Questions animating this course include: Why is force often used in international politics? What causes peace? How do wars, or competitions shaped by the lurking possibility of war, affect international relations and individual societies? How can governments best prepare to prevent wars or to win them if they occur? By what standards should resort to force, or strategic and tactical choices in combat, be judged legitimate or immoral? How are the prevention, outbreaks, processes, and outcomes of mass violence (or crises resolved short of combat) determined by politics, ideology, diplomacy, technology, economics, geography, military plans and tactics, intelligence, or arms control? What are similarities and differences among conflicts between states, within states, and between states and transnational groups (such as terrorists)? How important is terrorism? How do weapons of mass destruction coerce or deter? Is the world safer or more dangerous after the Cold War? Can war be made obsolete? The course emphasizes problems in the relation between political ends and military means. Students must grapple with the terms of reference in both dimensions. The course is organized thematically, not by cases, but illustrative examples are drawn from conflicts in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The course emphasizes issues in the 20th Century, and in U.S. national security policy.

Requirements: This is a graduate lecture course open to advanced undergraduates. It is designed to be demanding. Anyone who cannot or does not wish to read and ponder a heavy load of material, or who does not wish to accept the seven following rules, should not take this course. Students must (1) complete assigned readings; (2) attend all lectures, arriving on time (seated NLT 11:00); (3) view two films; (4) take the final examination on the scheduled date (make-up exams will not be allowed except for certified medical excuse or family emergency); (5) give full attention to lectures and discussions. NB: Multi-tasking is not allowed in class. Laptops may be used only for taking notes. Use of Blackberries, i-Phones, or anything connected to the Internet during class is strictly prohibited. Students found to be checking E-Mail, surfing the Internet, or text-messaging will be asked to leave the class. At the final examination, students must leave all electronic devices except battery-powered watches at home or outside the examination room. Undergraduates must also (6) take the mid-term examination (optional for graduate students) and (7) attend discussion sections (optional but highly recommended for graduate students).

This is a survey course. To allow maximum time for reading there is no paper assignment. Reading averages 210 pages per week, but is concentrated disproportionately in sections IV and VI-VIII. To help you plan reading time the numbers of pages in each item and for each section of the syllabus, are noted in brackets. The total reading required for the course is 2,943 pages. Books ordered in the College Bookstore and Book Culture should be purchased so that you can mark them up. Students may choose instead to do all the reading in the library, but will then have a harder time taking proper notes. Students who do the reading without marking or taking notes are fools, unless they have photographic memories and superhuman capabilities for mentally organizing a complex array of concepts, arguments, and historical examples.

Whatever the education system from which you come, understand that the purpose of this course is not to indoctrinate you with what the instructor believes to be the right answers. The purpose is to highlight important questions and ideas and expose you to the main currents of debate about them. Performance on examinations is judged by how well you understand concepts and debates, and how thoroughly you exploit relevant readings and lectures in answers.
I.  **Introduction: Nature and Functions of War**

Three Visions of Conflict: Does War Have a Future?
Concepts of National Security and Philosophy of War
Political Ends and Military Means: Rationality
War is Hell: Insanity and Obscenity
The Perspective Between Pacifism and Militarism

Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History”
John J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War.”
Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”

* What are the essential differences in these three visions?
* What are their assumptions about causes and effects in international politics?
* Should we draw lessons from the past to predict the future? If so, which competing lessons are the best? If not, on what basis can we forecast?
* What developments would validate or discredit any of these theories or their implicit predictions?
* Which of them is most and least convincing? Why (that is, for what reasons other than whether the argument appeals to you or disgusts you instinctively)?


Consider the following questions rationally and empirically, apart from the more important question of whether and why war is ever morally justified:

* What is the nature of war?
* What is the purpose of war?
* What is the relationship between the ends and means of war?
* What does Clausewitz mean when he says that “Combat is the only effective force in war”?
* When does he believe that “the object must be renounced and peace must follow”? How often do statesmen actually follow this advice?

Sun-Tzu, *The Art of Warfare*, Roger T. Ames, trans. (Ballantine, 1993), chaps. 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11 [25]. (The Sawyer, Griffith, Mair, or Huang translations are also acceptable.)

* What are the main apparent differences between Sun Tzu (Sun Zi) and Clausewitz?
* Which of these basic approaches to the functions of war makes more sense?
* What differences in their situations and concerns when they wrote might explain the differences in their arguments?
* Can the apparent differences between the two be reconciled?


* How does Fussell refute the view of war as a rational enterprise?
* Is he convincing? If not, what argument does he have for why you cannot know what you are talking about?
* Is Fussell a pacifist?
II. **Causes of War and Peace**

_Psychology and Anthropology: Instinct, Ritual, or Continuation of Sport by Other Means_

_Religion: Fighting for God_

_Main Paradigms: Realism and Liberalism_

_Autarky or Interdependence_

_Ideology and Fraternity_

_Feudalism, Capitalism, Marxism, Militarism_

Kenneth N. Waltz, _Man, the State, and War_ (Columbia University Press, 1959), chaps. 2-4, 6-8 [184].

- What are the strengths and weaknesses of each of the three images that Waltz presents?
- What are the real-world consequences – probabilities of success or failure in different policy choices – of diagnosing the problem of war in terms of each of the respective images?
- Why does Waltz favor the Third Image?
- Although he privileges the Third Image, what does he see as the valid or useful elements of the other two images?

Betts, ed., _Conflict After the Cold War_ [106]:

-Thucydides, “The Melian Dialogue”
-E. H. Carr, “Realism and Idealism”
-Geoffrey Blainey, “Power, Culprits, and Arms”
-Margaret Mead, “War is Only an Invention -- Not a Biological Necessity”
-Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace”
-John Mueller, “The Obsolescence of Major War”
-Norman Angell, “The Great Illusion”
-Geoffrey Blainey, “Paradise is a Bazaar”
-V. I. Lenin, “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism”
-Joseph Schumpeter, “Imperialism and Capitalism”
-Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Causes and Economic Effects”
-Richard Rosecrance, “Trade and Power”
-Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics.”

- Which of these authors are arguing with each other, and which arguments are more convincing?
- What conscious or unconscious assumptions about what causes war or peace do each of these selections reflect?
- What evidence, if any, do they offer as proofs of their arguments? Do they offer answers to criticisms of their arguments by other theorists?
- How do we know whether any of them are right or wrong? What evidence would validate or discredit any of these assumptions, arguments, or theories?
- What are the benefits, costs, or risks of taking any of these arguments as guides for policymakers in the real world?
- Is international politics derivative of economics, psychology, anthropology, sociology, religious faith, or political ideology, or does international politics have a life and logic of its own?
III. **Securing Peace: Balance of Power and Institutions**

What is Stability? Equilibrium or Peace
Meanings of Balance of Power
Effects of Unipolarity, Bipolarity, Multipolarity
International Organization, “Regimes,” and Collective Security

- What are the various meanings of “balance of power”?
- Of what use is the concept of balance of power? What are the practical consequences of the different conceptions?

- What is the difference between collective security and balance of power?
- What is the difference between collective security and an alliance?
- Is collective security in the proper sense of the term feasible? Under what conditions, if any?

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [19]:
Robert Gilpin, “Hegemonic War and International Change”
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, “Power and Interdependence.”
- In what ways does or does not the sweeping historical pattern that Gilpin discerns provide lessons for the 21st century?
- Why do Keohane and Nye point to a conclusion different from Gilpin’s?
- Keohane and Nye originally wrote over thirty years ago. Has the perspective they presented been borne out?

- Can “peacekeeping” or “peace enforcement” missions ever cause harm?
- Would cases other than the ones mentioned in this essay (which is not a systematic study) lead to different conclusions?
- If the argument in this article is convincing, should the “international community” intervene less in civil conflicts? or intervene frequently but take sides, rather than try to be impartial? or be impartial and bear much higher costs to impose a settlement on the locals? If your answer is the last of these, where should the necessary extra blood and treasure come from?

- Do the data in this chapter refute the arguments in “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention”?
- Which specific cases among the ones considered are most relevant for judging peace operations?
- Are any cases not listed relevant?
- Are implications for policy on mounting peacekeeping missions consistent with implications for peacemaking or peace enforcement missions?
IV. **Choosing War or Peace: Conquest, Coercion, Crisis Management**  

*The Spectrum of Choice: Concession, Compromise, Combat  
Setting the Price of Peace: Political Stakes vs. Military Costs  
Setting the Price of War: Blood, Treasure, and Risk  
Deterrence, Reassurance, Crisis Management, and “Accidental” War  
Cases: 1914, 1938, 1962  
Theory and Practice of Coercive Force: Bombing and "Compellence"

Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966), chaps. 2-4  
- What are Schelling’s assumptions about what will motivate statesmen to concede to coercion? (He is an economist. Would a psychologist, anthropologist, or historian offer any different assumptions?)  
- How does Schelling implicitly agree and disagree with Clausewitz about the nature and purpose of war? Reconsider this question when you come to section VI.

Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win* (Cornell University Press, 1996),¹ chaps. 2, 3, 6, 9  
- Why is the question Pape addresses especially important?  
- How does Pape’s analysis reflect on Schelling?

- How do the internal politics and decision processes of countries or alliances affect the applicability of strategic logic such as Schelling’s?  
- Was the military campaign against Serbia strategically sensible? With benefit of hindsight what, if anything, should have been done differently? According to what criteria? If any of the NATO actions implemented were bad ideas, or desirable actions were not implemented, who or what was to blame for the mistakes?  
- Was the war over Kosovo, which occurred after *Bombing to Win* was published, inconsistent with Pape’s argument?

V. **Modern War: Constraints, Conditions, Conduct**  

*Geography: Natural Security and Vulnerability  
Economy: Resources, Power, and Strategy  
Combined Arms: Armies, Navies, Air Forces  
Campaigns and Logistics*

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*  
- Niccolò Machiavelli, “Money is Not the Sinews of War, Although It Is Generally So Considered”  
- Alan S. Milward, “War as Policy.”  
  - Is the aim of profit a motive for war or a constraint against it?  
  - How do Machiavelli’s theory and the historical experience described by Milward relate to the theories about economics and war in section II?  
  - Is Machiavelli logically wrong?  
  - Are the rationales for war described by Milward forever outmoded?

Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford University Press, 1974), chaps. 4-6 [62].

- What are the main trends in the evolution of warfare described by Howard?
- Which developments have enduring implications?
- How has the rough balance of advantage between attack and defense evolved over the centuries covered by Howard?


- The Battle of the Somme was a disaster for Britain. Were the planners of the operation stupid?
- How did technology affect the planning?
- How did sociology and organization affect the planning?
- What made the outcome confound the plans?


- Why is logistics at least as important as strategy and tactics?
- How do geography, technology, economics, and politics affect logistics?
- Why is logistics a higher priority for a global or maritime power than for a regional or continental power?

VI. *Policy, Strategy, and Operations: Integrating Political Ends and Military Means* [443 pp.]

*Three Levels of Analysis*

*Technology: Innovations and Interactions*

*Plans: Organization, Doctrine, Tactics, Obstacles*

*Military Effectiveness: What Produces Success in Combat?*

*Attack and Defense: Aggressive, Preventive, Preemptive, and Defensive War*

*How Ends Determine Means, How Means Determine Ends*

Clausewitz, *On War*, Book I, chap. 7; Book II, chap. 3; Book III, chap. 1; Book VI, chaps. 1, 3, 5 [26].

- How should the concept of “friction” affect strategic planning and decisions for war?
- How does the concept of friction affect academic strategic theories such as Schelling’s, or nuclear strategists considered in section XI below?
- Reconsider what Clausewitz means when he says that all strategic success is at base tactical success, and that combat is the only effective force in war.
- How do Clausewitz’es arguments about attack and defense at tactical and strategic levels of analysis relate to each other?


- Why does Biddle believe that judgments about a nation’s power are likely to be wrong if they are derived from economic data about resources without an understanding of the nation’s military operational practices?
- Why haven’t all countries adopted the “modern system” of force employment?

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Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [25]:

- What are the advantages of offense-defense theory?
- Are the advantages greater for understanding nuclear strategy and deterrence than for understanding other strategic competitions (see section XI below)?
- Does Levy effectively discredit offense-defense theory?

Michael Shaara, *The Killer Angels* (Ballantine, 1975) [355].

- How does this docu-novel illustrate issues and theoretical concepts considered elsewhere in the course, for example the relative advantages of attack and defense, the political effects of specific military engagements, and so on?
- The Armies: Shaara presents a contrast between the two armies’ sociology, culture, and ideology. Did these differences affect combat, and thereby, political results of the war?
- The Men: What effect did “the Cause” have on leadership in the two armies? What effect did personality have on command decisions?
- The Decisions: Who was right about strategy: Lee or Longstreet? What is the best case for the opposite answer? What was Buford’s dilemma? What could have justified him in making a different decision? What was Chamberlain’s most important decision?
- The Battle: Was Gettysburg a “decisive battle”? What is the best case for the opposite answer? What counterfactual history must be assumed for either argument?

VII. **Ends and Means in Total War and Limited War** [362 pp.]

*Estimating Costs, Benefits, and Feasibility*
*Estimating the Culminating Point of Victory*
*Total War: World Wars I and II*
*Limited War: Korea and Kuwait*
*Total or Limited? Iraq II*

Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VII, chap. 22; Book VIII, chaps. 1-3, 6 [32].

- What are the risks in overshooting or undershooting the “culminating point of victory”?
- If “absolute” war is not “real” war, what is the point of understanding the concept of absolute war?
- Why does Clausewitz hammer so hard and in such detail on the principle that war must serve policy? How does the concept of absolute war relate to this question?


- Why and how does the proper relation between policy objectives, strategy, and military operations become compromised or even reversed?
- What would Clausewitz have thought of the strategic performance of his country in the century after his death?


- Were the allies’ World War II strategic decisions rational? If so, why did American military leaders oppose some of them? If not, why did political leaders make such decisions?

- How does the ending of the war against Iraq in 1991 illustrate important political effects of friction in military operations?
- Did that war end satisfactorily? By what criteria?


- How does the second war against Iraq compare with the first?
- What factors in leadership, planning, political judgment, or military capability best account for the differences?


- How did the Bush II administration come to change strategy in the course of war in Iraq?
- Did the means change, or the ends change, or both?
- Ricks titles his account of the shift *The Gamble*. How high should the estimated odds of success be to justify such a gamble?

**Wednesday, October 21: Mid-Term Examination**

VIII. **Unconventional Warfare and Terrorism** [359 pp.]

*People’s War, Counterinsurgency, and Incentives for “Asymmetric” Strategies*
*Linkages Between Conventional and Unconventional War*
*Stealth, Strength, and Advantages of Attack Over Defense*
*Secular and Sacred Motivations*


- What differences does Clausewitz see between “the people in arms” and the other forms of warfare that he discusses?


- Summers frames the Vietnam War in terms of Clausewitz. Is any other interpretation of Clausewitz relevant, and might it lead to a different conclusion?
- What does Summers believe the center of gravity was for each side?
- What is Summers’ strongest argument?
- What is his weakest argument?

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), chaps. 1, 6-8, 10 [109].

- What does Krepinevich believe the center of gravity was?
- Who is more convincing: Summers or Krepinevich?
- What is the main difference in their descriptions of U.S. strategy in Vietnam?
- Can the two interpretations be reconciled in any way?
- Could the Vietnam War have been won by the USA and Saigon government if either Summers’es or Krepinevich’es preferred strategies had been fully adopted?
Betts, ed., Conflict After the Cold War [92]:
T. E. Lawrence, “Science of Guerrilla Warfare”
Mao Tse-tung, “On Guerrilla Warfare”
Samuel P. Huntington, “Patterns of Violence in World Politics”
Martha Crenshaw, “The Strategic Logic of Terrorism”
Mark Juergensmeyer, “Religious Radicalism and Political Violence.”
Marc Sageman, “Jihadi Networks of Terror”
Osama bin Ladin, “Speech to the American People.”

• What are the differences between “conventional” warfare and unconventional/guerrilla/insurgent/irregular/asymmetric warfare?
• Is guerrilla warfare a substitute for conventional military operations?
• How does terrorism relate to unconventional war?
• By what criteria can terrorism be judged strategically rational?
• Are there effective strategic alternatives to terrorism? to guerrilla war?


• How does Post’s diagnosis compare with Crenshaw’s or Sageman’s?
• Are the differences fundamental disagreements, or related to the different times and groups on which the three authors focus?

David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (Oxford University Press, 2009), chap. 1 [38]

• How is Kilcullen’s idea of guerrilla war different from those of previous authors?
• What mistakes does he believe the USA has made in its approach to counterinsurgency?

Ricks, The Gamble, pp.140-143 [4].

• Will adoption of Kilcullen’s approach win the USA’s war in Iraq?


• If Ward is right, are the other authors in this section misleading as a guide to a superpower’s military strategy in the 21st century?

Required Film: See before the end of section VIII: The Battle of Algiers (1967), directed by Gilo Pontecorvo, screenplay by Franco Solinas. Remember that the French did not consider Algeria a colony, but part of metropolitan France (it had about a million European settlers). Although fiction, several characters are composites of real figures (one of the FLN leaders plays himself in the movie). The realism of this film is demonstrated by the fact that after early showings the producers had to insert a notice at the beginning that it was not a documentary. While obviously pro-FLN, the film is also unusual in the extent to which it does not demonize the French, but empathizes with them.

• Were the tactics used on either or both sides illegitimate? Does the legitimacy or illegitimacy of terror or torture depend on the nature of the tactics or the justice of the cause they serve?
• By what criteria were tactics employed effective or counterproductive?
• Could either side have won without using those tactics? How are the issues of legitimacy and efficacy related?
• How are terrorism and guerrilla warfare related?
• How are the issues posed by Al Qaeda or the Taliban today similar and different from those in this case?
• Is Colonel Mathieu’s character evil, admirable, tragic, or something else?
• How do the French and FLN strategies reflect Huntington’s points about the “tripartite” nature of revolutionary war or Mao’s points about guerrillas and population being “fish” and “sea”?
• Did the Bush II administration learn the wrong lessons from this film?
IX. **Society, Polity, Culture, and Capability**

*Nationalism, State Expansion, and Social Mobilization*

*Civil-Military Relations*

*Recruitment, Conscription, Organization*

*Culture and Combat Effectiveness*

*Combat Motivation: When Fighting Can Get One Killed, What Makes One Fight?*

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [38]:

Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War”

Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars”

Radha Kumar, “The Troubled History of Partition.”

- Do Mansfield and Snyder discredit “democratic peace” theory?
- Who is more convincing – Kaufmann or Kumar? What counterfactual histories do you assume in making your judgment?

Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (Summer 1948) [35].

- Why did the *Wehrmacht* hold together and continue fighting like wild dogs even after defeat was practically certain?

Omer Bartov, *Hitler’s Army* (Oxford University Press, 1991), chaps. 3-4 [119].

- Why does Bartov disagree with Shils and Janowitz?
- Can the two interpretations be reconciled?


- If Arab military personnel fight so bravely, why does Pollack believe that Arab military organizations are ineffective in combat?
- What explanations other than cultural ones might there be?

X. **When Is War Murder? The Moral Calculus of Killing**

*Absolute vs. Utilitarian Criteria*

*Atrocities: Cold Blood and Passion*

*Are Some Lives Worth More Than Others?*

*Is Terrorism Ever Legitimate?*


- In what respects does Walzer deny that utilitarian or consequentialist criteria should govern standards for legitimate killing?
- In what respects does he accept such criteria?
- When does he believe that killing civilians is legitimate?
- Are his arguments consistent?

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- What are the motives for mass killing of civilians?
- Are the conditions promoting strategies of mass killing rare or common?
- What are the best ways to prevent or stop mass killing?

Paul Fussell, “Thank God for the Atom Bomb,” in Fussell, *Thank God for the Atom Bomb and Other Essays* (Summit Books, 1988) [22].

- Who is more convincing – Walzer or Fussell?

**Required Film:** See before lectures for section X: *Saving Private Ryan* (1998), directed by Stephen Spielberg, screenplay by Robert Rodat. Look at the first 25-minutes (the assault on Omaha Beach) as one of the least unrealistic of Hollywood portrayals of combat. (Paul Fussell approved heartily of this sequence.) Look at the rest of the film as an evocation of dilemmas about risking, deliberately spending, or wrongfully taking lives in wartime.

- How should decisions to spend lives be made? By what criteria?
- Whose decisions to spend lives in this venture were right or wrong?
- Did the Americans who shot surrendering Germans while overrunning the bunkers on Omaha Beach commit a war crime that should have been prosecuted?
- Was Upham right or wrong about whether to kill the prisoner the first time the question arose? The second time?

**XI. The Nuclear Revolution: Theory and Practice** [117 pp.]

*Nuclear Weapon Effects*
*Deterrence and Compellence*
*Rationality, Uncertainty, and Credibility*
*Limited War and Escalation*
*Nuclear War Plans and Operational Doctrine*
*Cold War Crises*

Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 3d Ed. (Palgrave, 2003), chaps. 6-9, 12, 14-16 [117].

- What are the basic concepts of deterrence theory?
- What were the main changes in ideas and policies about nuclear strategy in the second half of the 20th century?
- What are the arguments for and against counterforce targeting, and for and against resting nuclear strategy on capability for “assured destruction”?
- How did NATO strategy for the defense of Western Europe affect the development of nuclear strategy?
- How much did actual practice in nuclear strategy reflect the dominant concepts of theorists?
- Can nuclear strategy be rational? What would Clausewitz think about nuclear weapons?
- Which aspects of Cold War deterrence theory and nuclear strategy are transferable to the 21st century and which are not? What does your answer assume about future developments in international politics and military technology?
XII. Threat Assessment and Defense Planning

Aggression or Security Dilemma?
Intentions and Capabilities
Deterrence and Provocation
Intelligence and Uncertainty
Strategic Assumptions and U.S. Force Planning


• How do the respective rationales of Crowe, Sanderson, and Henderson in the Munich crisis documents below, reflect the dilemmas of deterrence and crisis management?
• Is there a strategic concept for resolving such dilemmas?
• If British, French, and Russian statesmen had acted more in line with Sanderson’s and Henderson’s thinking, might World War I have been avoided?

Documents 551, 553, and 650 on the Munich crisis in E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., assisted by Margaret Lambert, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 3d Series, vol. II: 1938 (London: HMSO, 1949) [7].

• Is it a good idea to empathize with an adversary? Is it easy to have empathy without sympathy?
• When a threat is uncertain, which emphasis in policy – deterrence or reassurance – is least risky?
• If British, French, and Soviet statesmen in 1938 had acted more in line with Crowe’s logic, might they have resisted Hitler earlier?


• Where does Ikenberry’s argument fit among the theories surveyed in sections II and III?
• What is the most important word that does not appear anywhere in this article?


• Is the possibility of deliberate aggression by China what the West should worry about most?
• What historical analogies are least misleading in estimating the odds of conflict between China and the West?


• How do the strategic alternatives discussed relate to theories surveyed in sections II and III?
• Which of the four general strategies outlined make the most and least sense?
• Where do the strategies of the Bush II and Obama administrations fit in the Posen-Ross framework?
• Is there a fifth general model that is truly different conceptually from the four outlined – one not subsumable under any of them -- that should be added to the list?
XIII. **Arms Control**

*Political, Economic, and Military Rationales for Arms Regulation*
*Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Cold War Negotiations*
*Conventional Forces: “Defense Dominance”?
*Arms Trade*
*Costs and Benefits of Regulation*
*Regional Conflicts and Incentives for Proliferation*
*WMD After the Cold War: Biological, Chemical, Nuclear*

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*  [21]:
Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. and Abram N. Shulsky, “Arms Control: The Historical Experience”

• What are the best, most successful examples of arms control?
• How can arms control have perverse effects?
• What prospective arms control projects would avoid unanticipated consequences and be a good idea?
• What are the best counterarguments to Waltz’s benign view of nuclear proliferation?

XIV. **Conclusion: Evolving Bases of Conflict and Cooperation**

*Religion*
*Power Without Force?*
*Information Warfare*
*Non-Lethal Weaponry*
*Theories, Experience, and Prediction*
*A “Revolution in Military Affairs”?*
*Environmental Sources of Conflict*
*Culture and Conflict*


• Why did the concept of the RMA have such appeal?

Biddle, *Military Power*, chap. 10  [18].

• How does Biddle challenge the idea of the RMA?
• Who is more convincing – Cohen or Biddle?


• In what respects do and do not robotics constitute an RMA?

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*  [25]:
Thomas Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict”
Samuel P. Huntington, "Peace Among Civilizations?"

• What should be the standards for categorizing environmental dangers as security threats?
• Are attempts to spread western values good or bad for peace?

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Selected Supplementary Readings

The following are listed for bibliographical purposes, for students specializing in security studies, and are not in any way required for W4895. Not all readings on this syllabus, especially in this section, are listed because their arguments are correct or convincing; indeed, some are quite wrong. They are listed as examples of ideas that have been influential at some time.


I. Introduction: Nature and Functions of War


II. Causes of War and Peace


Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (W.W. Norton, 1997).


Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight (MIT Press, 2005).


III. Securing Peace: Balance of Power and Institutions for Cooperation


John R. Bolton, "Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?" *Chicago Journal of International Law* (Fall 2000).


Ernst Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?" *World Politics* 5, no. 4 (July 1953).


IV. The Choice of War or Peace


Benjamin S. Lambeath, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo (RAND, 2001).

Ernest R. May and Phillip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Harvard University Press, 1997).


Wallace Thies, When Governments Collide (University of California Press, 1980).


John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich: Prologue to Tragedy (Macmillan, 1948).

V. Modern War: Constraints, Conditions, Conduct


Thomas L. McNaugher, New Weapons, Old Politics (Brookings Institution, 1989).


Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics (Harcourt, Brace, 1942).

Monica Duffy Toft, "Indivisible Territory, Geographic Concentration, and Ethnic War," Security Studies 12, no. 2 (Winter 2002/3).

VI. Policy, Strategy, and Operations: Integrating Political Ends and Military Means


Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry Posen, Israel's Strategic Doctrine, R-2845-NA (RAND Corporation, September 1981).

Richard K. Betts, "Must War Find a Way?" International Security 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999).


VII. Ends and Means in Total War and Limited War

Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War (Harper, 1950).


Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944 (Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959).


VIII. Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare


Christopher Harmon, “Five Strategies of Terrorism,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 12, no. 3 (Autumn 2001).


Ian O. Lessner et al., *Countering the New Terrorism* (RAND 1999).


IX. Society, Polity, Culture, and Capability


Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Greenwood, 1982).


Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture (Doubleday, 2001).


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