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Jihad in West Africa and the Congress of Vienna

Paul E. Lovejoy

This paper has its genesis in the realization that scholarship has not necessarily been crossing boundaries, particularly in the incorporation of African history into mainstream global history, and therefore the nature of the discourse on important subjects has frequently been neglected.¹ This is a particularly serious problem in the contemporary world when militancy and aggressive confrontation have characterized the relations between Muslims who refuse to accept complacency and toleration when global capitalism and western domination perpetuate inequities and injustice. Ignorance and simplistic interpretation characterize the CNN approach to the coverage of the news. Efforts to control resources – petroleum, minerals, agricultural production, labor migration – reinforce the wealth of the few who control companies and receive the support of countries who advance the interests of capitalist resources. This is done in the name of free enterprise in what is factually restrictive and monopolistic concentrations of wealth in the hands of elites that profit from corruption and secret arrangements that benefit the few. Whether or not altruistic motives or occasional acts of generosity are implemented through donations that cleanse dirty money by attaching the names of the rich to institutions that guarantee a place in history is beside the point. This is the context of Boko Haram. [SLIDE ONE – BOCO HARAM]

The role of Islam in the modern world is often misunderstood, and the role of Islam in West Africa even more so. The terrorism of al-Qaeda and its affiliates in northern Mali and southern Algeria is attributed to an infusion of foreign ideas from the Middle East without recognition of the long tradition of Muslim resistance and political fervor in the region itself that stems from the poverty imposed by political decisions. Similarly, the murderous path of Boko Haram in Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon is approached with a shocking sense of discovery that fails to recognize a long tradition of Islamic radicalism that is home grown, including the earlier Maitatsine movement, despite whatever role played by pan-Islamic influences. The dynamic forces that are in place as a response to globalization and military solutions that are much more devastating than the evil that is targeted are far from revolutionary in the solutions that are prescribed. One only has to look at the attitudes towards women to see that misogyny is a central feature of the response. In a post-socialist world, polarization has produced a new dialectic whose outcome is far from certain. [SLIDE TWO – DETAILS ON BOCO HARAM]

The focus of this paper is on the past, not the current manifestations of *jihad* and the global contradictions of enormous population growth, the tremendous advances in technology and scientific discovery, and the unexplained concentration of wealth and power in the hands of tiny elites who have the means of perpetuating position. Understanding the past *jihad* movement in West Africa must be understood, because the evolution of human society seems determined to find new ways of not learning from the past and relying on ignorance and subterfuge when the amount of new knowledge that has emerged is actually accelerating in its quantity, without any significant corresponding impact on the body politic. The more we learn through scientific enquiry, the less we seem to understand. The exposition of past *jihad* is essential in understanding how *jihad* continues to have strong appeal in West Africa, as does the intensive

militancy of Islam in other contexts in the Middle East, East Africa and indeed in Britain, North America and elsewhere amply demonstrate. The long tradition of Islam in West Africa is my starting point. [SLIDE THREE – HISTORIC MOSQUES]

Eric Hobsbawm described the period between c. 1775 and 1850 as the “age of revolutions” that marked a turning point in modern history.² For Hobsbawm and subsequent historians, revolution altered the course of world history, or at least that part of the world centered on Europe and by extension the Americas and what has come to be known as the Atlantic World. The political transformations that undermined autocratic and aristocratic governance were matched by economic change, especially the intensification of industrialization and the emergence of the modern global economy. The powerful arguments supporting this view of historical change challenge scholars of Africa and the African diaspora to understand how people of African descent fitted into this period of history. Clearly, the St. Domingue revolution and many slave revolts that occurred during the age of revolutions can be understood to be part of the historical trend identified by Hobsbawm. Indeed Eugene Genovese has argued as much, envisioning the St. Domingue revolution as a turning point in the history of resistance to slavery. According to Genovese, resistance before the St. Domingue uprising idealized a politically independent African past while subsequently the enslaved population concentrated on overthrowing the system of slavery not by establishing enclaves of restoration of some reconstructed African past.³ As David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam have noted, the term “age of revolutions” is one of “the most enduring period markers known to modern historians and has often been used by scholars invested in identifying pivotal moments in the emergence of a putatively modern world.”⁴

What is not clear is how the African regions that bordered the Atlantic and the people who constituted the African diaspora in the Americas related to the global pattern that is identified as the age of revolutions in the Atlantic world. According to Joseph C. Miller, the age of revolutions was only “one phase in a longer cycle of militarization and commercialization in the greater Atlantic world that becomes visible when the dynamics of African, rather than Euro-American history are used to define and calibrate the dimensions of transformation.”⁵ Miller’s view is completely misguided. From his perspective, the homelands and regions of origin of the enslaved were not involved in the age of revolutions but rather on the periphery of global events. It is perhaps then not surprising that Africa has largely been excluded from the discussion of the Atlantic world and the era of revolutions, except when enslaved Africans were taken to the Americas and expressed their resistance to slavery.⁶ The purpose of my forthcoming book, *Jihad in West Africa during the Age of Revolutions*, is to introduce African history into this discourse of revolutionary change by focussing on the impact of *jihad* in West Africa. The aim is examine how the homelands of enslaved Africans can be brought into the discussion. The period of revolutions in the narrowly defined “Atlantic” world of western Europe and the Americas coincided with an era of *jihad* that was much more than simply being part of Miller’s “longer cycle of militarization and commercialization.” The fact that Africa was not involved in the discourse that centers on the Congress of Vienna was made amply clear by Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch’s presentation yesterday.

Clearly, the economic consequences of the Atlantic slave trade in the development of the global economy were profound, long ago recognized by Eric Williams. Barbara Solow, who provides one of the best overviews in recent book, has outlined many issues relating to the relative importance of slavery in the economic transformation of the Atlantic world and western Europe, but without any consideration of the African dimension of slavery. Her complete silence

on African history, not just the *jihad* movement, suggests that her analysis has to be taken much further than she has dared to go.⁷ What constituted the Atlantic world in this period, and why is most if not all of Africa excluded from discussion of that conception? It is perhaps not surprising that the idea of Atlantic history has received considerable criticism but the place of Africa in a global perspective is still largely ignored. While David Armitage has even sarcastically proclaimed the “we are all Atlanticists now,” his work hardly lives up to that claim when it comes to a consideration of Africa.⁸ James Sidbury and Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra have even challenged what is meant by “Africa,” rather than trying to comprehend how Atlantic Africa fitted into the Atlantic world, and if it did fit at all.⁹ Despite the asymmetrical relationships that characterized the regions that bordered the Atlantic Ocean, it can still be asked what those relationships entailed and why so many scholars have avoided a meaningful discussion. The considerable interest in the origins of enslaved Africans and their influence on the development of the “creole” societies of the Americas might suggest that the study of the Atlantic World would have corrected this distortion, but it has not. In fact this interest in the origins of enslaved Africans rarely includes an understanding of the historical context in which people were enslaved in Africa, marched to the coast, and sold to the ships destined to cross the Atlantic. Yet this migration occurred during the “age of revolutions,” and Africans and people of African descent played a major role in the events of the Caribbean, North America, Brazil and Hispanic America, and indeed in the abolition movement against the slave trade and slavery.

Cultural influences, such as the religious practices and beliefs of the Yoruba, the resistance of slaves and the assignment of ethnicity to resistance, as with Akan in Jamaica, and the cultural links between Brazil and Angola, as expressed in *capoeira*, have been central in the study of slavery and its legacies. Although we know the regions of Africa from where people came, too often the African component is amorphous, timeless, and devoid of the rigorous methodology of historical analysis, except among specialists who have not been concerned with how African regions fitted or did not into the age of revolutions, let alone why Africa did not fit into the discussion of the Congress of Vienna. The slave trade or the trade in blacks – and the subject of this conference – was a theme of the Congress, but that did not involve the countries of Africa. My contention is that historians of slavery in the Americas and the study of resistance to slavery in the age of revolutions have virtually ignored, or if not ignored often misinterpreted, and almost always misrepresent the historical context in which a significant proportion of the population of the Americas traced its origins. This observation applies to all parts of Africa.

However my aim here is to draw attention to the *jihad* movement and how it can be incorporated into the reconstruction of the Atlantic world and the age of revolutions. Any conception of the “Atlantic” world has to include those parts of Africa that actually bordered the Atlantic and thereby helped to define the geographical boundaries of analysis. The “Atlantic world” does extend to the Americas from England, France, Spain, and Portugal, but the connections are not just to Brazil, the Caribbean, Hispanic America and North America, but also to various parts of West Africa, and indeed Angola and Mozambique, whose involvement in the era of revolutions should be considered because of the links of these areas to the Atlantic world. Indeed, without the forced migration of Africans to the Americas, there would not have been an Atlantic world. Miller’s *longue durée* is misconceived and distorted.

The focus here is on the *jihad* movement of West Africa and specifically the consolidation of states that were founded in *jihad* that came to dominate much of West Africa during the same period as the “Age of Revolutions.” It is argued that, like western Europe and the Americas, the history of West Africa was also characterized by an age of revolutionary

change that resulted in the overthrow of virtually all established governments, the restructuring of society in fundamental ways, and a shift in the ideological underpinnings of the social formation. Although *jihad* was not inspired by the same sentiments and forces that characterized the history of Europe and the Americas, there were important similarities and interactions that provide a new perspective on the Atlantic world and the age of revolutions in a global context. The *jihad* movement affected the forms and intensity of slave resistance in the Americas, particularly in Bahia but with reverberations from the Christmas uprising in Jamaica to the Civil War in the United States. The intention is to demonstrate how the West African *jihads* helped shape the Atlantic world and therefore why this history should be incorporated into the analysis of the “age of revolutions.”

When the *jihad* movement was first identified as a “neglected theme” in West African history in the 1960s, the focus of African historical research was on Christian missions, European colonialism, and the nationalist thrust towards independence. Since then, it can be legitimately claimed that the study of Islamic Africa has become a major theme of historical research and analysis, but unfortunately that analysis has often been ignored in the historiography of the Americas, despite important exceptions such as the work of Michael Gomez, Sylviane Diouf and others. Or the work on biographies of enslaved Muslims, such as my study with Robin Law of the life of Mahommah Gardo Baquaqua [SLIDE OF BAQUAQUA AND HIS JOURNEY] The extensive research that has been undertaken in the last generation has literally transformed our understanding of African history, especially those areas where Islam was predominant. Moreover, with access to the huge libraries of Timbuktu and many other centers, the amount of available documentation has simply mushroomed, with the result that the study of Islamic West Africa will continue to be subjected to revision and further analysis. Islamic Africa, and specifically including sub-Saharan Africa, has come into its own, even without the attention that radical Islam in the form of al-Shaab, Boko Harum and other manifestations of contemporary *jihad* have brought to bear. Despite the recognition that the Islamic presence is so substantial, the history of Islam in West Africa has not entered the mainstream of historical analysis. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the silence of historians on West Africa during the age of revolutions, which is seen as focused on Europe and the Atlantic world to the exclusion of Africa, and indeed Asia, with some important exceptions presented here at this conference.

An overview of *jihad* in West Africa identifies the revolutionary movements first of Senegambia, beginning in the late seventeenth century but particularly from the 1780s when a tradition of *jihad* had become firmly established with the founding of Fuuta Bundu, Futa Jalon and Futa Toro. The Sokoto Caliphate, which is hardly on the lips of most historians, other than specialists of Africa, was founded in *jihad* in 1804-1808 under the dynamic leadership of Uthman dan Fodio, his son and his brother. I want ask the fundamental question why so little is known about the momentous events in West Africa when so much is known about the events in Europe and the Americas during the same period. By the time of the Congress of Vienna, the Sokoto Caliphate had emerged as the largest state in Africa since the collapse of the medieval Songhay Empire in 1591-92. [SLIDE –MAP OF SOKOTO caliphate] Led by Muslim scholars affiliated with the Qadiriyya brotherhood, these *jihads* completely transformed West Africa. The Sokoto *jihad* was the most dramatic and successful of the *jihads*. Between 1804 and 1808, the jihadists overthrew all the governments of the Hausa states, including Gobir, Zamfara, Kano, Katsina, Zaria and Kebbi; by 1810, the *jihad* had undermined the Borno state, which had to rebuild after the destruction of its heavily populated capital district; thereupon, *jihad* swept

through Nupe, toppling its ancient government and initiate a period of civil war that eventually resulted in the incorporation of Nupe into the Caliphate in the decade after 1810 and then from 1817 to 1823 led to the inclusion of Ilorin and ultimately the destruction of the Yoruba empire of Oyo. [SLIDE SHOWING INTERIOR IN c. 1780]

The year 1817 was propitious because it marked a transition. In that year, the leader of the movement, Uthman dan Fodio died and was succeeded by his son, Muhammad Bello, and his brother, Abdullahi dan Fodio. At the same time, a major uprising that protested the transition was crushed in Zamfara; moreover, an uprising in the military of Oyo, the major Yoruba state to the south, spread *jihad* into the Yoruba region, ultimately destroying Oyo by 1836. Finally, *jihad* spread to the middle Niger River valley south of Timbuktu and the emergence of another *jihad* state, the caliphate of Hamdullahi, which initially owed its allegiance to Sokoto but broke with Sokoto over doctrinal issues. Nonetheless, by 1817, *jihad* had become the dominant revolutionary movement in West Africa. The independent, non-Muslim states on the coast, including Asante and Dahomey, were challenged by this *jihad*. The leadership in Asante staged a coup d'état against the reigning king, Asantehene Bonsu in 1806, because of his alleged sympathies to the *jihad* movement, and Dahomey imposed restrictions on the movements of Muslims within its territories and otherwise responded to the collapse of Oyo by asserting its independence. In summary, the *jihad* movement had an impact on virtually all of West Africa that was comparable in scope and geographical extent as the revolutionary era of western Europe and the revolutionary changes in the Americas.

The proposition that is pursued here is simple: how are we to understand the age of revolutions from the end of the eighteenth century through the middle of the nineteenth century without considering the course of *jihad* in West Africa during the same period? Why is it that parallel developments are not examined? Why do scholars continue to interpret the West African experience in simplistic terms, unless they are specialists, when there is a vast literature that is accessible and easy to understand? Why do scholars refer to “Islamicized Africans,” a frequent barbarism to describe people who were actually Muslims when the same scholars do not use the same conceptual framework and do not refer to “Christianized Europeans” when they discuss Europeans who might not only be Christians but also might be Jewish? Why is such conceptual weakness tolerated when the same scholars make sure that sound historical standards are applied in accepting articles for learned journals like the *American Historical Review* or the *William and Mary Quarterly*? Somehow there are conceptual blockages of perceiving the Atlantic world as a framework that incorporates Africa into the picture. I consider this a failure of scholarly discourse.

The consequence of the age of revolutions in Europe and the Americas transformed political structures and laid the foundations for economic development in western Europe and the Atlantic world, but also, despite the failure to include an analysis of Africa in the Eurocentric paradigm, was challenged and transformed from within Africa. These transformations emanating from Europe and the Americas led to European colonial imperialism and imposed racialized interpretations of history that prevail to this day through the terminology that is employed in discussing the “other” and the means of verifying major historical changes through the exclusion of Africa. One profound example stands out when the *jihad* movement is put into global context. The changes that emerged during the age of revolutions introduced what Dale Tomich has called a “second slavery” in the Americas, particularly in the USA, Brazil and Cuba, despite revolutionary changes that undermined monarchies, sometimes promoted more representative governments, and propelled economic change and technological advancement.¹⁰ As Tomich has

argued, slavery continued despite revolutionary changes and indeed propelled economic growth in the Atlantic world, an Atlantic world which for Tomich does not include Africa, I want to hasten to add that this analysis stops abruptly when a global view is required. *Jihad* was also responsible for the continuation of slavery in West Africa on a massive scale.

The *jihad* states of West Africa experienced an intensification of slavery that was astonishing. We can look at some basic figures, estimates to be sure, that demonstrate that the *jihad* states had more slaves in the early nineteenth century than all the countries of Tomich's "second slavery" in the Americas combined, and more slaves than at any time in the history of the Americas, the Caribbean, Brazil and the United States combined. This level of slavery in West Africa has been known for a long time and has been almost entirely ignored. [SLIDE SHOWING SLAVE POPULATION OF WESTERN SUDAN] The contours of my argument hinge on my interpretation of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the possible numbers of enslaved Muslims and the population that was enslaved by Muslims and their proportion in the estimates for migration in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. I estimate that no more than 8 percent of all enslaved Africans were Muslims or came from areas dominated by Muslims throughout the entire period of trans-Atlantic slavery, in contrast to the great number of enslaved who came from Bantu speaking areas, Igbo and Ibibio areas, and parts of West Africa that were not part of the Muslim world. I compare these admittedly very rough projections with equally challenging attempts to estimate the enslaved populations of the Muslim states of West Africa during the period of revolutions. Whatever factors of error that are contained in these projections, there is one startling conclusion that is not widely recognized. There were as many slaves in West Africa as in the Americas. There were more slaves in the *jihad* states than in Brazil or the United States, and the enslaved population in Cuba was relatively small by comparison.

Moreover, the "second slavery" of the *jihad* states was related to intensive economic development that was centered on the following:

1. Urbanization [SLIDE OF KANO] – the Sokoto Caliphate alone encompassed 34 emirates and numerous subemirates, each centered on a walled city; Kano alone had at least 40 walled towns within a 50 km radius of the capital city of the emirate.
 2. A substantial majority of the enslaved populations of the Caliphate was located on plantations, some of which were substantial, housing as many as 500 or more slaves. These estates grew agricultural commodities, first and foremost grain, bulrush millet and sorghum, but also cotton, tobacco, tree crops, and many other agricultural goods.
 3. The textile industry was the backbone of industrial development. There were an estimated 15,000 indigo dye outs centers in and around Kano alone, with an estimated work force of 50,000. Virtually all women in the Caliphate were involved in the carding of cotton and the spinning of thread.
 4. The leather industry was also highly developed, making shoes, bags, horse and camel gear, cushions, and loin clothes for the enslaved population
 5. Other sectors included salt processing and production, blacksmithing, silver work
- Hence the slaves of West Africa were growing cotton, like the USA, and they were growing tobacco, and even some sugar cane, although not much. These were crops destined for regional markets, perhaps not for sale to Europe but still monetarized. Capitalistic impulses were directed according to Islamic law, but were nonetheless entrepreneurial. The differences between the Islamic states of slavery and the Americas are worth exploring, but not at the expense of ignoring the need for comparison.

How are we to understand the contradiction between revolution and intensified exploitation through a “second slavery” that emerged in the *jihad* states of West Africa? The contradictions of political reform and restorationist reaction in Europe and the Americas have to consider the equally contradictory movements that prevailed in the regions dominated by Islam. The impact of industrialization and economic growth was indeed global, but there were countervailing forces at work in the world in which there were attempts to achieve similar intensified economic growth, as outlined in my book with respect to the Muslim countries of West Africa. To the extent that such transformations occurred during a time that political revolution was current throughout the broad Atlantic world that usually excludes West Africa has to account for the expansion of economies in areas dominated by Muslim governments in West Africa and indeed elsewhere. This is not to say that the various trajectories were the result of the same causes or shaped the course of events in a common global pattern, but any attempt to understand contemporary Muslim extremism has to consider that there was a period in the past when the age of revolutions was shadowed by the age of *jihad*.

My approach relies on a methodology that I have characterized as an alternative perspective to a Eurocentric bias that can discuss Muslim converts when there is no proof of any conversion or “Islamized” structures and people when nothing was “Islamized” in the way that is intended in such descriptions, because things, institutions, and people were already Muslim. There was no process underway which can be described as “Islamization” even if what was emanating from Europe was “Christianization” and “Europeanization” in the imperial and colonial contexts that explain subjugation and domination. Who was a Muslim and who was not was and is easy to determine, even if Muslims disagree over whose interpretation of Islam is legitimate and whose is not. People did convert. That is not the issue, but when, where, and why conversion occurred requires an understanding of historical context. The relevant historical questions relate to interpretation, not to conversion. In West Africa, the Qadiriyya *tariqa*, a *sufi* order of interpretation, was dominant during the era of *jihad*. That does not mean that everyone was an adherent to the Qadiriyya or accepted its *wird*, that is, its path. Depending on context, people behaved as Muslims in some situations and might not in others. Behavior was defined by prayer, in Arabic, profession of monotheism and recognition of the Prophet Muhammad, as well as the practice of certain customs relating to Ramadan, fasting, and communal celebration. Religious leaders who were literate in Arabic and taught children and adults the rudiments and advanced sciences had to be acknowledged as leaders of the community, whether seen locally in the specific context of a town or section of a town or broadly in terms of the world of Islam. Relations between males and females were subjected to norms that were written and based on the Shari’a, as well as how these were interpreted through tradition. Local customs and practices were respected; however, there was a strong tendency to condemn human sacrifice, the veneration of spirits associated with trees, rocks, hills and other natural phenomena, the eating of pork, drinking, smoking and the condemnation of human greed through the collection of interest, speculation, and hoarding. Individuals could and did express what they believed in situational contexts, which sometimes violated what others might condemn as unorthodox. Slavery was a complicating factor in understanding how Islam was understood because of the emphasis on the status of free born Muslims as being inherently protected from enslavement and the social ostracism associated with the lack of kinship. However, to discuss the societal relationships in terms of conversion or a process of “Islamization” does not grasp the historical context and only imposes a discourse that is foreign and that cannot be documented.

There is a further confusion that is confronted in my forthcoming book which relates to ethnicity and even now, after decades of intensive research, what is sometimes pejoratively designated as “tribal.” I have previously attempted to present a more sophisticated analytical approach and perspective on understanding identity in the context of West Africa, which I have characterized as a “methodology through the ethnic lens.” As I have explained, ethnicity is a complicated phenomenon which is situational. References in the sources to what are considered “ethnic” require explication to discover what is meant and what is not meant. Ethnicity is multi dimensional, both changing and not changing. Hausa and Mandinka have existed as identities related to language and culture for hundreds of years before the focus of my book. Identity was especially associated with language, not just religion. Patterns of facial and body scarification and cultural upbringing reinforced these identities over very wide geographical regions and involving very large populations. Hence, recognition of the ethnic factor is only the first step in analysis which must lead to disaggregation of context and to explanation of relationships to political structures and economic underpinnings that once may have been referred to as modes of production and social formations.

Many scholars have attempted to confront the perplexing dilemma of ethnic terminology that sometimes seems to confuse attempts to understand African history. This perplexity especially applies to scholars of the Atlantic world and scholars of slavery in the Americas when the same obfuscation does not seem to affect the analysis of Europeans, when there are no such problems of identification in the ongoing frictions among France, England, Spain, Portugal and other “European” countries. The origins of people, how people identified in different contexts, and the languages individuals spoke are repeatedly confused and often fused. The same methodology should be employed in deciphering meanings in European discourse should be employed. If we examine the age of revolutions as a unifying feature of history in the world of western Europe and the Americas, we need to understand the age of *jihad* in West Africa during the same period by unraveling meanings. The implications for appreciating the seriousness of contemporary *jihad* in the Islamic world, whether in West Africa or elsewhere, are profound. Such explication might help to explain why no African or Muslim country was represented at the Congress of Vienna in 1817 and why modern scholarship has chosen to go global without a solid empirical and analytical base in the Atlantic world of Africa. Africa evinced no simplistic *longue duree* as argued by Miller that was unlike the *longue duree* of warfare and strife that also characterized Europe and the European conquest of the Americas. The *longue duree* was one of war and subjugation everywhere. Why was the period of the so called age of revolutions so different is the issue that Miller ignores in peripherizing Africa and by extension Armitage, Tomich and the dominant interpretations of global history.

Where do Muslims show up in the Americas during the Age of Revolutions; how are we to perceive their involvement in that age? I want to close by putting individuals back into history and show several examples: first, as we all know, Muslims were responsible for the Males Uprising in Bahia in 1835, and indeed in a number of revolts in Bahia that begin in 1807, as documented by Joao Reis and Stuart Schwartz, among others. [SLIDE OF MUSLIMS IN BAHIA]. The role of Nago in the revolt has been emphasized by Joao Reis, the leading historian on the uprising. Second, I want to draw attention to Muhammad Kaba Saghanughu (1757-1845) from Bouka inland from Futa Jalon, who was taken to Jamaica in 1777, where he lived until his death in 1845 [SLIDE OF KABA’S KITAB AL-SALAT]. Known as Dick as a slave from 1777 to 1813, and then as Robert Peart, after the name of his deceased master, Kaba insisted on being called by his Muslim name in 1834. Two of his sons were executed after the Christmas uprising

in Jamaica in 1831-32. Third, I want to draw attention to Nicolas Sa'id from Borno [SLIDE OF NICOLAIS SA'ID]. He was the son of Barca Gana, one of the generals of the al-Kanemi regime of Borno, and governor of the Logone province of southern Borno, originally of Hausa origin; his wife of Mandara origin. He fought in the American Civil War. These examples show the intersection of the age of revolutions with the age of *jihad* . They demonstrate that a truly global approach to the era of the Congress of Vienna has to take into consideration an Africa and its history that cannot be excluded from a consideration of the Atlantic world. Hence discussions of the slave trade, or as the Congress of Vienna called it, the trade in blacks, has to examine countries and societies of Africa. The racialization of the discourse in the subtle shift from slave trade to trade in blacks at the Congress of Vienna cannot be allowed to carry over into historical analysis.

¹ An earlier version of the arguments in this paper was presented at the conference, “Les résistances à l’esclavage dans le monde atlantique français à l’ère des Révolutions (1750-1850),” McGill University, Montréal, 3-4 mai 2013 and the Congress of Vienna Conference last September. The arguments have been published as “*Jihad na África Ocidental durante a ‘Era das Revoluções’ – Rumor a um Diálogo com Eric Hobsbawm e Eugene Genovese,*” *Topoi: Revista de História*, 15:28 (2014), 22-67. I wish to thank Rina Cáceres for discussions that helped in the conceptualization of the forthcoming book. Myriam Cottias, Nielson Bezerra, Carlos da Silva, Jr., Elaine Moreira, Mariana Candido, Feisal Farah, Henry B. Lovejoy, Jennifer Lofkrantz, Suzanne Schwarz, Vanessa Oliveira, and Katrina Keefer made valuable comments and provided assistance in a variety of ways, from research to translation. I also wish to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Canada Research Chair in African Diaspora History, whose support for my research has been indispensable and is greatly appreciated. The basic thrust of this argument expands on *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), first published in 1983 and now in its third edition, and indeed my earlier discussion in 1979 at a conference organized by Michael Craton; see Lovejoy, “Indigenous African Slavery,” in Michael Craton ed., *Roots and Branches: Current Directions in Slave Studies* (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1979), 19-61, originally published in *Historical Reflections/ Reflexions Historiques*, 6:1 (1979), 19-61, with commentaries by Igor Kopytoff and Frederick Cooper, 62-83. The forthcoming book is being published by Ohio University Press.

² Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996 [1962]), ix.

³ Eugene Genovese, *From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the Making of the Modern World* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1979).

⁴ David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Introduction: The Age of Revolutions, c. 1760-1840 – Global Causation, Connection, and Comparison,” in Armitage and Subrahmanyam, eds., *The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760-1840* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), xii.

⁵ Armitage and Subrahmanyam, “Introduction,” xviii; and Joseph C. Miller, “The Dynamics of History in Africa and the Atlantic ‘Age of Revolutions,’” in Armitage and Subrahmanyam, *Age of Revolutions in Global Context*, 101-24.

⁶ For a reformulation of this perspective that Africa was only involved in the Atlantic world through the actions of the enslaved who were taken to the Americas, see Wim Klooster, “Slave

Revolts, Royal Justice, and a Ubiquitous Rumor in the Age of Revolutions,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 71:3 (2014), 401-24.

⁷ The brilliant insights of Barbara Solow in her analysis of the Eric Williams thesis have been conveniently combined, with additional analysis, in *The Economic Consequences of the Atlantic Slave Trade* (New York: Lexington Books, 2014).

⁸ David Armitage, “Three Concepts of Atlantic History,” in Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds., *The British Atlantic World, 1500–1800* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 11–27 (quotation, 11). See Patrick Griffin, “A Plea for a New Atlantic History,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 68:2 (2011), 236.

⁹ James Sidbury and Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, “Mapping Ethnogenesis in the Early Modern Atlantic,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 68:2 (2011), 181-208, but see Griffin, “New Atlantic History,” 236-39.

¹⁰ Dale W. Tomich, “The ‘Second Slavery’: Bonded Labor and the Transformations of the Nineteenth-Century World Economy,” in Francisco O. Ramírez, ed., *Rethinking the Nineteenth Century: Contradictions and Movement* (New York, 1988), 103–117; Dale W. Tomich, “The Wealth of the Empire: Francisco de Arango y Parreno, Political Economy, and the Second Slavery in Cuba,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 1 (2003), 4–28; Tomich, *Through the Prism of Slavery: Labor, Capital, and World Economy* (Boulder, CO, 2004). Also see Dale Tomich and Michael Zeuske (eds), *The Second Slavery: Mass Slavery, World-Economy, and Comparative Microhistories, Part II*, special issue of *Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center*, 31 (2008), Dale W. Tomich, “Atlantic History and World Economy: Concepts and Constructions,” *Proto Sociology: An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research*, 20 (2004), 102-21; and Michael Zeuske, “Historiography and Research Problems of Slavery and the Slave Trade in a Global-Historical Perspective,” *International Review of Social History* 57:1 (2012), 87-111.