Armed Forces to issue an apology for the massacre it committed today [in reference to the Cabinet clashes] […] [and] the continuation of parliamentary elections."

After the first rounds' results started coming in and it was apparent the MB had won the lion's share of the people's assembly it went ahead with plans for the removal of the transition government, as made apparent by the previous statement. It had, however lost out, on the Mohamed Mahmoud clashes because it was made apparent that its words were lip service and it was focused on elections. This was made clear by the preamble to this statement which read: "we noticed that whenever things calm down and the country heads towards elections to achieve democratic transformation that someone lights things up and destabilizes [Egypt's] democratic transformation" (MB, 2011). Therefore securitization here is also for electoral gain and the referent object, the state, is threatened not by these protests or the killings but by the result or use of it by a conspirator who plans on postponing elections. This explains the silence during the month of November 2011 by the MB and its next statement issued in 2013 on the anniversary of the Mohamed Mahmoud clashes.

There is also an acute awareness of the politics of securitization and desecuritization which prompted several of those who participated in

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securitizing idea, which masked a deeper issue; the MB's attempt to rush through a transition process.

the original 2011 Mohamed Mahmoud protests to clash with the MB on the 2013 anniversary, sensing their abuse of the protest (Yasn, 2011). The MB issued a statement on November 17, 2013 saying:

> There are several plots in the pathway of the January 25 2011 revolution which should prompt people to stop and learn their lessons, of these are the Mohamed Mahmoud clashes which started on the 19th of November 2011, these clashes which pained all revolutionaries and honorable citizens', and which were used by a third party, that did not want to handover power, and wanted to trap the partners of the revolution. The different positions taken by different sides have remained a controversy since day one, and we trust that there will come a day where the facts will come to light and everyone's wrong held assumptions [towards the MB] disappear, and the unity and purity between the honorable [citizens] return (MB, 2013).

The statement then went on to affirm: "if you [protestors of Mohamed Mahmoud] really protested for democracy then it is time for the people to say its word [against the events of June 30th, 2013 and afterwards] [...]Will you respect the peoples' will [...] your credibility is on the line." Even on the Mohamed Mahmoud anniversary we find that it is securitized and yet again called a conspiracy; this time, however, a conspiracy against the revolution with a clear shift of the referent object. It also simultaneously, and less conspicuously, desecuritizes the opposition, shoring up their credentials of democracy by virtue of participation in the Mohamed Mahmoud clashes and carries a veiled message that the MB's precarious 2011 position will be understood one day when the 'conspiracy' is revealed. The revolution is in trouble, it must be 'secured'.

This connotes an important shift that brings us up to the announcement of Morsi's victory in the presidential race and during his rule; when all events by the opposition were securitized as threats to the revolution. It is that monopoly and politics of securitization and desecuritization that prompt a larger question towards the ontology of what is and is not the revolution; a clearly politicized and politi*cizing* issue to the collective memory of Egyptians. That is why the politics of securit-

ization and desecuritization underwent a foundational moment directly before, and during, Morsi's inaugural speeches as he assumed the presidency.

Another change of position is the MB's 2013 statement on the Cabinet Clashes anniversary which it had described in 2011, right after it happened, as "deepening societal strife [...] threatening democracy [...] and part of [a plan] by treacherous forces to fight the Egyptian revolution which will lead the regional and Arab world to prosperity, stability and progress." Not surprisingly the statement went on again to affirm the need to hold legislative elections on time lest the revolution be threatened. That is why its fifth recommendation in the statement called upon the military government in 2011 to reveal those who are part of the international conspiracy and quoted General Adel 'Omara's press conference one day before the statement in which he sought to make the argument that protesters were part of an international plot to threaten Egypt (Ikhwanweb, 2011b). However the 2013 statement, made by the 'legitimacy alliance' a MB led-alliance of likeminded 'Islamist' organizations formulated after Morsi's removal from power, stated: "[we] affirm your [the revolutionaries] legendry stand and all the revolutionaries' [stand], and all the [female] revolutionaries and your stand for your principles and the martyrs' principles in the fourth anniversary of the dispersal of 'Rab'a and Nahda sit-ins and the second anniversary of the Cabinet clashes" (Ahmed Abdel-Azim, 2013). Thus here desecuritization aims to erase the effects of 2011's securitization for electoral gains; it aims at catching up with other rhetoric and creating an archive of statements that helps make the revolutionary 'legitimacy' argument, in an attempt to shore the MB's revolutionary' credentials.

Presidential elections: Tahrir Square, August, 2012

Morsi's inaugural speeches after he won elections were the most prominent instances of securitization, even after the so-called 'existential crisis' had passed. The MB had amassed its cadres in Tahrir Square and other areas around the country in anticipation of the election results, fearing that it would be forged against Morsi. Asem Abdel Magid of the

Jama Islamiya stated: "the country will witness an explosion if [Ahmed] Shafik is declared winner." The whole electoral campaign was framed as the last breath against the counter-revolution with independent activists holding the 'Fairmont conference' to announce their decision to ally and vote for Morsi. Simultaneously, Alaa Abu el Nasr of the Jama Islamiya also stated: "if Shafik wins we will mobilize all the adherents of the Jama Islamiya and its party." Meanwhile Khalid Saeed of the Salafi front said "the Egyptian street will explode if Shafik wins." Even Tarek el Khouly of the executive office of the revolution's youth coalition said that there are several ongoing talks considering plans in case of Shafik wins, although he, in contradistinction to the following statements, highlighted that there is no option but 'peaceful escalation.'

Lastly, and most importantly, Islam Fares of the MB Helwan media office stated: "the [MB] Jama declared a state of utmost [battle] readiness and is in a state of emergency across all grassroots cadres and we have been issued an order at the governorate level not to close our [cell] phones, not to leave the governorate without notifying our superior, an order may come any minute asking us to go down to the squares across [the nation's] governorates." Mohsen Rady of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) politburo, the MB party, warned: "if there is any manipulation in the results we will challenge each forger, by all means that will make the revolution fulfill its peacefulness and goals [...] the results of the elections were handed to us and declared at auxiliary voting stations, all that remains is the formal announcement", (al Waziry, 2012; Mohamed, 2012).

The Fairmont front even managed to transcend an earlier securitization: that of Islam during the March 2011 referendum. Instead of saying Islam was being threatened and needed protecting, as was the case in 2011, the focus of the Fairmont conference was to transcend that divide and display a conciliatory tone. However this does not mean it dissipated; it was instead left to be utilized for later. It is therefore quite peculiar to see figures such as Alaa el Aswany, a famous Egyptian novelist among those previously vindicated by the MB for his 'secularism', present at the Fairmont conference (Salma Shukrallah, 2013). When Morsi

was announced president, the crowds went home and yet another dilemma persisted. Morsi's MB and fellow allies had securitized the ruling military transitional government and judges of the Supreme Constitutional Court. This was because of the SCC's verdict in dissolving the peoples' assembly; another issue that was securitized as a plot against the MB despite knowledge that the law was unconstitutional (Emara and Ghoneim, 2013) yet Morsi was due to attend a handover of power ceremony that brought both actors together. That is why Morsi pledged the oath several times amidst a spatial war of securitization; he did not want to go the temple of the judiciary, the Supreme Constitutional Court, which his ruling bloc would besiege to pass the 2012 constitution; the entity which his ruling bloc had securitized. He therefore pledged an informal oath, and uttered the same words, at Cairo University (Al Jazeera Arabic, 2012) and Tahrir Square in addition to the formal event at the SCC and the handover of power ceremony at the Egyptian Military's Headquarters.

In fact the Supreme Justice and head of the SCC then, Farouk Sultan, seemed to be quite aware of this and how Morsi's securitization of the counter-revolution, and by association the SCC, seemed bent on legitimization. It is important to note that it is not the securitization of the SCC that is the issue, rather, it is of the counter-revolution; this is because of the simple ontological *apriori* point that constitutes the counter-revolution. If such a thing is to exist, and this is not to dispute it, rather, it is to show that Morsi is not merely using it, rather, he is creating it.[13] Sultan remarked: "your presence at the SCC to swear the *legal* oath is a *live embodiment* [emphasis added] of [your desire] to uphold constitutional legitimacy *above all* [other] *priorities*",[14] [emphasis added] (Al Jazeera 2012). Directly before his oath at the SCC Morsi gave a speech at Tahrir which he sought to emphasize as his 'true' address, which included an oath in which he informally pledged allegiance to the

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[13] A more profound argument would be to see how Morsi's regime benefits from the counter-revolution and its securitization, as a bogeyman if so to speak, this is attested by Morsi's political economy and use of the ancien regime and its NDP big business heavy weights such as Mansour Amer, Ahmed Abu el Enein and others.

[14] The particular word is *hamat* which does not have a literal translation but means all high things or things of high value.

nation *and* the revolution. It is why it was important for him to empha-size he was at "the revolution square [...] [and] in freedom square", (ONTV, 2012) when in actual fact he was largely surrounded by mem-bers of his ruling bloc and sympathizers, who had taken control of or-ganizing the event and whom he affirmed as 'the revolutionaries'. In seeking to reaffirm his power he stated firmly "I will not tolerate any curbing of the powers of the President" (ONTV, 2012) and immediately followed with "this does not mean in any way we do not respect the law or the constitution [...] there is no contradiction between this and that", (ONTV 2012). This addressed the ongoing spat with state institutions, the judiciary and the army as well as Morsi's SCC oath. Though this speech largely desecuritized several issues and aimed at starting a new page, this was far from being the case. On the contrary several herme-neutic devices of mild securitization, the mention of his presidential powers, legitimacy and the subtle securitization of the counter-revolu-tion would continue. The cathedral attack, as will be argued soon be-low, would also be the first test for Morsi in his term in which, like MB General Guide Mohamed Badi'e, he would choose to hand out mutual blame and securitize the counter-revolution and continue to reproduce it in such a way that could only have been deemed obsessive at the least and obsessive at most.

Constitutional Declaration of November 2012

During the month of November 2012, Morsi issued a Constitutional Declaration (CD) that barred the dissolution of the constituent assem-bly drafting Egypt's constitution and barred judicial review of the CD and immunized it along with the Shoura Council (which had a pending law suit against it that eventually was ruled it should be dissolved). This resulted in a tense atmosphere in which the constituent assembly rushed through its work before the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) could convene and issue its ruling against the assembly. Its first attempt to convene was prevented after Morsi's supporters besieged it and it suspended its work in protest. The second time it convened the SCC issued its ruling against the assembly and dissolved it. A previous court ruling by the administrative court had dissolved it because it was exclusionary. This tense environment led to extreme protests by the

opposition by the presidential palace. Khairat al Shater, the Deputy General Guide, went out and stated that 80% of those protests are composed of Copts, securitizing the protests implicitly (Ibrahim, 2013). Here we see a clear instance of the labeling of a mass protest, by all walks of life and with huge turnout ascribed to the Church, as if it is a 'foreign plot'.

This plays on similar rhetoric adopted by President Sadat in the 1970s and 1980s to deflect accusations of violence against Copts in which he warned that Christians had organized with the help of the Phalangists of Lebanon to plot against Egypt (Hassan, 2003). Thus the MB seems to be discursively adopting similar securitization of Copts during times of crisis to their legitimacy. What is new is their ability to utilize the state as a referent object after winning over the presidency. This is key because it shows an implicit understanding of the concept of the incumbent and his tools of securitization. The opposition had always voiced the grievance that Egypt was still in transition and its constitution should be met with a new president and new elections. Thus the ability to build off securitization of the state made an important assumption: that the MB are the proper, legitimate and rightful rulers of the state and that the transition had ended. This is interesting considering that Morsi had stated that the transition period had ended with the promulgation of the constitution (Fouad, Omar and Sadka, 2012). When Morsi's legitimacy was challenged he would say democracy is a long road and requires 'democratic participation' delineating what is and is not democracy, what is and is not acceptable. This came during Morsi's point of crisis: the constitutional declaration.

Cathedral attack 2013

On the January 3, 2011 the Mar Mina (Saint Mina in Coptic) Church in al Khosous, a satellite city of Cairo that lies in the Governerate of Qalyubiya was attacked and its community members were taken hostage and tortured until Christians of the area handed themselves over to the attackers. This episode happened before in the same area in 2008. In April of 2012 two children in the area of al Khosous were ac-

cused of drawing crosses on an Azharite institute and were incarcerated pending investigations against the defilement of the institute and Islam. In the end it was disproven that they drew crosses (Basil El-Dabh, 2013). It is important to stop here before the story continues and note the extent to which such accusations, namely those that articulate the securitization of Islam, can be translated into punitive measures beyond mere statements. These measures included the arrest of the children who drew on the Azharite institute. It was justified because they were 'drawing crosses' and that a torn Qur'an found on the street suddenly became the victim of these children's actions (Abu el Enein, 2013). The MB released a statement in which it said it intervened to contain the situation, failing to mention that the public prosecutor ordered their detention in violation of Egyptian and international law, even though the court later dropped the charges. The MB's statement stated: "we are sure these children do not realize the *seriousness* [emphasis added] of what they have done."[15] In this regard even when the MB appears to be solving the crisis, and desecuritizes, it maintains that the referent object, namely Islam, is in threat. The events of al Khosous later resulted in more bloodshed when further instances of violence against Copts broke out. The funeral procession of the victims, which was to end with a march outside the cathedral, ended with police forces surrounding the cathedral and attacking it with teargas. This included unmarked plainclothes individuals thought to be working with the police's criminal investigative unit. The Church's statements were clear in implicating the Ministry of Interior and holding it responsible for the damage done to the cathedral. Copts were arrested and used as hostages for a 'reconciliation committee' that achieved 'parity' by releasing from 'both sides' (Taha, 2013). Further, Morsi desecuritized the incident altogether and said "Muslims and Christians were hurt […] it is

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[15] See archived statement of MB Guidance Bureau member:
http://web.archive.org/web/20121011030250/http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30318

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not a sectarian incident [...] any fight between Muslims and Christians ends up being labeled as sectarian."[16]

This follows the alternative discursive dichotomy and general party line adopted by Morsi's aid Essam el Haddad when he stated that "the police responded after being attacked by Coptic mourners in the memorial procession", (Ahram Online, 2013a). These are similar to alternative statements in which the National Security Committee of the Shoura Council (Egypt's former Upper Chamber) convened a special session to discuss the spread and threat of 'sectarian violence' a similar ruse that is used by Morsi that hides the reality: attacks against Christians (Ikhwanweb, 2013a; 2013b). The use of the word 'sectarian' as a given assumes that violence, as per Morsi and El Haddad's statements, went both ways. This helps the performativity of the narrative that 'sectarianism' is a foreign plot that "threatens the nation". Thus the normal understanding of desecuritization as adopted by the Copenhagen school can in fact be used for further securitization, at least in this context. It is more likely that the initial desecuritization by Morsi was not enough and that statements by the Pope managed to rally support to show how this was a clear cut instance of an attack against Christians. However there was no way to avoid the MB's enthusing securitization and discussion about 'sectarianism' vis-à-vis its threat to the state. In this regard resistance is limited.

Politics of securitization the monopoly on speech-act

How, who and what are the determinants of the referent object? When is Islam, the state or the revolution threatened? What is the difference when one is threatened but the other is not? These are all important meta-questions that provide more questions but fewer answers. The answer to the previous question that haunted security studies, 'what is a security threat', should be clear by now: there is no one universal security threat and it depends on the referent object. I therefore shifted

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[16] See a copy of Al Jazeera Mubasher Misr interview, April 20 2013,
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SdKXtJgNldo;
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fMqIod76m-k >, accessed December 28, 2013

the focus of this chapter laterally up to ontological determinants to security. A shift in the referent object, especially during a tumultuous time of change, is what should be triangulated. With the MB, the politics of securitization were clearly in their favor; the branding of everything and everyone as a security threat worked for quite a while. This was attested to by the counter-campaign by figures such as Ahmed Shafiq, ironically the designated 'threat' to the 'revolution' who started to gain prominence. This firmly encapsulated a new axis of 'stability politics' in which opponents vie for the best candidate to bring 'stability'; never mind the need to debunk an all-encompassing and collectivizing concept such as 'stability' much the same way 'security' was debunked.

Securitization will only lead to more securitization. This is due to the prominence of state-led concepts such as national-security. To further problematize such concepts is to problematize the state; this is where post-modern analysis is needed to show the link of neoliberalism and situate the economy of threats and counter-threats in the 21st century. An example of where these politics are at play is the 2013 constitution and its securitization by the MB. Though the securitization is not as powerful, it does however entrench certain concepts and hide others, showcasing how the politics of securitization are dominant. The issue of numbers (of protestors or any other 'threat') becomes key in fulfilling the needed performativity for what is and is not a threat. This is especially prevalent with Copts and the punitive nature of the census conducted by the state measuring them (K. Malak, 2013) and Shi'tes whenever the MB and even Al Nour speak of the 'dictatorship of the minority'[17] and the 'spreading Shi'ism' (Ahram Online, 2013b) in Egypt.

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[17] The use of this statement has been made by the MB and Al Nour for more see: http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86_%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9; Mohamed Ali, "hmad: al mnsḥbwn mn al-taʾsysya yḥwlwn frḍ dktatorya al-aʾqaliya," al-balad, June 13 2012,<http://www.el-balad.com/189643/hmad-almnshbon-mn-altasy.aspx>, accessed December 13 2013.

2013 constitution:

Since the 2013 constitution was finalized securitization of the constitution was achieved via the same Cartesian plane of religion. The constitution was branded as a 'threat' to the religion of Islam, unmediated and without interpretation, as an absolute. This, though it seems marginal, should not be underestimated. The organization that has been taking responsibility for several car bomb attacks against civilians, Ansar Byt al Mqdis, has adopted the same discourse. It too had issued a statement saying that the constitution does not implement 'God's rule', thus securitizing it vis-à-vis the religion of Islam. This securitization is performed via several mechanisms. First is the mass distribution of copies of the constitution with certain religious identity articles omitted. Examples include article 2, which declares Islam as "the religion of the state" and "the source of legislation" and article 3 which outlines that non-Muslims such as Christians and Jews have their own personal status legislation. It also had article 7, the article entrusting Al Azhar as the sole religious reference to the nation, omitted. At another level was MB rhetoric that used the 2013 constituent assembly's omission of article 219, which prohibited slander against the Prophet and his house and declared it a punishable crime, as evidence of the constitution being "against Islam […] and the prophets." The reference is a sly veiled one that shows that this constitution empowers Shi'tes who were previously accused of slander against the prophet and his house.

In this regard even Shi'tes' voices remain Othered. The omission of article 3 in the fake copies is also made to depict that Egypt has moved into a civil system of personal status law; this draws anxiety to the drafters of the constitution and results in an unequivocal denial. Yet no mention is made that a unified personal status law is not a threat or an abomination. This is yet again another omission. To address these issues requires addressing them head on, not with a state-centric logic, but with a post-modern nuance to the exclusionary nature of the concept of the state.

Conclusion

Theoretically, this chapter has built off the Copenhagen School's pre-dilections of speech-act by situating it within circumstance, as opposed to its Schmittian bias that assumes its interaction in a stable democracy with Western values or towards it within a transition paradigm. As the theoretical framework has shown, this is often far from the case, Euro-centric and deterministic. This chapter has also sought to show how the referent object can be so fluid, in this case it can be Islam as opposed to the state; and surprisingly, or perhaps not so much for anyone versed in the finesse of 'Islamic discourse(s)', securitization of Islam can be a very powerful Othering mechanism. Even against adherents of the re-ligion themselves, suffice it for the actors doing the Othering to find something different, or exceptional about it. In this case the Schmittian idea can be reworked not so much in terms of having the state as its central actor and referent object- as in the realm of 'normal politics'- but it can be adopted for sub-state actors.

In the case of Shi'tes, Sufis, Copts suffice for the MB to find something 'different' about them, define it, spread it and securitize it, to exclude them and make them exceptional. In desecuritizing threats most actors have played by the politics of securitization and desecuritization of the actor doing the Othering, in this case spearheaded by the brotherhood since 2011. Copts and Shi'tes continue to desecuritize themselves but play by the referent object dictated to them; be it the state, Islam, or a medium form of the 'Islamic state'. This is the *apriori* ontological deter-minant when it comes securitization and the 'meta-theoretical debate' that Ole Waever has called for it to be questioned (Greenwood and Waever, 2013: 467). Sufis have shown aptitude at navigating discursive pitfalls in shifting the referent object, namely the state, and securitizing 'Islam' via their own Cartesian plane in defining the MB and 'Islamists' as the true threat to it.[18] Copts and Shi'tes have not managed to follow

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[18] This involved impressive discursive acrobatics in which the MB were branded as similar to the *khwaraj* of Islam by Ahmed Nafis, a Shi'te public figure and founder of the Tahrir party that was refused a party license against MB cadre Safwat Hegazy in which Hegazy called Shi'tes unbelievers and heretics [*kufr*] and in return Nafis used the term *khwaraj* to describe the MB. In addition it also appeared in fieldwork

their lead for the most part — save for some exceptions as by Ahmed Rasim Nafes, a Shi'te public figure who entered into a public TV debate with MB cadre Safwat Hegazy. In this regard however Hegazy's extreme securitization of Nafes, and his decision to call him and all Shi'tes infidels live on air, was counterproductive (al Masry al Youm, 2013).

The question is not whether to securitize or desecuritize, in fact both can sometimes have the same effect; rather it is in relation to what, whom, how and to what referent object. The MB and its allies seem to have almost securitized everyone other than themselves and desecuritized their opposition at moments of crisis when the pendulum was about to swing against them, when the opposition found that there was no realm for 'normal politics'. It seems that discursively, where politics of securitization and desecuritization are concerned, it has in fact swung against them after 30, June 2013 after the opposition realized there really was no 'normal' realm of politics left to them and acted. As early as 2011, local Egyptian NGOs questioned the MB and its Salafi allies of their securitization of segments of society (EACPE, 2011). In 2011 MB General Guide Badi'e said Copts' fears are out of place when the MB takes power, while giving a statement in English to the German press after the Maspero attack. He affirmed that elections should not be postponed because of this event and warned of a foreign plot to derail elections. Securitizing Copts for electoral gain was novel and sinister, but not entirely surprising for the MB. Badi'e however ended his statement by saying "[T]ime will tell [...] and prove to Copts that their equality, freedom, and rights will be fully observed" (Ikwhanweb, 2011). In this regard Badi'e could not have been farther from the truth.

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conducted in June 2013. For an extract of the television debate see
http://www.elnafis.net/videos/120/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D
8%AF%D9%8A_%D9%81%D9%8A_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D9%88
%D8%A7%D9%86_%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%88%D8%AA_%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%
A7%D8%B2%D9%89__%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%88%D8
%B1_%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF_%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85_%
D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B3_%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA_
%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B1_%D9%88%D8%AE%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82
%D8%A9_%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%87%D9%85; personal communication with Wafaa el Masry, June 22, 2013.

Copts, Shi'tes, Sufis, women and at times the entire opposition were Othered.

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